Americans For Immigrant Justice v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.

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AMERICANS FOR IMMIGRANT JUSTICE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 22-3118 (CKK)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

July 6, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This case concerns conditions of confinement at four immigration-detention facilities. Plaintiffs are not detainees, but their respective counsel. Each Plaintiff is affiliated only with one particular facility, and each facility is physically located in a different jurisdiction none of which is the District of Columbia. Similarly, no Plaintiff has any ties to the District of Columbia. Defendants have moved to sever the case into four and transfer each sub-case to its appropriate jurisdiction. Upon consideration of the briefing,^[1]the relevant authorities, and the record as a whole, Defendants' [93] Motion to Sever and Transfer Venue is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. This case is severed as to three of the four Plaintiffs, each case to be transferred to their respective districts. The Court retains, however, what shall hereafter be captioned Florence Immigrant Refugee Rights Project v. Department of Homeland Security, Civ. A. No. 223118 (D.D.C.).

I. BACKGROUND

The Court addressed this case's factual and procedural background at great length in its last opinion in this matter, Am. for Immigrant Just. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Civ. A. No. 22-3118, 2023 WL 1438376 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 2023) (hereinafter, “AIJ”). In their operative complaint, five^[2]distinct legal services organizations seek a broad overhaul of all communications policies, technology, and access at four detention facilities, mostly on behalf of their clients (the vast majority of whom had not been identified). Id. at *1. Although each facility is ultimately answerable to Defendants-the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), the Secretary of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and the Acting Director of ICE-several layers of supervision separate Defendants from the local contractors entrusted with the day-to-day operation of each facility. Id.

Each Plaintiff is tied to a particular facility. First, Americans for Immigrant Justice (“AIJ”) advances claims on behalf of its clients at Krome North Service Processing Center in Miami, Florida. Id. at *2. According to Defendants, and as is evidently discernable from the public record, Defendant ICE owns and operates Krome, but contracts Krome's operation to Akima Global Services. Notably, AIJ has in the recent past chosen to contest their clients' conditions of confinement at Krome in the judicial district encompassing Krome and with their clients (not AIJ) as named plaintiffs. Id. (citing, e.g., Gayle v. Meade, Civ. A. No. 20-cv-21553 (MGC) (S.D. Fla.)).

In supporting declarations, AIJ addresses specific conditions that it considers to fall short of the relevant detention standards applicable to Krome, which are not applicable to other facilities. AIJ, 2023 WL 1438376, at *2. For example, AIJ complains that its attorneys cannot bring laptops or phones with them into visitation rooms, which is not required by the PBNDS, and that AIJ attorneys have had to wait up to an hour-and-a-half to use an attorney-client visitation room. Id. at *3. AIJ also claims that detainees “must make calls from telephones located in the open housing unit, which are within earshot of other detained individuals and guards;” detainees are not permitted to make phone calls from an administration office. Id. AIJ also alleges that the particular layout of Krome does not “provid[e] a reasonable number of telephones on which detainees can make [legal] calls without being overheard by staff or other detainees,” in violation of section 5.6(F)(2). Id.

Second, Plaintiff Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project (“FIRRP”) advances claims on behalf of its clients detained at the Central Arizona Florence Correctional Complex (“Florence”) in Florence, Arizona. Id. FIRRP claims that Florence has no private rooms in which documents may be passed between attorney and client; worse, visitation areas in which attorneys can share documents take place within a “cafeteria”-like setting. Id. at *4. FIRRP further alleges that legal calls made from all housing units “are never confidential” because other individuals are always within earshot, and “[n]o separate phones are provided for legal calls.” Id. Like AIJ, FIRRP also complains that the process for a free legal call is “extremely complicated” because it involves a “multi-step process.” Id.. Additionally, FIRRP claims that “officials at Florence and ICE have told FIRRP that scheduling legal calls is not possible, largely due to lack of resources and cost.” Id. (cleaned up). Finally, Defendants evidently concede that there is not VTC availability for attorney-client communications. Florence is managed and operated by a private prison company, CoreCivic. ECF No. 66-1 at ¶ 5.

Third, Plaintiff Immigration Services and Legal Advocacy (“ISLA”) represents detained immigrants at River Correctional Center in Ferriday, Louisiana (“River”), among other institutions. Id. at *4. River is operated by a private prison company as well, LaSalle Corrections. ISLA maintains that the main visitation room seats at River seats interviewees within earshot of a table used for in-person visitation. Id. at *5. ISLA alleges that their “clients have told [them] that their phone calls with us take place at a desk in a hallway. There are multiple desks in that hallway where guards are sitting doing work.” Id. These spaces are evidently the same as those used for prescheduled, attorney-client calls, even after it is ISLA that schedules the call with River staff. Although there is VTC functionality, Defendants admit that “[t]here are no privacy dividers at tablet kiosks” for VTC calls. ECF No. 71-3 at ¶ 5.

Fourth, Plaintiff Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services (“RAICES”) at one point represented detainees at the Laredo Processing Center in Laredo, Texas. Id. at *5. It has expressly decided to forgo taking on any further Laredo detainees as clients unless and until Laredo provides RAICES easier access to detainees. Id. RAICES alleges that, at some point in the past year, the walls between the private visitation rooms were so thin that sound carried easily. Id. RAICES also complains that, when they last provided legal services at Laredo, they could not bring laptops or cell phones into visitation rooms. Id. RAICES further claims that it cannot maintain a confidential call with a detainee (were RAICES to resume legal services to detainees at Laredo) because “other detained people and guards standing near the phone can hear our clients on the phone.” Id. Like Florence, CoreCivic operates Laredo. ECF No. 66-3 at ¶ 2.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Severance

The Court's discretion to sever claims into separate lawsuits springs from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, which permits severance of “any claim against a party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 21; see also M.M.M. on behalf of J.M.A. v. Sessions, 319 F.Supp.3d 290, 295 (D.D.C. 2018) (PLF). “In making this determination, courts consider multiple factors, including: (1) whether the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence; (2) whether the claims present common questions of law or fact; (3) concerns related to judicial economy, multiplicity of litigation, and orderly and efficient resolution of disputes; (4) the availability of witnesses and other evidentiary proof; and (5) the potential for confusion, undue delay, or prejudice to any party.” M.M.M., 319 F.Supp.3d at 295 (citations omitted).

The Court previously confronted this question in a very similar case, S. Poverty L. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Civ. A. No. 18-0760 (CKK), 2019 WL 2077120 (D.D.C. 2019). As here, a legal services organization, the Southeast Immigrant Freedom Initiative (“SIFI”) and through its parent organization the Southern Poverty Law Center (“SPLC”), sought better access to its clients at three ICE detention facilities. Id. at *1. Defendants, including ICE and DHS, moved to sever and transfer the case, characterizing the focus of the plaintiff's complaint as conditions of confinement at three distinct detention facilities. Id. at *2. In denying the request to sever the matter, the Court focused on the plaintiff's allegation that their clients' “difficulties accessing counsel at all three facilities .... stem from Defendants' administration of national standards, such as the PBNDS.” Id. In other words, because the case appeared to revolve around an administrative claim focused on conduct in the District of Columbia, severance was not warranted. See id. (“[T]he gravamen is not the practices of the different contractors running the three facilities, but rather Defendants' responsibility for enforcing their own standards.”).

Over time, it became eminently clear the gravamen of the matter was, in fact, conditions of confinement at three facilities. First and foremost, the Court subsequently concluded that an administrative-law challenge revolving around DHS and ICE failed as a matter of law. S. Poverty L. Ctr. v. U.S Dep't of Homeland Sec., Civ. A. No. 18-0760 (CKK), 2023 WL 2564119, at *4-6 (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2023). Moreover, after the Court entered a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiff on its punitive-detention claim, the case further centered on the precise details of each facility's restrictions on attorney-client communications. See S. Poverty L. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 605 F.Supp.3d 157, 164-65 (D.D.C. 2022). In particular, the Court settled a lengthy and costly battle over Defendants' compliance with the Court's preliminary injunction,...