Alston v. Boeing Co.

Donta Alston, Plaintiff, v. The Boeing Company, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 2:19-02713-RMG-MGB

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division

October 25, 2021

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MARY GORDON BAKER MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff filed this action alleging race discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. This matter is now before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 83.) Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code Section 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in employment discrimination cases are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 83) be granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a black male. (Dkt. No. 87 at 1.) He began working for Defendant as a Level A Aircraft Painter in October of 2016. (Dkt. No. 83 at 2; Dkt. No. 87 at 1.) In this role, Plaintiff performed various duties, including sanding aircraft surfaces, prepping aircraft barrels, and painting base coats. (Dkt. No. 83 at 2; Dkt. No. 87 at 1.) Prior to his employment with Defendant, Plaintiff painted military vehicles. (Dkt No. 83 at 2; Dkt. No. 87 at 1.) He believes that he was entitled to a higher-level position than a Level A Painter based on this experience. (Dkt. No. 87 at 1.) Plaintiff claims that he applied for higher-level positions (both Level B and Level C) but was told that those positions were unavailable. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff claims that several employees were hired as Level B Aircraft Painters soon after he began working as a Level A Aircraft Painter. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant misled him and intentionally did not hire him for these available higher-level positions. (Id.)

Plaintiff further alleges that he was unfairly required to train newly hired Level B and Level C Aircraft Painters. (Dkt. No. 56 at 2; Dkt. No. 87 at 2.) He claims that these Level B and Level C Aircraft Painters were less qualified than him, and that they were largely Caucasian. (Dkt. No. 56 at 2; Dkt. No. 87 at 2-3.) He further claims that, as a Level A Painter, he made less money than the Level B and Level C Painters he was required to train, even though he had more experience and knowledge than they did. (Dkt. No. 56 at 2; Dkt. No. 87 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that he complained about this disparity to his supervisor, Mr. Robert Jernigan, on several occasions. (Dkt. No. 56 at 2; Dkt. No. 87 at 2-3.) Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Jernigan “responded by telling [Plaintiff] not to worry about the money, and threatened to write him up for insubordination if he did not continue training painters.” (Dkt. No. 56 at 2; Dkt. No. 87 at 3.)

In October of 2017, Plaintiff was promoted to a Level B Aircraft Painter. (Dkt. No. 83 at 8; Dkt. No. 87 at 3.) Plaintiff claims that he was “paid as a low, Level B Painter, although he was performing the work of [a] Level C Painter.” (Dkt. No. 87 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that he complained about being underpaid several times throughout his employment as a Level B Painter. (Dkt. No. 56 at 2; Dkt. No. 87 at 3.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he complained to: Mr. Jernigan; other managers, including Charles Little and Randy Wilson; and an employee in Human Resources, Lisa Sprinkle. (Dkt. No. 87 at 3.) Plaintiff claims that his complaints were “rebuffed” and that his concerns “fell on deaf ears.” (Dkt. No. 56 at 2.)

In January of 2020, Plaintiff “finally received a Level C promotion.” (Dkt. No. 87 at 3.) However, Plaintiff claims that around the same time, “Defendant filled the Manager position in [the] Paint Department, without posting the job vacancy, or otherwise notifying Plaintiff of the position.” (Dkt. No. 56 at 2.) According to Plaintiff, “a lesser qualified, Caucasian employee, who Plaintiff trained, was hired for the Manager position” and “Defendant's purposeful denial of this promotional opportunity was in direct retaliation of Plaintiff's prior complaints.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that, based on Defendant's unfair treatment, he did not “see himself advancing in the Paint Department” and therefore took a job as a Level B Production Acceptance Specialist for the Paint Quality Department in December of 2020, “despite the possible salary cut.” (Dkt. No. 87 at 3-4.)

Plaintiff contends that Defendant's unfair treatment is a result of race-based discrimination. (See generally Dkt. No. 56; Dkt. No. 87.) He claims that Defendant's actions have “caused him and [] still [] caus[e] him to suffer tremendous damages in terms of his physical, mental, and emotional heath, as well as suffering other ongoing actual and compensatory damages.” (Dkt. No. 56 at 2.) Thus, he filed the instant civil action. (See generally Dkt. No. 56.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, along with three co-Plaintiffs (Kevin Austin, Jonathan Bennett, and Joel Washington), filed an initial complaint against Defendant on September 24, 2019. (Dkt. No. 1.) The initial complaint alleged race discrimination, hostile work environment and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, breach of contract, breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, and promissory estoppel.^[1] (Id.) On March 24, 2020, this Court ordered that the claims be severed into four separate actions, noting that each Plaintiff should file an amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 24.) Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on May 5, 2020. (Dkt. No. 29.) After requesting and receiving leave from the Court, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on September 11, 2020, eliminating his promissory estoppel claim. (Dkt. No. 56.)

On September 25, 2020, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 57.) On January 25, 2021, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 75.) In doing so, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. (Id.) Accordingly, only Plaintiff's claims for race discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 remain.

Now before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, which was filed on April 19, 2021. (Dkt. No. 83.) After requesting and receiving an extension of time, Plaintiff filed his response in opposition to Defendant's motion on June 1, 2021. (Dkt. No. 87.) Defendant replied to Plaintiff's response on June 14, 2021. (Dkt. No. 89.) As such, the motion before the Court has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.

LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Facts are ‘material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

“As the moving party, Defendant[] [is] required to identify those portions of the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which [it] believe[s] demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact.” Perez v. Arnold Transportation, No. 3:15-cv-3162-TLW, 2018 WL 2301850, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 12, 2018) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “As the nonmoving party, Plaintiff[] must then produce specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 317). “Plaintiff[] may not rest on mere allegations or denials; [she] must produce ‘significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.'” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In other words, “the nonmoving party must go beyond the facts alleged in the pleadings and instead rely upon affidavits, depositions, or other evidence to show a genuine issue for trial.” Crawford v. Newport News Indus. Corp., No. 4:14-cv-130, 2018 WL 4561671, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 2, 2018) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 317), adopted in part, 2018 WL 2943445 (E.D. Va. June 11, 2018), appeal dismissed sub nom. Kershaw v. Newport News Indus. Corp., 2018 WL 8058614 (4th Cir. Oct. 25, 2018).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “‘the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the Court must “draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Sandlands C & D LLC v. Cty. of Horry, 737 F.3d 45, 54 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013)). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

DISCUSSION

Defendant asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment on each of Plaintiff's remaining claims. (See generally Dkt. No. 83.) More specifically, Defendant contends that: (1) Plaintiff's race...