Amatucci v. O'Brien

Josephine Amatucci v. James O'Brien, Town of Wolfeboro,Dave Owen, Rob Houseman, Stuart Chase, and Shane Emerson

Case No. 15-cv-356-JL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

January 18, 2017

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

In this action, Josephine Amatucci brings claims that arise from: (1) a series of incidents that took place on May 7, 2014; and (2) a "No Trespass Order" ("NTO") issued by the Wolfeboro Town Manager and Board of Selectmen about two weeks later, in response to the events of May 7, that prohibits her from entering two town buildings. Before this magistrate judge for a Report and Recommendation is "Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Based on Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel" (Doc. No. 132) seeking judgment on the pleadings as to most, but not all, of plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff objects. For the reasons that follow, defendants' motion should be granted in part and denied in part.

Legal Standard

Pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court must "take all well-pleaded facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Najas Realty, LLC v. Seekonk Water Dist., 821 F.3d 134, 140 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing Gray v. Evercore Restructuring L.L.C., 544 F.3d 320, 324 (1st Cir. 2008)). Judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant is appropriate "if the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to establish a 'claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Gray, 544 F.3d at 324 (quoting Trans-Spec Truck Serv. v. Caterpillar Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 320 (1st Cir. 2008)).

Background

The factual basis for plaintiff's claims has been set out in narrative form, and in considerable detail, in the undersigned magistrate judge's August 5, 2016 Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 52) ("August 5 R&R"). On the assumption that interested readers are familiar with the August 5 R&R, or can refer to it, the court will not provide a detailed recitation of the facts here. Instead, the court will identify specific factual allegations, as necessary, in the analysis that follows.

Discussion

Relying on the doctrines of res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, and collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, defendants move for judgment on the pleadings on eighteen of plaintiff's claims, identified in the court's October 19, 2016 Order (Doc. No. 111) ("October 19 Order) as Claims 1(a), 1(d), 2(a)-(c), 3(a), 3(b), 3(d), 5(a), 8(a), 8(b), 11, and 12, and part of a nineteenth claim, identified in the October 19 Order as Claim 8(d). Specifically, "[t]he only claim that defendants do not claim [to be] barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel is [a] claim . . . against Town Manager [Dave] Owen for alleged defamation . . . and the corresponding respondeat superior claim . . . against the Town [of Wolfeboro] related to that alleged defamation." Defs.' Mem. of Law (Doc. No. 132-1), at 5. In this section, the court begins by outlining the applicable legal principles and then proceed to evaluate each defendant's entitlement to judgment on the pleadings.

A. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel

Defendants invoke both res judicata and collateral estoppel to bar plaintiff from relitigating various claims and issues that have already been decided against her in: (1) Amatucci v.Town of Wolfeboro, No. 212-2015-CV-095 ("Amatucci I"), which was litigated before Judge Temple in the New Hampshire Superior Court; (2) Amatucci v. Welman, No. 212-2014-CV-00114 ("Amatucci II"), which was also litigated before Judge Temple in the Superior Court; (3) State v. Amatucci, No. 464-2014-CR-00836 ("Amatucci III"), a criminal case prosecuted before Justice Patten in the District Division of the New Hampshire Circuit Court; and (4) Amatucci v. Town of Wolfeboro, No. 13-cv-501-PB ("Amatucci IV"), which was litigated before Judge Barbadoro in this court. While defendants invoke the doctrines of both res judicata and collateral doctrines, and rely upon the preclusive effect of both state-court judgments and a previous judgment from this court, the only legal principles necessary to rule on defendants' motion are those governing the application of res judicata in a second action in a federal court when the first action took place in a state court.¹

"[F]ederal courts generally have . . . consistently accorded preclusive effect to issues decided by state courts." Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980) (citing Montana v.United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) and Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947)).

The modern version of the [full faith and credit statute], 28 U.S.C. § 1738, provides that "judicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State . . . ." This statute has long been understood to encompass the doctrines of res judicata, or "claim preclusion," and collateral estoppel, or "issue preclusion."

San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 336 (2005) (citation omitted). Thus, with respect to res judicata, "[a] federal court must give preclusive effect to a state-court judgment if the state court would." Universal Ins. Co. v. Office of Ins. Comm'r, 755 F.3d 34, 37-38 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Atwater v. Chester, 730 F.3d 58, 63 n.3 (1st Cir. 2013)).

As for the elements of res judicata under New Hampshire law, the New Hampshire Supreme Court ("NHSC") has explained that

[t]he doctrine [of res judicata] prevents parties from relitigating matters actually litigated and matters that could have been litigated in the first action, if three elements are met: "(1) the parties are the same or are in privity with one another; (2) the same cause of action was before the court in both instances; and (3) the first action ended with a final judgment on the merits."

412 S. Broadway Realty, LLC v. Wolters, --- N.H. ---, ---, 147 A. 3d 417, 425 (2016) (quoting Merriman Farm, Inc. v. Town of Surry, 168 N.H. 197, 199 (2015)).

B. Stuart Chase

Plaintiff brings three claims against Stuart Chase. In May of 2014, Chase was the chief of the Wolfeboro Police Department ("WPD"). The court considers each of plaintiff's claims against Chase in turn.

1. Claim 1(a)

In Claim 1(a), plaintiff asserts that Chase violated her First Amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances on May 7, 2014, when he threatened to "get her" and to arrest her, and then caused her to be arrested after a traffic stop, in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment right to file an administrative complaint with the WPD alleging misconduct by various WPD officers. Defendants argue that Claim 1(a) is precluded by three previous judgments, including Judge Temple's order of dismissal in Amatucci II. With respect to Amatucci II, defendants are correct.²

Plaintiff's primary legal objection to defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is her argument that traditional rules of preclusion, such as res judicata and collateral estoppel, are not applicable to claims that have been asserted through the mechanism of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While plaintiff relies on Allen for the proposition that traditional rules of preclusion do not apply to § 1983 claims, the Allen Court actually held that the res judicata and collateral estoppel do apply in § 1983 actions. See Allen, 449 U.S. at 105.

In Amatucci II, Amatucci sued eight defendants, including Chase.³ In his order granting defendants' motion to dismiss, Judge Temple characterized Amatucci's claims as follows:

Amatucci brings nine counts against the defendants in her original complaint: (1) a claim that [WPD Lieutenant Dean] Rondeau violated Amatucci's due process rights; (2) a claim of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; (3) "a Monell claim" against the Town of Wolfeboro; (4) a claim of conspiracy to commit fraud and perjury; (5) a criminal attempt charge; (6) a criminal false misrepresentation charge; (7) a criminal conspiracy charge; (8) a criminal threatening charge; and (9) a false imprisonment charge.

Defs.' Mem. of Law, Ex. M (Doc. No. 132-14), at 2.

The first paragraph of Amatucci's complaint in Amatucci II states:

And Chief Chase in a bogus traffic violation, and an unlawful incarceration on May 7, 2014. In retaliation against the Plaintiff for demanding an investigation of criminal acts of police officer James O'Brien, and Lt. Rondeau.

Defs.' Mem. of Law, Ex. F (Doc. No. 132-7), at 3. Amatucci then elaborated:

On May 7, 2014 the Plaintiff went inside the Wolfeboro police department to complain to police chief Stuart Chase about the criminal act of Lt. Dean Rondeau, on August 21, 2013, when he [accused] Plaintiff of a bogus traffic violation, that she did not commit, and violated her right under the procedural due process of the law. Instead of accepting my Complaint and investigating it, as required by Internal Affairs, the Chief [lunged] at the Plaintiff and criminally threatened her warning her that if she ever accuses any of "his men" of misconduct again he will get her and come after her and arrest her. Which he did that same day, when he and another cruiser followed her with the lights and siren's [sic] on and accused her of speeding when she was not speeding, and put her in jail. IN RETALIATION. The police had no warrant. They arrested her and incarcerated her and impounded her car.

Id. at 12-13. Finally, in Count III of her complaint in Amatucci II, which asserted a claim under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), Amatucci said this:

Under the second requirement [for establishing a Monell claim], the Plaintiff establishes that Police Chief Stuart Chase in a deliberate act (of a decision-maker) with policymaking authority proximately caused her constitutional injuries. When under the custom ofthe Wolfeboro Police Department he refused to

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