Ames v. Bonneville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 93

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SHANTAY AMES, Plaintiff, v. BONNEVILLE JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 93, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho; CRAIG MILLER, in his official and individual capacities; and ANDREW CHAPPLE, in his official and individual capacities, Defendants.

No. 4:22-cv-00364-DKG

United States District Court, D. Idaho

October 1, 2024

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

HONORABLE DEBORA K. GRASHAM UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court are Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and two Motions to Strike. (Dkt. 38, 44, 45). The motions are fully briefed and ripe for the Court's consideration.^[1] A hearing on the motions was conducted on August 28, 2024. Having carefully considered the arguments and submissions of the parties and the entire record herein the Court finds as follows.

BACKGROUND^[2]

1. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff, Shantay Ames, began working for Defendant Bonneville Joint School District No. 93 (District 93) as a long-term substitute elementary school teacher in 2006. In the Fall of 2020, Plaintiff became a seventh grade history teacher at Rocky Mountain Middle School. The following school year, 2021-2022, Plaintiff transferred to a position teaching eighth grade history at Black Canyon Middle School. A male student, referred to in this case as John Doe (JD), was assigned to Plaintiff's history class for the 2021-2022 school year. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 13); Fed.R.Civ.P. 5.2(a)(3).^[3]

JD frequently engaged in offensive and inappropriate behavior at school against both students and teachers prior to and during the 2021-2022 school year.^[4] Plaintiff alleges that she was individually subjected to daily and escalating sexual harassment by JD beginning at the commencement of the 2021-2022 school year, and that she and other teachers tried unsuccessfully to stop JD's behavior using the disciplinary actions allowable under the school policy. Plaintiff claims school administrators - specifically Craig Miller, District 93 administrator; and Andrew Chapple, District 93 administrator and vice principal of Black Canyon Middle School - were aware of JD's behavior and failed to take action to stop JD from continuing his inappropriate conduct for several months despite reports by Plaintiff and other teachers.

On January 6, 2022, a meeting was held with Miller, Plaintiff, one other teacher, the District 93 Title IX Coordinator, and JD's parents to discuss JD's behavior. During the meeting, Plaintiff alleges she was verbally attacked by JD's parents and blamed for not preventing his conduct. Plaintiff left the meeting and went on personal medical leave thereafter due to the mental and physical strain of the circumstances. Following the meeting, Plaintiff alleges she was pressured by Miller to not file a Title IX complaint.

On January 18, 2022, counsel for Plaintiff sent a letter to Scott Woolstenhulme, District 93 superintendent, formally complaining of sexual harassment and discrimination by JD; stating District 93's administration had failed to take action; and requesting paid leave until the situation was resolved. District 93 declined Plaintiff's request for paid leave and initiated a Title IX investigation. Plaintiff contends the Title IX investigation process was “disturbing and upsetting,” and that she was forced to take unpaid leave during the entirety of the Title IX investigation - from January to April 2022. (Dkt. 39-1, PSOF ¶ 54; Dkt. 39-2, Dec. Ames ¶¶ 31-32).^[5] Plaintiff claims the toll of these events deprived her of access to the benefits of her employment, created a hostile work environment, impacted her mental and physical health, resulted in her constructive discharge, and, ultimately, caused her to find another occupation as she did not believe she could return to teaching.

2. Procedural History

On May 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Idaho Human Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. A Notice of Right to Sue was issued on June 2, 2022. Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit on August 22, 2022, by filing a Complaint alleging the following five causes of action:

Count One: Violation of Title VII and the Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA) for hostile work environment as against District 93.

Count Two: Violation of Title VII and the IHRA for retaliation against District 93.

Count Three: Violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 under the Equal Protection Clause against all Defendants.

Count Four: Violation of Title IX for actual notice against District 93.

Count Five: Violation of Title IX for heightened risk against District 93.

(Dkt. 1). On March 8, 2024, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts. (Dkt. 38). Defendants also filed motions to strike certain portions of Plaintiff's declaration and an exhibit, which were submitted by Plaintiff in response to the motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 44, 45). Plaintiff opposes each of Defendants' motions. (Dkt. 39, 48, 49). The Court will first address the motions to strike, as they are determinative of the materials properly considered on the motion for summary judgment, and will then take up the motion for summary judgment.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case, and a dispute about a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). The evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that summary judgment is proper as a matter of law. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce specific evidence of a genuine dispute of material fact supporting its claim or defense. Sonner v. Schwabe N. Am., Inc., 911 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2018) (“To defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party must produce evidence of a genuine dispute of material fact that could satisfy its burden at trial.”). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the respondent cannot rely on an unsworn affidavit or the pleadings; rather the respondent must set forth the “specific facts,” supported by evidence, with “reasonable particularity” that preclude summary judgment. Far Out Prods., Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 997 (9th Cir. 2001).

At summary judgment, the Court does not make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or determine the truth of the matter. Zetwick v. Cnty. of Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 2017). Such determinations are reserved for the trier of fact. Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 507 (9th Cir. 1992). Rather, the Court's role is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Zetwick, 850 F.3d at 441.

DISCUSSION

1. Motions to Strike

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[a] party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). Motions to strike objecting to evidence submitted in support of or against a pending motion for summary judgment “functions much as an objection at trial, adjusted for the pretrial setting. The burden is on the proponent to show that the material is admissible as presented or to explain the admissible form that is anticipated.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 advisory committee's note (2010 Amendments).^[6] At the motion for summary judgment stage, the focus is on the content of the evidence. Even if the evidence is presented in a form that is currently inadmissible, such evidence may be evaluated on a motion for summary judgment so long as it could be presented in an admissible form at trial. Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003); Burch v. Regents of Univ. of Cal, 433 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1120 (E.D. Cal. 2006).

A. Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff's Declaration and Statement of Facts

Defendants move to strike thirteen categories of statements and evidence contained in Plaintiff's declaration and statement of material facts filed in response to the motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 44).^[7]Generally, Defendants argue the statements and evidence are inadmissible hearsay, irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, inconsistent with prior deposition testimony, and lack personal knowledge. Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing the statements and evidence are admissible and proper for the Court's consideration on summary judgment. (Dkt. 48).

“‘[O]bjections to evidence on the ground that it is irrelevant, speculative and/or argumentative, or that it constitutes an improper legal conclusion, are all duplicative of the summary judgment standard itself' and unnecessary to consider here.” Holt v. Noble House Hotels & Resort, Ltd, 370 F.Supp.3d 1158, 1164 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (alteration omitted) (quoting Burch, 433 F.Supp.2d at 1119) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 2482); see also Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 665. “Similarly, the [c]ourt will not consider the parties' objections to the characterization of or purported misstatement of the evidence represented.” Holt, 370 F.Supp.3d at 1164 (citing Hanger Prosthetics & Orthotics, Inc. v. Capstone Orthopedic, Inc., 556 F.Supp.2d 1122, 1126 n.1 (E.D. Cal. 2008)). “Moreover, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 objections are unnecessary at the summary judgment stage because there is no jury that can be misled...