Alvarez v. Bause

1

WILLIAM ALVAREZ, Plaintiff, v. CALEB BAUSE, et al., Defendants.

No. 9:22-CV-00186 (LEK/ATB)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

February 2, 2023

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

LAWRENCE E. KAHN, United States District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff William Alvarez commenced this action on February 28, 2022. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff later filed an amended complaint on March 29, 2022, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), alleging claims against Correctional Officers (“C.O.”) Caleb Bause Skyler Tuttle; Anthony Farina; Michael Babicz; and Sergeant Glenn Trombly (collectively, “Defendants”) for violations of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment, First Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment rights arising out of his confinement at Marcy Correctional Facility (“Marcy C.F.”). Dkt. No. 12 (“Amended Complaint”).

Now before the Court is Defendants' partial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) regarding Plaintiff's claims arising under the Right to Intimate Association and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause; Defendants also request a fourteen-day extension to file an answer in response to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 14 (“Motion”). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion is denied in part and granted in part.

II. BACKGROUND

The following facts, which the Court assumes to be true at this stage, are taken from the Amended Complaint. See Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2015).

At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was confined at Marcy C.F. Am. Compl. ¶ 2. On September 25, 2020, Plaintiff and Bause “engaged in an acrimonious verbal exchange” related to Bause's instruction that Plaintiff must stop talking or lower his voice. Id. ¶ 22. Later that day, Bause ordered Plaintiff to clean the floors of the bathroom showers. Id. ¶ 23. While Plaintiff was cleaning the bathroom shower area, Bause called out Plaintiff's name, but Plaintiff did not respond. Id. ¶ 24. Bause repeated his call to Plaintiff, and this time, Plaintiff turned around. Id. ¶ 25. When Plaintiff turned around, Bause suddenly discharged “chemical spray” in Plaintiff's face. Id. ¶ 26. After Bause sprayed Plaintiff, Plaintiff ran out of the bathroom toward “the main dorm area” of the prison to avoid any further attack from Bause, and to position himself where others could witness what Bause was doing to Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 27. Afterward, Bause followed Plaintiff into the main dorm area, and ordered the other inmates to return to their sleeping quarters. Id. ¶ 28. Bause then ordered Plaintiff to step into a vestibule located at the entrance of the dorm, id., and although Plaintiff complied with the order, Bause activated his personal alarm system which summoned other officers to respond to the scene. Id. ¶ 29.

In response to Bause activating his personal alarm, Tuttle, Farina, Babicz, and Trombly arrived in the vestibule. Id. ¶ 30. When the other officers arrived on the scene, Bause explained that he had activated his personal alarm because Plaintiff-who now had his hands up against the wall-had attacked Bause. Id. ¶ 31. In response to Bause's statement, Tuttle slammed Plaintiff s head against the wall several times, and then handcuffed Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 32. Once Tuttle handcuffed Plaintiff, the officers repeatedly kicked Plaintiff in the head and body. Id. ¶ 33.

Although Plaintiff could not identify which officers kicked him, none of the Defendants intervened to stop the kicks. Id. ¶ 34.

Soon thereafter, Plaintiff “was dragged into a van” and transported to the prison infirmary. Id. ¶ 35. Tuttle, Farina, and Trombly accompanied Plaintiff in the van. Id. ¶ 36. During the trip to the infirmary, Tuttle punched Plaintiff several times, while Farina and Trombly declined to intervene or “stop the beating.” Id. ¶ 37. Once the van arrived at the infirmary, Trombly said to Tuttle, “[t]hat's enough,” whereupon the beating stopped immediately. Id. ¶ 38. Because of these “beatings,” Plaintiff suffered fractures to his face which required surgical repair, and resulted in Plaintiff suffering “a permanent facial deformity.” Id. ¶ 39.

On September 25, 2020, Plaintiff was enrolled in and had nearly completed a Comprehensive Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatment program (“CASAT”) at Marcy C.F. Id. ¶ 40. CASAT is a program where inmates receive intensive substance abuse treatment with the goal of early release and “reintegration from prison into the outside community.” Id. ¶ 41. Because Plaintiff was on track to complete the CASAT program and exhibited good behavior during his incarceration, Plaintiff was likely to be released from prison before the end of 2020. Id. ¶ 42.

Plaintiff was especially motivated to complete the CASAT program and obtain his early release to reunite with his then-two-year-old daughter, who was diagnosed with and being treated for retinoblastoma, a malignant cancer of the eyes. Id. ¶ 43. Prior to Plaintiff's incarceration, he lived with his daughter. Id.

At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff alleges that Bause was aware of the following facts: (1) Plaintiff's daughter was diagnosed with and being treated for cancer; (2) Plaintiff's prospective early release date from prison; (3) and Plaintiff's desire to successfully complete his CASAT program and be released to care for his daughter. Id. ¶ 44. Plaintiff specifically expressed to Bause his desire to be released early multiple times. Id.

After the use of force incident in the Marcy C.F. dorm, Plaintiff asserts that Bause authored a misbehavior report in which he knowingly and falsely accused Plaintiff of attacking him in the bathroom shower area without provocation. Id. ¶ 45. The misbehavior report falsely charged Plaintiff with “Assault on Staff,” “Violent Conduct,” and “Refusing Direct Order.” Id. ¶ 46. Bause also wrote that Plaintiff “started running towards me aggressively and with a closed left fist and struck me in the right side of my face and chest area.” Id.

Because of the false misbehavior report, Plaintiff was required to appear “at a Tier Hearing” to adjudicate the charges that Bause filed against him. Id. ¶ 47. At the hearing, Bause repeated his false allegations by testifying that inside the bathroom shower area, Plaintiff attacked Bause without provocation. Id. ¶ 48. Plaintiff states that Bause was aware that his false accusations would likely result in Plaintiff being found guilty of some or all of the charges made in the misbehavior report, discharged from the CASAT program, and deprived of the opportunity to be released early from prison and care for his daughter. Id. ¶ 49. Ultimately, because of the false misbehavior report and testimony at the Tier Hearing, Plaintiff was found guilty of all administrative charges. Id. ¶ 50. Plaintiff was subjected to various forms of punishment, including confinement to the prison's Special Housing Unit (“SHU”) for sixty days, which was tantamount to solitary confinement. Id.

Before Plaintiff was in SHU, he had been in daily telephone contact with his daughter's healthcare providers to monitor her medical condition. Id. ¶ 51. However, while in SHU, Plaintiff was denied access to and prohibited from being in telephone contact with the healthcare providers. Additionally, Plaintiff was subjected to unprovoked harassment by correctional officers. Id. ¶ 52.

Another consequence of the false charges against Bause included being discharged from the CASAT program. Id. ¶ 53. This discharge resulted in Plaintiff (1) losing his opportunity to complete the program; (2) being denied early release; (3) being transferred to Great Meadow Correctional Facility-a maximum-security prison; and (4) being denied the opportunity to tend to the care and custody of his daughter. Id. ¶ 53. Plaintiff remained incarcerated until June 25, 2021. Id. ¶ 54. Similarly, because of the false misbehavior report and accompanying punishment, Plaintiff's relationship with his daughter was adversely affected and Plaintiff was unable to provide the emotional and “other support” he would have provided had his release not been delayed. Id. ¶ 55. Furthermore, because of the delay in Plaintiff's release, the medical care and treatment Plaintiff's daughter needed became delayed, and was “thereby adversely affected.” Id.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A court must accept as true the factual allegations contained in a complaint and draw all inferences in favor of a Plaintiff. See Allaire Corp. v. Okumus, 433 F.3d 248, 249-50 (2d Cir. 2006). A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) only where it appears that there are not “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Plausibility requires “enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the alleged misconduct].” Id. at 556.

The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit a court to infer more than the mere possibility of the alleged misconduct, the pleader has not demonstrated that she is...