Allen v. Vt. Dep't of Corr.

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David Allen, Plaintiff, v. Vermont Department of Corrections, Vital Core, James Baker, Nicholas Deml, Max Titus, Stephen Riendeau, Charles Pavlovic, Stephanie Kindred, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 5:21-cv-280

United States District Court, D. Vermont

August 24, 2023

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (DOC. 29)

KEVIN J. DOYLE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Plaintiff David Allen, proceeding pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for alleged violations of his civil rights regarding his medical treatment as a pretrial detainee at Southern State Correctional Facility (SSCF). Mr. Allen claims that Defendants have failed to properly manage his Type 1 diabetes since he entered SSCF, and that “he has endured denial of rights and privileges, attacks, . . . threats, harassment . . . physical violence, loss of property, and more,” resulting in daily deterioration of his physical and mental health. (Doc. 28 at 36.) Mr. Allen seeks an individually tailored diabetes treatment plan to include specific monitoring devices, weekly private consultations with the nurse of his choice, dental treatment from Clear Choice specialists, and permanent removal of several Defendants from employment with the State of Vermont or in the medical field among other claims. In addition, Mr. Allen seeks over $34 million in monetary damages. (Id. at 43-44.)

This Report and Recommendation addresses the second Motion to Dismiss by former Commissioner of the Vermont Department of Corrections (DOC) James Baker, current DOC Commissioner Nicholas Deml, and DOC Director of Health Services Max Titus (collectively “Defendants”).^[1] (Doc. 29.) Mr Allen brings claims against Defendants in their official and individual capacities. (Doc. 28 at 1-2.) As explained below I recommend GRANTING the Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSING Mr. Allen's claims against Defendants Baker, Deml, and Titus with prejudice.

Background

Mr. Allen filed the Amended Complaint on February 13, 2023. He alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and his Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care, among other allegations. (See Doc. 28 at 14-15, 37.) He claims that his diabetes care regimen was discontinued at the time of his arrest, and that SSCF staff has refused to reinstate the regimen since he came into DOC custody. Mr. Allen further alleges that various SSCF nurses and correctional officers have provided inadequate medical care to him, resulting in blackouts, seizures, shakes, confusion, weakness, sweating, difficulty breathing, gum disease, and loss of teeth, among other conditions. (Id. at 11.) He asserts that DOC staff and nurses have regularly abused him and intentionally moved him from cell to cell in order to place him with “problematic” inmates. (Id. at 16-17.) Mr. Allen claims to have endured prison attacks, threats, physical and sexual harassment, physical violence, loss of property, “and more” in retaliation for his efforts to bring about changes at SSCF. (Id. at 36.)

The forty-seven-page Amended Complaint references numerous individuals affiliated with SSCF and describes many allegedly unlawful incidents involving Mr. Allen. Regarding Defendants Baker, Deml, and Titus specifically, the Amended Complaint alleges that Mr. Allen has suffered “never[-]ending issues daily for the past two and a half plus years” because of their provision of inadequate medical and dental care to Allen. (Id. at 35.) Mr. Allen asserts that all three Defendants were aware of his medical concerns but did nothing to help him; and that Commissioner Deml ordered and allowed policies and procedures at SSCF that violate Mr. Allen's constitutional rights. (Id. at 28, 38-39.) Mr. Allen also claims that he wrote to Commissioner Baker about alleged deficiencies in the grievance process (id. at 8); that Director Titus rejected one of his grievances (id. at 9-10); and that all three Defendants “participated directly and indirectly in the continuous rights violations, pain and suffering, and harm that [Mr. Allen] has . . . endure[d] for more than two []and []a []half years” (id. at 11). Finally, Mr. Allen claims that Commissioner Deml ordered a “facility[-]wide shakedown” to train new prison employees, which involved strip-searching and handcuffing detainees and inmates. (Id. at 26.)

The Amended Complaint also makes brief reference to the ADA, contending that “insulin-dependent diabetes . . . meets all three prongs of the ADA's disability definition” (id. at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Mr. Allen alleges that he “has had several of his rights violated ([c]onstitutional, ADA, and other statutory)” (id. at 40). His request for injunctive relief includes “treatment from Clear Choice specialists,” the “abrupt[]” end to all harassment and abuse, provision of an “Omni Pod 6 insulin[] pump and compatible [D]excom 6 CGM [continuous glucose monitor],” and “weekly private consultations with the nurse of [Mr. Allen's] choice.” (Id. at 42.)

In an April 14, 2023 Order denying Mr. Allen's request for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, Chief Judge Crawford explained that “much of the relief Mr. Allen seeks is beyond this court's power to grant; the court cannot preemptively control each and every interaction Mr. Allen has at [SSCF] on a day-to-day basis.” (Doc. 30 at 8.) As the Court's Order denied Mr. Allen's request for injunctive relief, this Report and Recommendation does not address the requests for injunctive relief in the Amended Complaint.

Defendants request dismissal of Mr. Allen's claims on the following grounds: (1) the Eleventh Amendment bars claims for monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities; (2) Defendants in their official capacities are not “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) Mr. Allen has not adequately alleged that Defendants were personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivations, a required element of a § 1983 claim; (4) ADA claims cannot be maintained against government officials sued in their individual capacities; and (5) to the extent that Mr. Allen attempts to assert a negligence claim against Defendants, he must name the State as a party because Vermont law does not permit a cause of action for negligence against individual state employees. (See Doc. 29.) Mr. Allen's response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was docketed on June 14, 2023. (Doc. 32.)

Analysis

I. Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “provide the grounds upon which [its] claim rests.” ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007). A plaintiff must also allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This does not require a plaintiff to provide “detailed factual allegations” to support his claims, but the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. If the plaintiff “ha[s] not nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [his] complaint must be dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

In assessing the adequacy of the pleadings, the court must accept all factual assertions as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Wilson v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 671 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2011); ATSI Commc'ns, 493 F.3d at 98. The Court is not required to credit the complaint's “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, [which are] supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (“We are not . . . bound to accept conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Even after Iqbal and Twombly, the Court must construe a pro se complaint “liberally,” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), reading it “to raise the strongest arguments . . . suggest[ed],” Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This policy of liberally construing pro se submissions is driven by the understanding that ‘[i]mplicit in the right of self-representation is an obligation on the part of the court to make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights because of their lack of legal training.'” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)).

Therefore, in considering pro se complaints on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts “apply[] a more flexible standard to evaluate their sufficiency than [they] would when reviewing a complaint submitted by counsel.” Lerman v. Bd. of Elections in the City of N.Y., 232 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 2000). “This is particularly so when the pro se plaintiff alleges that h[is] civil rights have been violated.” Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008).

However even pro se litigants “remain subject to the general standard applicable to all civil complaints under the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal.” ...