Amalgamated Transit Union v. New Orleans Reg'l Transit Auth.

600 F.Supp.3d 656

AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION et al.

v.NEW ORLEANS REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY et al.

CIVIL ACTION No. 21-1790

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

Signed April 27, 2022

Thomas M. McEachin, Benjamin O. Flaxenburg, Schonekas, Evans, McGoey & McEachin, L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, Michael Persoon, Pro Hac Vice, Despres, Schwartz & Geoghegan, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Amalgamated Transit Union et al.

N. Sundiata Haley, Haley Law Firm, New Orleans, LA, Ross Adam Ledet, Kriste T. Utley, Alexis R. Jani, Boykin, Ehret & Utley, APLC, New Orleans, LA, for New Orleans Regional Transit Authority.

Michelle Denice Craig, Rubiante Lolana Brown, Transcendent Law Group, New Orleans, LA, Ross Adam Ledet, Kriste T. Utley, Alexis R. Jani, Boykin, Ehret & Utley, APLC, New Orleans, LA, for Alex Wiggins.

SECTION I

ORDER & REASONS

LANCE M. AFRICK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is a motion¹ to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, alternatively, to stay proceedings pending arbitration, filed by Regional Transit Authority of New Orleans ("RTA") and Alex Wiggins ("Wiggins") (collectively, "defendants"). Valerie Jefferson ("Jefferson") and Amalgamated Transit Union ("ATU") (collectively, "plaintiffs") oppose² the motion. Defendants filed replies³ in support of their motion.

In their memoranda, all parties made extensive reference to a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"),⁴ which was attached to the motion to dismiss, but which was not referenced in, nor attached to, plaintiff's complaint. Accordingly, on April 20, 2022, the Court advised the parties that, pursuant to Rule 12(d), the motion would be converted into a motion for summary judgment, limited to the issue of arbitrability.⁵ The Court also provided the parties with an opportunity to file any additional materials relevant to the resolution of the motion.⁶ The parties declined to submit additional materials.⁷

For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts of the instant action, as alleged in the complaint, are as follows.⁸ Wiggins is the chief executive officer of RTA, which is a public transit authority.⁹ ATU is a labor union that represents individuals employed by RTA.¹⁰ Jefferson was an employee of RTA until she was terminated in September 2021.¹¹ She was elected president of ATU Local 1560 in 2019 and continues to hold that office.¹² As the chief officer and business agent of ATU Local 1560, Jefferson advocates for "better wages, hours, and working conditions" on behalf of the ATU members who work for RTA.¹³ Plaintiffs allege that Jefferson has engaged in public speech and association critical of RTA, including throughout 2021.¹⁴

On September 8, 2021, Jefferson was acting in her capacity as union representative when she learned that RTA was apparently refusing to comply with a recent agreement regarding emergency pay.¹⁵ She went to Wiggins’ office to inquire about the issue.¹⁶ Wiggins confirmed that an individual who had been involved in negotiating the emergency pay agreement had been fired.¹⁷ Jefferson understood this to be an indication that RTA intended to renege on the emergency pay agreement.¹⁸ Jefferson exited Wiggins’ office, stating, "Well, I know what kind of person I'm dealing with. It's on. I need to talk with my executive board."¹⁹

Less than an hour after this interaction, Jefferson was presented with a notice stating that she was being terminated because she allegedly told Wiggins, "[i]t's on now bitch," in a "threatening manner."²⁰ Plaintiffs claim that this termination was retaliation for her protected speech and association, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.²¹ Plaintiffs further assert that defendants have caused irreparable injury to Jefferson, in that the firing of Jefferson is intended to have a chilling effect on her advocacy on behalf of ATU members, in furtherance of their voluntary association.²² In addition, plaintiffs claim that defendants’ actions violated the First Amendment rights of ATU Local 1560 and its members.²³

Defendants assert that, pursuant to the CBA between ATU Local 1560 and RTA,²⁴ all of plaintiffs’ claims are subject to mandatory grievance procedures and arbitration.²⁵ As such, defendants submit that the Court must dismiss plaintiffs’ claims or, alternatively, stay these proceedings pending arbitration.²⁶ Plaintiffs respond that Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent dictates that plaintiffs must be permitted to bring their claims in federal court because the CBA does not clearly and unmistakably state that § 1983 claims must be submitted to arbitration.²⁷

II. STANDARD OF LAW

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the court shall grant summary judgment in favor of the moving party "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In determining whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact, the court may review the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any submitted affidavits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (the "FAA"), governs the enforceability of arbitration agreements in federal court.²⁸ "The Act provides two parallel devices for enforcing an arbitration agreement: a stay of litigation in any case raising a dispute referable to arbitration, 9 U.S.C. § 3, and an affirmative order to engage in arbitration, § 4." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. , 460 U.S. 1, 22, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). Specifically, Section 3 provides:

If any suit or proceeding be brought ... upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement[.]

9 U.S.C. § 3.

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

No dispute of material fact exists for the purpose of the instant motion: both parties agree that the CBA between RTA and ATU Local 1560 is a valid agreement. Thus, the Court must determine whether defendants have established that they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

"Arbitration is strictly ‘a matter of consent,’ and thus ‘is a way to resolve those disputes—but only those disputes —that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.’ " Gallagher v. Vokey , 860 F. App'x 354, 356 (5th Cir. 2021) (emphasis in original) (quoting Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters , 561 U.S. 287, 299, 130 S.Ct. 2847, 177 L.Ed.2d 567 (2010) ). The Fifth Circuit conducts a two-step inquiry when determining whether claims are referable to arbitration. First, "the court must determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute." Polyflow, LLC v. Specialty RTP, LLC , 993 F.3d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Will-Drill Res. v. Samson Res. , 352 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 2003) ). This inquiry entails two considerations: "(1) whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) whether the dispute in question falls within the scope of that arbitration agreement." Id. Second, if the court finds that the parties agreed to arbitrate, the court "must consider whether any federal statute or policy renders the claims nonarbitrable." Id.²⁹

Federal law governs the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. Savant v. APM Terminals , 776 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Masonite Corp. , 122 F.3d 228, 231 (5th Cir. 1997) ; Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456–57, 77 S.Ct. 923, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957) ). Nevertheless, "courts may draw upon state rules of contractual interpretation to the extent that those rules are consistent with federal labor policies." Id. (quoting Nichols v. Alcatel USA, Inc., 532 F.3d 364, 377 (5th Cir. 2008) ).

Plaintiffs do not dispute that the CBA constitutes a valid agreement to arbitrate. Instead, they argue that the CBA does not require Jefferson to submit her § 1983 claims to mandatory arbitration, citing 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett , 556 U.S. 247, 129 S.Ct. 1456, 173 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009).³⁰ In other words, they argue that Jefferson's claims do not fall within the scope of the CBA's grievance and arbitration requirements. Defendants do not address Penn Plaza in their memorandum in support of the motion, nor in their reply.

"In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, the Supreme Court clarified that, in the absence of statutory language to the contrary, a union may agree with an employer to submit employees’ statutory claims exclusively to arbitration or another non-judicial grievance procedure." Savant , 776 F.3d at 288 (citing Penn Plaza , 556 U.S. at 256–58, 129 S.Ct. 1456 ). "For that agreement to be enforceable, however, the CBA must ‘clearly and unmistakably require[ ] union members to arbitrate.’ " Id. (quoting Penn Plaza , 556 U.S. at 274, 129 S.Ct. 1456 ). The Fifth Circuit, in applying Penn Plaza , has held that, "for a waiver of an employee's right to a judicial forum for statutory discrimination claims to be clear and unmistakable, the CBA must, at the very least, identify the specific statutes the agreement purports to incorporate or include an arbitration clause that explicitly refers to statutory claims." Id. at 288–89 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ibarra v. United Parcel Serv., 695 F.3d 354, 359–60 (5th Cir. 2012) ).

Additionally, Penn Plaza instructs that a CBA provision which exclusively submits statutory claims to arbitration must be enforced "unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.’ " 556 U.S. at 258, 129 S.Ct. 1456 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. , 500 U.S. 20, 26, 111...