Alley v. Foley Indus., 2:20-cv-04054-NKL

ORDER

NANETTE K. LAUGHREY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Defendant, Foley Industries Inc. (“Foley”), moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff Adam Alley's claim that he was fired for reporting a workplace injury. Doc. 43. Foley claims there is no issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment because a reasonable jury could only find that Alley was fired for timecard fraud. Because a reasonable jury could conclude that Foley fired Alley in retaliation for reporting a workplace injury, Foley's motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Alley worked for Foley as a field technician from 2012 until he was terminated in 2018. He had worked for Foley's predecessor since 1998. As a field technician, Alley was responsible for repairing heavy machinery. Doc. 10 (Amended Complaint), ¶ 17.

On February 27, 2018, Alley reported that he felt pain in his left shoulder when he reached for a device from his work truck. Foley investigated to determine if Alley was eligible for workers' compensation. Foley contends that part of that investigation involved recreating Alley's day by looking at his time records. Foley's employees were required to manually enter their time into

BMTS-Foley's timekeeping system. Foley also had a GPS system in its employees' trucks and cell phones, known as Telogis, that allowed Foley to track employees' movements.

When Foley recreated Alley's day, Foley discovered that Alley had reported washing his work truck from 3:45 to 4:30 pm. However, Telogis showed that Alley's truck was only stopped at the wash bay from 3:44 to 4:04 pm. Brandy Buffington, an H.R. employee, investigated and identified 17 additional time keeping discrepancies from February 27, 2018, to March 7, 2018. On March 13, 2018, Alley's supervisor Tyler Burch, Alley's former supervisor Case Clough, and Buffington called Alley into a meeting to discuss these discrepancies.

After meeting with Alley, Buffington emailed Aaron Smith-Burch's supervisor-and stated there were 2 incidents for which she felt they could prove timecard fraud. Ex. 101 (Buffington email to Smith), at FEC 286.^[1] The first involved Alley's misreporting of when he washed his truck. Second, Alley had entered into the BMTS system that he performed a post trip inspection of his truck on March 5. However, Buffington did not believe Alley had entered an inspection into Telogis for that day. During the meeting when Alley was pressed on this he stated, “Oh I guess, I didn't I don't know what happened there.” Ex. 101 at FEC 297 (Buffington's Notes from March 12, 2018, Meeting). Alley was suspended pending further investigation.

The next day Alley called Clough to recheck the Telogis records. Clough noticed that there was now an entry in Telogis made by Ron Adams, an IT employee who often enters late Telogis entries. The Parties contest whether that entry was made the morning after the meeting or if it had been made previously and overlooked by Burch, Clough, and Buffington.

Additionally, on March 14, 2018, Burch discovered that another employee, Everett Snider, had logged into Alley's truck on Telogis to enter inspections. The Parties contest whether this was

an accident or whether Snider was trying to cover for Alley.

On March 16, 2018, Alley terminated Foley and Snider. Foley submitted Alley's workers' compensation claim, and Alley was paid $101, 156.63 on that claim.

B. Procedural Background

Alley alleges that he was fired in retaliation for reporting a workplace injury in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.780. See generally, Doc. 10 (Amended Complaint). Foley argues that it should be granted summary judgment because the record makes clear Alley was fired for timecard fraud and falsifying documents, not for reporting a workplace injury.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“Summary judgment is proper if, after viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, no genuine issue of material fact exists[, ] and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Higgins v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 931 F.3d 664, 669 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “[A] genuine issue of material fact exists if: (1) there is a dispute of fact; (2) the disputed fact is material to the outcome of the case; and (3) the dispute is genuine, that is, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party.” RSBI Aerospace, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 49 F.3d 399, 401 (8th Cir. 1995). While the moving party bears the burden of establishing a lack of any genuine issues of material fact, Brunsting v. Lutsen Mountains Corp., 601 F.3d 813, 820 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted), the party opposing summary judgment “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 527 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. What Legal Framework Applies

Under Missouri law “[n]o employer or agent shall discharge or discriminate against any employee for exercising any of his or her rights under” Missouri's workers' compensation laws, “when the exercising of such rights is the motivating factor in the discharge or discrimination.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.780. Reporting a workplace injury to an employer is one of the employee's rights under Missouri's workers' compensation laws. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.127. A motivating factor is one that “actually played a role in the discharge” and had a “determinative influence on the discharge or discrimination.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.780. Foley argues it is entitled to summary judgment because Alley has failed to show that his reporting of a workplace injury was the “motivating factor” in Foley's decision to fire him.

Under federal civil rights law, a plaintiff must either provide direct evidence of discrimination or rely on the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. McCullough v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Scis., 559 F.3d 855, 860 (8th Cir. 2009). Under this framework, a plaintiff is required to make a prima facie case that an employee was fired for discriminatory reasons. Id. The burden then shifts to the defendant to offer a valid reason for the firing. Id. If defendant can do so, then plaintiff is required to offer evidence that shows defendant's proffered reason is a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id.

Alley argues that this framework does not apply to claims under Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.780. Alley points to the fact that in 2017 the Missouri Legislature changed the causation standard from contributing factor to motivating factor for claims brought under the Missouri Human Rights Act and Missouri Workers' Compensation Retaliation Statute. See 2017 Mo. SB 43, at 4-5 (2017) (Human Rights Act); 2017 Mo. SB 66, at 26-27 (2017) (Workers' Compensation Retaliation). In these bills, the legislature stated that the McDonnell Douglas test applied to claims under the

MHRA but was silent on whether it applied to claims for workers' compensation retaliation. Mo. SB 43, at 17.

Alley argues that since the McDonnell Douglas test does not apply, he is not required to show Foley's proffered reason for firing Alley was pretextual. Specifically, he claims if he makes a prima facie case that he was fired for filing a workers' compensation claim, then it is up to the jury to determine whether Alley was fired for reporting a workplace injury or for committing timecard fraud.

The Court need not decide whether the McDonnell Douglas framework applies because even under that framework Foley's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied. Therefore, the Court will apply the McDonnell Douglas framework here without deciding whether it is required.

B. Whether Alley has Made a Prima Facie case that He was Fired Because He Reported a Workplace Injury

Alley argues that a reasonable jury could find he was fired for reporting his workplace injury for the following reasons: (1) Alley was fired 17 days after filing his workers' compensation claim; (2) Alley had received consistently positive reviews from his company; and (3) Foley thought Alley was filing a false workers' compensation claim. The Court considers these points in turn.

1. Temporal Proximity

It is undisputed that Alley was injured and reported his work injury on February 27, 2018. It is undisputed that he was fired 17 days later, on March 16, 2018.

“Although timing alone cannot conclusively establish that an employee was discharged for exercising her” workers' compensation rights, proximity “is a factor to be considered.” St.

Lawrence v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 143, 150 (Mo.Ct.App. 1999); Coleman, 967 S.W.2d at 648 (citation omitted) (same). The closer in time the firing is to the exercise of the right, the stronger the inference of discrimination is. Donathan v. Oakley Grain, Inc., 861 F.3d 735, 742-43 (8th Cir. 2017) (“[T]emporal proximity generally is of greater inferential weight when time frames are compressed. Whether we consider the time frame in this case to be ten minutes or eight days, it is a meaningful and compressed time frame[.]”). Proximity is also given greater weight when the protected conduct was not done in anticipation of being fired. Id. There is no suggestion that Alley reported an injury in anticipation of being fired. The fact that Foley was fired less than three weeks after reporting an injury is evidence that his decision to report an injury was the reason he was fired.

Foley argues this proximity is irrelevant because “the presence of an intervening event undermines any causal inference that a reasonable person might otherwise draw from close timing between reporting an injury and termination.” Doc. 50...