Allstate Vehicle & Prop. Ins. Co. v. Richardson

ALLSTATE VEHICLE ANDPROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. MATTHEW S. RICHARDSON, andSHEILA SMITH, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JOSHA C. SMITH, Defendants.

CASE NO. 3:18-CV-204-PPS-MGG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

May 15, 2019

OPINION AND ORDER

This is a declaratory judgment action filed by Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company, seeking a declaration that it does not owe any indemnity or duty to defend to defendant Matthew Richardson in separate lawsuit filed in Indiana state court. That separate lawsuit is a wrongful death action, brought against Richardson by the Estate of Joshua C. Smith. Before me are two motions, defendant Richardson's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Stay the Proceedings [DE 50], and plaintiff Allstate's Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 62.] For the reasons outlined below, I will deny Richardson's motion to dismiss/stay and grant Allstate's motion for summary judgment on its declaratory judgment claims.

Background

This case began with a road rage incident which occurred on December 18, 2015. After the incident—and the exact timeline of events and reasons for them remain unclear—Richardson drove home and Joshua C. Smith, the other motorist, drove to the same address. From there things got tragic. There was an altercation between Smith and Richardson, and at some point, Richardson came outside of his home with a loaded firearm. A bullet was fired from Richardson's gun which struck Smith in his femoral artery. Smith later died from his injuries.

Richardson was charged with multiple crimes. He proceeded to trial, and Richardson was found guilty of and convicted of murder under Indiana Code 35-42-1-1(1) and pointing a firearm at another under Indiana Code 35-47-4-3(b). Specifically, Richardson was found to have "knowingly or intentionally kill[ed] another human being." I.C. 35-42-1-1(1). As a result of these convictions, Richardson was sentenced to 55 years in prison. [DE 64-6 at 4 (Def.'s Resps. to Pl.'s Reqs. for Admissions).] Richardson remains in prison at this time.

Richardson appealed his criminal convictions, but his appeal was dismissed with prejudice by the Court of Appeals of Indiana on September 28, 2017. [DE 52-1.] The dismissal order indicates that the appeal was dismissed because Richardson failed to timely file his brief. There is no evidence that Richardson sought review of his conviction or the Court of Appeals' order with the Indiana Supreme Court. Nor is there evidence that he has filed any other post-conviction relief, let alone any such relief that has been granted.

On August 24, 2017, (after the time for Richardson to file his brief had expired), the Estate of Joshua C. Smith filed a wrongful death action against Richardson. In this lawsuit, Smith's estate alleges that Richardson "accidentally" shot Smith and thatSmith's death was "directly and proximately caused by the negligent act of Richardson discharging the semi-automatic rifle and striking Smith in the leg." [DE 64-3, Wrongful Death Compl. at ¶¶ 10, 13.] Allstate has provided counsel to Richardson in that case, under a reservation of rights, and at present, the case has not proceeded much beyond the pleading stage.

On March 22, 2018, Allstate filed this lawsuit, claiming it has no duty to defend or duty to indemnify Richardson because the conduct at issue in the wrongful death lawsuit is excluded under the relevant insurance policy. [DE 1.] The insurance policy at issue contains the following exclusion:

We do not cover any bodily injury or property damage intended by, or which may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or criminal actions omissions of, any insured person. The exclusion applies even if:

such insured person lacks the mental capacity to govern his or her conduct;

such bodily injury or property damage is of a different kind or degree than intended or reasonably expected; or

such bodily injury or property damage is sustained by a different person than intended or reasonably expected. This exclusion applies regardless of whether or not such insured person is actually charged with, or convicted of a crime.

[DE 64-2 at 51, 53.] The parties all agree that the terms of the insurance policy control; the question is simply whether, as a matter of undisputed fact, Richardson's conduct is excluded (entitling Allstate to summary judgment) or if fact issues remain to be decided, either in this court, or before an Indiana state court (in which case the matter likely will need to be stayed or dismissed).

Discussion

I. Richardson's Motion to Dismiss or Stay

Richardson, proceeding without a lawyer, has filed a document titled "Defendant's Objections and Responses to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions and Production of Documents and a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative to Stay the Proceedings." [DE 50.] While this filing covers a lot of bases, it is at bottom, a request to stay this case while Richardson tries to have his conviction overturned in state court. Given the requested relief, it makes sense to address this motion before Allstate's motion for summary judgment.

The basis for Richardson's request that these proceedings be stayed is a species of the doctrine known as Younger abstention. Younger abstention is a court-created doctrine which holds that federal courts cannot, except with very limited possible exceptions not at issue here, enjoin ongoing state criminal proceedings. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971). The main thrust of Richardson's motion is that in his criminal case, he had ineffective assistance of counsel and that once this fact is proven, it will entitle him to a new trial at which he will prevail. The problem for Richardson is both simple and fatal: his appeal of his state court conviction was dismissed with prejudice by the Court of Appeals of Indiana on September 28, 2017. See Richardson v. State, Cause No. 64A05-1705-CR-1178 [DE 52-1.] His conviction is thus final, and while Richardson implies in his motion that he will be seeking some sort of post-conviction relief, no such relief has been sought. Presumably the basis for that relief would be that Richardson's counsel's failure to file his appellate brief constituted ineffective assistanceof counsel, and Richardson may have a valid argument. See Clay v. Director, Juvenile Division, Dept. of Corrections, 749 F.2d 427, 431 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Failure by an attorney to perfect an appeal where the client has indicated a desire to appeal amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel."). But "may" is not enough to stay this case.

Richardson included in his opposition to summary judgment a letter from attorney (Brian Woodward) dated December 12, 2018 which discusses the possibility of seeking post-conviction relief (and the possibility of a civil suit against Richardson's criminal counsel who failed to perfect his appeal). [DE 66-2.] It has been approximately six months, but Richardson has not notified the court that he has filed any petition for post-conviction relief. Nor has my own review of Indiana state court electronic dockets indicated that any post-conviction relief has been sought. Thus, there are no ongoing state criminal proceedings which would be threatened by me considering this case. See Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 651 (7th Cir. 2018) ("Federal courts generally may not intervene in ongoing state criminal proceedings."); see also Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1971) (holding that federal courts should not issue declaratory judgments which would impermissibly interfere with ongoing state criminal prosecutions). And I cannot delay consideration of the matter simply because Richardson told me six months ago that he would do something which he has so far failed to do.

Beyond Richardson's underlying criminal case, there is of course another live lawsuit pending which overlaps with the case before me. That is the state court wrongful death lawsuit filed by Smith's estate which is presently pending before the Superior Court of Porter County, Indiana. The analysis is distinct from the aboveYounger abstention question and Richardson does not fully flesh out this argument, but I will nonetheless address it.

To determine whether I, a federal district court judge, should yield or abstain from deciding the issues in the case before me on account of a pending state court case which touches upon similar issues is known generally as Colorado River abstention. See generally Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). In the context of a potential conflict between a state case and a federal Declaratory Judgment Act case, such as this one, the question is also known as a question of Wilton/Brillhart "abstention."¹ As with all of these related doctrines, the goal is to avoid "gratuitous interference with the orderly and comprehensive disposition of a state court litigation" by federal courts. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942). Of course, "the mere pendency of another suit is not enough in itself to refuse a declaration." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 422 F.2d 587, 590 (7th Cir. 1970). Instead, to determine whether or not to exercise my discretion, the Seventh Circuit has instructed me to review "the overlap between the federal and state proceedings in light of the substantive law that informed the declaratory judgment action and the underlying liability case." Med. Assur. Co. v. Hellman, 610 F.3d 371, 379 (7th Cir. 2010).As part of this inquiry, I must consider whether the parties to the two actions are identical, whether going forward with the declaratory action will serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal obligations and relationships among the parties or will merely amount to duplicative and piecemeal litigation, and whether comparable relief is available to the plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment in another forum or at another time. Nationwide Ins...