Amadi v. McManus, Civil Action No. 16-11901-NMG

BENNETH O. AMADI, Plaintiff, v. GARRETT MCMANUS, in his official and individual capacity,THE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,LINDA SPEARS, DCF COMMISSIONER, in her official and individual capacity,ANTHONY SEAN BERNARD, in his official and individual capacity,ROdGERS RANDAL, in his official and individual capacity,SEAN FERRICK, in his official and individual capacity,and RONALD STRAND, in his official and individual capacity, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 16-11901-NMG

United States District Court District of Massachusetts

October 26, 2018

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

GORTON, J.

This case arises from a child custody proceeding in the Massachusetts Juvenile Court involving Benneth Amadi ("Amadi" or "plaintiff") and his four minor children. Amadi claims that a state court judge, the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families ("the DCF") and its employees have, inter alia, conspired to violate his constitutional rights, prevented him from seeing his children and obstructed his access to court.

This Court has already twice rejected plaintiff's claims on the grounds of Younger abstention. See Amadi v. Dep't of Children & Families, 245 F. Supp. 3d 316, 322 (D. Mass. 2017) ("Amadi II"); Amadi v. McManus, No. 16-cv-10861-NMG, 2016 WL 3814597, at *4 (D. Mass. July 11, 2016), aff'd, No. 16-1960, 2017 WL 7048503, at *1 (1st Cir. Oct. 16, 2017) ("Amadi I"). Pending before the Court this time is defendants' renewed motion to dismiss the amended complaint. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Younger abstention still applies and thus plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). This Court also concludes that plaintiff's claims for damages are barred by sovereign immunity, absolute immunity and qualified immunity meaning that he has failed to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

I. Background

A. Facts

Pro se plaintiff Amadi is a licensed attorney in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Defendants in this child custody dispute are the DCF, DCF Commissioner Linda Spears ("Commissioner Spears"), DCF Attorney Sean Bernard ("Attorney Bernard"), DCF Manager Randall Rogers, DCF Social Workers Sean Ferrick and Ronald Strand and Massachusetts Juvenile Court Judge Garrett McManus ("Judge McManus").

In July, 2013, the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court, which has jurisdiction over divorce proceedings in the Commonwealth, entered a temporary order granting Amadi sole legal and physical custody of his four children.

In January, 2014, the DCF began a care and protection proceeding in the Juvenile Court and removed the children from Amadi's custody. He alleges that the DCF did so based on his gender and because its employees had "the dubious intention of transferring the custody to [the mother]". The DCF defendants respond that they commenced the proceeding and removed the children from Amadi's custody in response to two reports from mandated reporters alleging that plaintiff 1) was neglecting or abusing the children and 2) refused to cooperate with the subsequent investigation of the reports. The children were temporarily placed in foster care and the DCF developed "service plans" for the parents to complete in order to regain custody.

In May, 2014, the DCF returned physical custody of the children to their mother because of her cooperation with the service plan but it retained legal custody. Defendants assert that plaintiff neither completed his service plan nor cooperated with the DCF.

Plaintiff submits that the mother regained custody as a result of gender discrimination and a conspiracy between JudgeMcManus and the DCF. Defendants vehemently deny plaintiff's allegations.

In March, 2017, the care and protection proceeding in the Juvenile Court concluded and shortly thereafter that Court issued a decision unfavorable to Amadi. Plaintiff has since filed an appeal to the Massachusetts Appeals Court from that state court decision.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff has filed two lawsuits in this Court concerning the custody proceedings. His first complaint in May, 2016, alleged, inter alia, equal protection and due process violations under the federal and state constitutions. This Court dismissed that case ("the Prior Action") in July 2016 based on the Younger doctrine. Amadi I, 2016 WL 3814597, at *5, aff'd, 2017 WL 7048503, at *1.

In September, 2016, plaintiff filed his second complaint reasserting his previous claims but also adding claims for retaliation and conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, intentional infliction of emotional distress, other violations under state law and a preliminary injunction. Amadi alleges that a conspiracy exists between Judge McManus and the DCF to interfere with his constitutional right to raise his children and that the DCF and its employees retaliated against him for filing the Prior Action by placing onerous restrictions on hischild visitation rights. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In October, 2016, plaintiff filed an amended complaint and defendants moved to dismiss again.

In March 2017, this Court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, citing the Younger doctrine and concluding that plaintiff had no likelihood of success on the merits of either his prior or his new claims. Amadi II, 245 F. Supp. 3d at 322. The Court also denied as moot defendants' motion to dismiss the original complaint and directed the parties to submit memoranda on the issue of whether the Court was compelled to stay the case pending a ruling of the First Circuit Court of Appeals on plaintiff's appeal in the Prior Action. Id. In June, 2017, the Court issued an Order 1) staying the case pending a decision by the First Circuit, 2) denying defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint as moot and 3) permitting defendants to file a renewed motion to dismiss after the stay was lifted.

In October, 2017, the First Circuit affirmed this Court's judgment in the Prior Action and found that it had properly invoked the Younger doctrine. Amadi I, 2017 WL 7048503, at *1. In December, 2017, the Court lifted the stay in the present action and shortly thereafter defendants filed the pendingrenewed motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

II. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim

A. Legal Standard

A plaintiff faced with a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) bears the burden of establishing that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). If the defendant mounts a "sufficiency challenge", the court will assess the sufficiency of the plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations by construing the complaint liberally, treating all well-pled facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Valentin v. Hospital Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 363 (1st Cir. 2001).

If the defendant advances a "factual challenge" by controverting the accuracy, rather than the sufficiency, of the alleged jurisdictional facts, "the plaintiff's jurisdictional averments are entitled to no presumptive weight" and the court will consider the allegations by both parties and resolve the factual disputes. Id. The court has "broad authority" in conducting the inquiry and can, in its discretion, order discovery, consider extrinsic evidence or hold evidentiary hearings in determining its own jurisdiction. Id. at 363-64.

To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In considering the merits of a motion to dismiss, the Court may look only to the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint and matters of which judicial notice can be taken. Nollet v. Justices of Trial Court of Mass., 83 F. Supp. 2d 204, 208 (D. Mass. 2000), aff'd, 248 F.3d 1127 (1st Cir. 2000). Furthermore, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Langadinos v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 69 (1st Cir. 2000). Although a court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in a complaint, that doctrine is not applicable to legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

B. Younger Abstention

Defendants seek dismissal because the doctrine of Younger abstention purportedly compels this Court to decline jurisdiction by abstaining from interfering with the custody proceeding in a Massachusetts state court.

As fully described in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Younger doctrine "counsels federal-court abstention when there is a pending state proceeding." Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979). The doctrine derives from "principles of equity, comity, and federalism." Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460 (1974). It recognizes that state and federal courts bear an equal responsibility "to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the constitution of the United States." Id. at 460-61 (quoting Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884)).

The First Circuit has identified a three-step analysis to determine whether Younger applies. Sirva Relocation, LLC v. Richie, 794 F.3d 185, 192-93 (1st Cir. 2015). First, the state proceeding must be a criminal prosecution, civil enforcement proceeding or a civil proceeding "uniquely in the furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions." New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989); see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 80-82 (2013).

Second, the case must meet the...