Alsterda v. Dart

1

2024 IL App (1st) 221088-U

R. SCOTT ALSTERDA, in his capacity as Bankruptcy Trustee for the estate of Jaime Mireles, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THOMAS J. DART and the COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S MERIT BOARD, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1-22-1088

Court of Appeals of Illinois, First District, First Division

March 11, 2024

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 15 CH 03489 Honorable Neil H. Cohen, Judge presiding.

JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Lavin concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

PUCINSKI, JUSTICE

¶ 1 Held: We affirm the dismissal of plaintiff-appellant's second amended complaint seeking to invalidate his termination by the Sheriff's Merit Board based on defects in the appointments of the board members. Plaintiff's attack on the validity of the board is barred by res judicata in light of plaintiff's prior administrative review action and related appeal. Further, the circuit court correctly found that the de facto officer doctrine precludes his untimely challenge to the validity of the board.

¶ 2 Plaintiff R. Scott Alsterda, in his capacity as bankruptcy trustee for the estate of Jamie Mireles ("Mireles") appeals from the circuit court's June 2022 order dismissing his second amended complaint with prejudice. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Mireles was formerly employed as a correction officer by the Cook County Sheriff's Department. On July 22 2014 Thomas J. Dart, in his capacity as Cook County Sheriff (Sheriff), filed a complaint against Mireles with the Cook County Sheriff's Merit Board (Board). The Sheriff alleged that on March 31, 2012, Mireles used excessive force when he struck a detainee's face with his hand. The Sheriff also alleged that Mireles failed to submit an incident report documenting the use or force or to present himself to be interviewed about the incident. The complaint requested that Mireles' employment be terminated.

¶ 5 The Board's Termination Decision and Mireles' Prior Appeal

¶ 6 The Board conducted a hearing on October 23, 2014. In January 2015, the Board issued a final administrative decision upholding the charges against Mireles and terminating his employment. The decision was signed by eight Board members, including John Rosales.

¶ 7 On February 27, 2015, Mireles filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of Cook County. On January 7, 2016, the circuit court entered an order affirming the Board's decision.

¶ 8 Mireles appealed to this court, raising a number of arguments. Among these, he claimed that his use of force was not excessive; the investigation into the incident was insufficient; and the Board's determination that he failed to properly report the incident was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Mireles v. Cook County Sheriff's Merit Board, No. 1-16-0203 (March 8, 2017) (unpublished summary order), ¶ 7. Notably, Mireles did not raise any challenge to the composition of the Board. In March 2017, this court affirmed the Board's termination decision. Id.

¶ 9 The 2014 Circuit Court Decision in Taylor v. Dart and Affirmance By Our Court

¶ 10 In a separate proceeding involving a different employee's termination by the Board, in August 2014 the circuit court issued a decision that forms the basis of Mireles' current appeal. Specifically, in Taylor v Dart, the circuit court vacated a termination decision on the basis that one of the Board members, John Rosales, was not duly appointed under the governing statute. Specifically, whereas section 3-7002 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/3-7002 (West 2012)) required Board members to be appointed for six-year terms, Rosales was appointed for a term of less than one year. The circuit court in Taylor found that the Board "was not lawfully constituted at the time of the hearing and decision" so that the termination decision was invalid.

¶ 11 After the Sheriff and Board appealed, we agreed with the circuit court that the Board decision was void because it was "illegally constituted" at the time of Taylor's termination decision. Taylor v. Dart, 2016 IL App (1st) 143684, ¶ 47. In January 2017, our supreme court issued a supervisory order directing our court to additionally consider whether the Cook County Board of Commissions had home rule authority to approve interim appointments to the Board. Pursuant to that supervisory order, this court issued another opinion, holding that that (1) the Board was not authorized to appoint an individual for less than a six-year term; (2) Rosales' participation in Taylor's termination decision rendered it void; and (3) the Cook County Board of Commissioners did not have home rule authority to approve interim appointments. Taylor v. Dart, 2017 IL App (1st) 143684-B.

¶ 12 Mireles Challenges His Termination Decision on the Basis of Taylor

¶ 13 In October 2017, Mireles filed a petition pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking to vacate the January 2016 circuit court judgment that affirmed the Board decision. Mireles asserted, for the first time, that the Board's decision was void because one or more members "were not duly appointed" at time it rendered the January 2015 decision. He noted that John Rosales (whose appointment was found invalid by our court's decisions in Taylor) was a member of the Board that rendered his termination decision. Thus, he urged that the Board was "illegally constituted" pursuant to Taylor and the Board's decision was void.

¶ 14 The Sheriff moved to dismiss Mireles' section 2-1401 petition, arguing, inter alia, that section 2-1401 could not be used to challenge an administrative decision and that Mireles "waived or forfeited his argument that the Merit Board was not properly constituted" by not previously raising it. In April 2018, the circuit court granted the Sheriff's motion to dismiss the section 21401 petition and remanded the case to the Board.

¶ 15 The Sheriff subsequently moved to reconsider the April 2018 remand order based on "new and controlling law" applying the de facto officer doctrine to bar similar challenges based on the invalidity of the Board members. Specifically, the Sheriff argued that Lopez v. Dart, 2018 IL App (1st) 170733 and Cruz v. Dart, 2019 IL App (1st) 170915, had "altered the legal application of Taylor v. Dart." The Sheriff argued that in light of those decisions, the de facto officer doctrine barred Mireles from relying on Taylor to collaterally attack his termination decision.

¶ 16 In his opposition to the Sheriff's motion, Mireles argued that the de facto officer doctrine did not apply to him. He also asserted that all eight of the Board members who participated in his termination decision (not just Rosales) were illegally appointed for terms of less than six years.

¶ 17 The circuit court stayed any decision on the Sheriff's motion to reconsider, citing the pending appeal before our supreme court in Goral v. Dart, supreme court case no. 125085. Our supreme court issued that decision in October 2020. Goral v. Dart, 2020 IL 125085. In January 2021, the Sheriff filed a motion to "recall and dismiss the case," arguing that the supreme court's decision in Goral made clear that the de facto officer doctrine bars a challenge to the composition of the Board that is not asserted until after the Board has taken "substantive action."

¶ 18 Substitution of Plaintiff and Filing of the Second Amended Complaint

¶ 19 In May 2021, R. Scott Alsterda, as bankruptcy trustee for Mireles' estate, moved for substitution as plaintiff.^[1] In January 2022, the circuit court granted the substitution motion.^[2] In the same order, the circuit court granted leave to file a superseding amended complaint.

¶ 20 On January 14, 2022, Mireles filed a second amended complaint for judicial review of the Board's January 2015 decision. Mireles pleaded two counts, only one of which is germane to this appeal. In count I, Mireles sought review under the administrative review law, but he explicitly recognized "this count had already been ruled upon and it is included solely for the purpose of preserving it for any appeal."^[3]

¶ 21 The second count was entitled "declaratory judgment" and sought to invalidate Mireles' termination decision based on the composition of the Board combined with the fact that the Board rendered its decision after the August 2014 circuit court order in Taylor. In that count, Mireles alleged that the Board was defective in several respects when it rendered the January 2015 termination decision. First, John Rosales was one of the Board members, notwithstanding that he had "already been determined improperly-seated" by the prior August 2014 Taylor order. Further, Mireles alleged that several other Board members had been appointed to terms of less than six-years, and that certain of these were "non-staggered." Mireles alleged that the August 2014 Taylor order "put the Sheriff and the Board on notice of the defects," yet his termination decision was entered in January 2015 without "any action to fix the defects in the appointments."

¶ 22 Mireles additionally pleaded that the Board decision "could not be protected by the de facto officer doctrine" in light of the circuit court's August 2014 Taylor order. Mireles acknowledged that he did not raise these defects in his proceedings before the Board, but alleged "he did not need to as a matter of law once Taylor's challenge was made because the doctrine is 'backward looking' and does not allow a Board with defects to continue operating."

¶ 23 Mireles' second amended complaint thus sought declarations that...