Allgaier v. MicroBioLogics, Inc.

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BARBARA ALLGAIER, Plaintiff, v. MICROBIOLOGICS, INC., Defendant.

CIVIL No. 1:22-cv-01900-ELH

United States District Court, D. Maryland

April 7, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Ellen L. Hollander United States District Judge

Plaintiff Barbara Allgaier was employed by Microbiologics, Inc. (“Microbiologics”) as an “Area Sales Manager.” ECF 1, ¶ 4. Her employment began in September 2010, and she was terminated on September 18, 2019. Id. ¶¶ 6, 30.^[1]This employment discrimination suit followed on August 2, 2022. ECF 1 (the “Complaint”).

The Complaint contains two counts. In particular, Count I asserts a claim of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), and Count II asserts a violation of the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL”), Md. Code (2016 Repl. Vol., 2022 Supp.), §§ 3-501 et seq. of the Labor and Employment Article (“L.E.”). Plaintiff seeks compensatory, punitive, and treble damages, as well as attorney's fees and costs. ECF 1, ¶¶ 51-54.

Microbiologics has moved to dismiss the Complaint, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b)(6). ECF 5. The motion is supported by a memorandum. ECF 5-1 (collectively, the “Motion”). Plaintiff opposes the Motion (ECF 8, the “Opposition), supported by two exhibits. ECF 8-1; ECF 8-2. In the Opposition, she complains, inter alia, that the Motion was untimely filed, and asks the Court to strike it on this basis. Defendant has replied, and urges the Court to strike the Opposition as untimely. ECF 9 (the “Reply”).

No hearing is necessary to resolve the Motion. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, I shall grant the Motion in part and deny it in part, with leave to amend.

I. Factual and Procedural Background^[2]

Plaintiff commenced employment with Microbiologics in September 2010. ECF 1, ¶ 6. During plaintiff's tenure with Microbiologics, she was “an exemplary and high performing employee.” Id. ¶ 8. Throughout nine years of employment, Allgaier “never received a disciplinary reprimand or action.” Id. ¶ 21. Moreover, she received numerous awards and accolades, including the “‘President's Award' for sales,” id. ¶ 10; the “‘Top Sales Representative Award,'” id. ¶ 11; and the “Molecular Business Growth Award.” Id. ¶ 12; see id. ¶ 9. Further, Allgaier's “name is listed twice on the Microbiologics High Honor Plaque” at company headquarters. Id. ¶ 13. At the time of Allgaier's discharge, she was the only employee whose name was listed on the High Honor Plaque. Id. ¶ 14.

At the time of Allgaier's termination, she was working as an Area Sales Manager, and her “direct supervisor” was Alan Kaplan. Id. ¶¶ 7, 15. Kaplan served as Microbiologics's “vice president of sales for North America.” Id. ¶ 16. Notably, in August 2019, Kaplan distributed a “United States Sales Force Rankings.” ECF 1, ¶ 17. Allgaier was ranked as the “number one area sales manager for North America....” Id.

In August 2019, Kaplan “sent an email to all the Sales Area Managers requesting dates for meetings in order to complete the individual's third quarterly reviews.” Id. ¶ 22. Allgaier's review was originally scheduled for October 2, 2019. Id. ¶ 23. In a conference call on September 3, 2019, Allgaier asked Kaplan “why he wanted to meet with her” and Kaplan told her that “‘everything will be fine.'” Id. ¶ 24. During the conference call, Kaplan and Allgaier agreed to meet to complete the review on September 18, 2019. Id. ¶ 25. Kaplan “assured” Allgaier that defendant was “not intending to cut or eliminate any positions or territories,” id. ¶ 26, and that he ”intended to visit a client with the Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 27.

Allgaier met with Kaplan on September 18, 2019, at a hotel in Virginia. Id. ¶ 28. Tonya Inselman, Microbiologics's Employee Engagement Manager, who served in the Human Resources department, was also in attendance. Id. ¶ 28. At the meeting, id. ¶ 29, Inselman informed Allgaier that she was being discharged due to “‘territory elimination.'” Id. ¶¶ 30, 31.

At the time of Allgaier's discharge, she was defendant's “only female area sales manager.” Id. ¶ 40. After Allgaier was terminated, Microbiologics's “U.S. Area Sales Team consisted of all males.” Id. ¶ 42. Microbiologics had “terminated the other two female area sales managers in 2018 and 2019 respectively.” Id. ¶ 41.

Moreover, at that time, “there were open sales and marketing positions outside of Plaintiff's territory under Mr. Kaplan's supervisory authority.” Id. ¶ 32. But, Allgaier was not offered “the opportunity” to be considered for any “position within the company.” Id. ¶ 33.

After plaintiff's discharge, Microbiologics continued to do business with entities within Allgaier's former territory. Id. ¶ 35. According to plaintiff, her “district was not eliminated but redistributed.” ECF 1, ¶ 34. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that her clients and her district were “redistributed” to Mike Anderson and Joe Iacono, two of Allgier's male counterparts. Id. ¶ 36.

Anderson had been hired in March 2017 “to take over parts of Plaintiff's New England territory that Plaintiff had grown too large to manage single handedly.” Id. ¶ 37. Plaintiff asserts that Anderson was ranked “the lowest among sales managers” in the August 2019 employee ranking. Id. ¶ 38. Further, plaintiff claims that Iacono was also ranked lower than Allgaier in that same ranking. Id. ¶ 39.

As of the time of plaintiff's discharge, she had “booked approximately one-hundredthousand dollars” in sales. Id. ¶ 18. The products were shipped after Allgaier's departure. Id. ¶ 19. Allgaier alleges that she is “entitled” to commissions on these sales. Id. ¶ 20. But, she complains that Microbiologics has failed to pay the commissions. Id. ¶ 43.

II. Standards of Review

A defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Nadendla v. WakeMed, 24 F.4th 299, 304-05 (4th Cir. 2022); ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. City of Buena Vista, 917 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2019); Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit Pension Plan v. Weil, 918 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 2019); In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom. McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). That rule provides that a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendants with “fair notice” of the claims and the “grounds” for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).

To survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions' ....” (citation omitted)); see also Nadendla, 24 F.4th at 304-05; Paradise Wire & Cable, 918 F.3d at 317; Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). To be sure, a plaintiff need not include “detailed factual allegations” in order to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, federal pleading rules “do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 10 (2014) (per curiam). But, mere “‘naked assertions' of wrongdoing” are generally insufficient to state a claim for relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

In other words, the rule demands more than bald accusations or mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). If a complaint provides no more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” it is insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[A]n unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” does not state a plausible claim of relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rather, to satisfy the minimal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must set forth “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of action, “even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a court ‘must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,' and must ‘draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.'” Retfalvi v. United States 930 F.3d 600, 605 (4th Cir. 2019) (alteration in Retfalvi) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011)); see Semenova v. Md. Transit Admin., 845 F.3d 564, 567 (4th Cir. 2017); Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015). However, “a court is not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts.” Retfalvi, 930 F.3d at 605 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see Glassman v. Arlington Cty., 628 F.3d 140, 146 (4th Cir. 2010). “A court decides whether [the pleading] standard is met by separating...