Alston v. Warden

Ira Alston (Inmate #275666) v. Warden

No. CV124004741S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Tolland, Rockville, Geographic Area 19

August 14, 2017

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Hon Vernon D. Oliver.

The petitioner, Ira Alston, initiated this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his underlying trial counsel provided him ineffective legal representation. He seeks an order of this court vacating his convictions and returning the matter to the criminal court for further proceedings. The respondent denies the petitioner's claims. The court finds the issues for the respondent and denies the petition.

I PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The petitioner was the defendant in State of Connecticut v Ira Alston, Docket Number TTD-CR08-0093113-T, in the Tolland Judicial District. The petitioner was charged with one count of possession of a weapon or dangerous instrument in a correctional institution, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-174a. The state also charged the defendant in two-part information as a persistent serious felony offender. (Ex. E.) The defendant, at the time of trial, was serving a thirty-five-year term of imprisonment related to his convictions, in 2002, of manslaughter in the first degree and carrying a pistol without a permit, as well as his conviction, in 2003, of larceny in the third degree. On October 1, 2010, the petitioner was convicted, after guilty plea, of one count of possession of a weapon or dangerous instrument in a correctional institution. (Ex. E G.) On October 1, 2010, the court, Sullivan, J., sentenced the petitioner to one year to serve, consecutive to his previously imposed sentence. The petitioner was represented at all relevant times by attorney Douglas Ovian.

The petitioner's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Alston, 141 Conn.App. 719, 62 A.3d 586 cert. denied, 308 Conn. 943, 66 A.3d 884 (2013). In affirming the judgment below and finding that the petitioner's guilty plea was entered voluntarily and that the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter based on having put the petitioner on notice as to elements of the offense, the court made the following relevant findings.

" The defendant, Ira Alston, appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered following his guilty plea to the crime of possessing a weapon or dangerous instrument in a correctional institution in violation of General Statutes § 53a-174a. The defendant claims that the court (1) improperly accepted his plea because it was not made voluntarily, and (2) lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the information failed to state all of the essential elements of the crime with which he stood charged. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

" By substitute information dated November 20, 2008, the state charged the defendant with possessing a weapon or dangerous instrument in a correctional institution. On October 1, 2009 the defendant's attorney, public defender Douglas Ovian informed the court that the defendant wished to plead guilty in accordance with a plea bargain reached with the state. After the defendant entered a guilty plea, the prosecutor set forth the factual basis for the plea. The prosecutor stated that on June 30, 2008, while the defendant was an incarcerated prisoner at Northern Correctional Institution, he was found to possess an instrument consisting of a pen with a razor blade attached to it. The instrument was found on the defendant's person, concealed in his boxer shorts. Days prior to this discovery, the defendant and his cellmate were given razors for shaving purposes, but later told prison staff that they had disposed of the razors by flushing them down the toilet. Following a canvass of the defendant, the court found that the plea was knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered with the effective assistance of counsel, and accepted the plea. Thereafter, the court imposed the agreed-upon sentence of one year incarceration, consecutive to the defendant's existing term of incarceration.

" The defendant argues that his statements during the plea canvass reflect that his plea was coerced, rather than voluntary. The plea was coerced, he asserts, because it resulted from the denial of his right to the effective assistance of counsel. He states that " [the] plea was the result of force because it was based on his belief that his attorney failed to represent him." He argues that his statements at the time of his plea did not reflect that the plea was voluntary, the court did not make a record to demonstrate the voluntariness of the plea and that this court cannot presume that the plea was voluntary. The defendant did not raise the present issue before the trial court, either by moving to withdraw the plea or otherwise . . .

" The following additional facts are relevant to our analysis. On October 1, 2010, before the court, Hon. Terence A. Sullivan, judge trial referee, the defendant withdrew his prior pleas and elections, and pleaded guilty to the crime of possessing a weapon or dangerous instrument in a correctional institution. The prosecutor set forth the factual basis for the plea and indicated that the plea agreement was for one year to serve, consecutive to any sentence imposed previously.

" The court proceeded to canvass the defendant concerning his plea. The court asked the defendant if he had discussed with Ovian the decision to change his plea. The defendant replied affirmatively. The court asked the defendant if Ovian had explained the essential elements of the crime to him. The defendant replied that he did not understand the elements of the crime. After a colloquy between the court, Ovian and the defendant, the defendant stated: " I don't understand it . . . what I do understand is regardless of . . . the representation that I've been given by Douglas Ovian, that it really doesn't matter. So, weighing those options, [if] I go to trial with his representation, there's no way I'm going to be successful whether I'm guilty or not guilty. So, I'm just going to take the one year instead of going to trial with him and getting [up to a twenty-five-year term of incarceration].

" The court then asked if the defendant intended to make an Alford plea, at which time Ovian stated that he was unsure. The following colloquy occurred:

[The Defendant]: I don't even understand [the] Alford plea. This is new to me. I didn't get [any] notice. I didn't even know I had court today. I was pulled in, and he's telling me all of this, that we're starting a jury trial. He didn't even discuss trial strategy with me. So, in light of all of that, I know I'm unprepared for a trial. With his representation, there ain't no way I will be successful at a trial. It just came up today. Now, Alford came up today. All of this is new today. And I don't understand-I never seen the Alford case. I don't know what Alford requires, so in light of one year to what he says, twenty-five years, and the representation that I'm given, I'm stuck between a hard spot and a rock.

The Court: So, tell me what you want to do?

[The Defendant]: In light of everything I just said, I don't have the necessary means to employ private counsel. I'm not saying that I'm guilty.

" Additional discussion between the court and the defendant occurred. Once more, the court discussed with the defendant the elements of the crime. The defendant questioned whether the state had to prove that he used a dangerous instrument. The court informed the defendant that this was not the case. The defendant represented that he understood that, by pleading guilty, he was forgoing his right to a trial, his right to remain silent, his right to confront adverse witnesses and present evidence on his behalf and his right to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant stated that he understood the state's burden of proof with regard to the crime with which he stood charged. The following colloquy then occurred:

The Court: Okay. Now, I hate to even ask this because it's-you're not thinking the way that I'm thinking-but I have to ask you, is anyone threatening or forcing you to enter this plea today?

[The Defendant]: Forced by?

The Court: By anybody? Is anybody threatening you that . . . you have to plead guilty today?

[The Defendant]: Not in the sense that you're presenting it. It means, like, physical harm?

The Court: I'm talking about any kind of coercion, threats-

[The Defendant]: I feel pressured, yes.

The Court: If you don't plead guilty, we're going to do something to your family. If you don't do something, we're going to take you out and beat you up-that type of thing.

[The Defendant]: Not in that context, no.

" The court questioned the defendant about the plea agreement with the state, the sentence to which he was exposed if he did not plead guilty and other consequences of his plea. The defendant stated that he understood these facts and consequences. The following colloquy ensued:

[The Court]: You've indicated to me that you understand what the plea agreement is, and I'm going to ask you once more, are you sure that this is what you want to do today, because it has to be decided now. I need to know whether or not you-I'm asking you for a final time, is this what you've decided to do, not that you like it, but this is what you've decided to do and it's your decision. It's your decision right now, but if I find you guilty, then the decision is gone.

[The Defendant]: In light of the circumstances, yes, I did decide.

The Court: Okay. And this is what you want to do today?

[The Defendant]: In light of the circumstances, yes.

" The court found that the plea was entered knowingly voluntarily and intelligently, with the effective assistance of counsel. The...