Amicus Assocs. LP v. N.Y.C. Loft Bd.

205 A.D.3d 639

167 N.Y.S.3d 386 (Mem)

In the Matter of AMICUS ASSOCIATES LP, Petitioner–Appellant,

v.NEW YORK CITY LOFT BOARD et al., Respondents–Respondents.

16038

Index No. 150485/20

Case No. 2021–01532

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

ENTERED May 31, 2022

Kucker Marino Winiasrky & Bittens LLP, New York (Jason M. Frosch of counsel), for appellant.

Sylvia O. Hinds–Radix, Corporation Counsel, New York (Daniel Matza–Brown of counsel), for New York City Loft Board, respondent.

Goodfarb & Sandercock LLP, New York (Elizabeth Sandercock of counsel), for Jaymie Wisneski, Jakob Boeskov, Morteza Saifi, Isabel Penzlien, Angelo Fabara, Nicole Noselli, Erik Wysocan, Nihn Wysocan, Trevor Clark, Patricia Dwyer, Vera Correll and Daphne Correll, respondents.

Webber, J.P., Kern, Oing, Scarpulla, Pitt, JJ.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Melissa A. Crane, J.), entered on or about March 29, 2021, denying the petition to annul a determination of respondent New York City Loft Board, dated September 19, 2019, which had denied petitioner's application for a second extension of code compliance deadlines and for an order declaring that New York City Loft Board Regulations (29 RCNY) § 2–01(b)(3) was ultra vires, and dismissing the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The Loft Board rationally denied petitioner's application. Petitioner's request for an extension exceeded the time limitation for extensions set forth in 29 RCNY 2–01(b)(3), and petitioner failed to sustain its heavy burden of establishing that the limitation is so lacking in reason that it is essentially arbitrary (see Matter of Tri–City, LLC v. New York City Taxi & Limousine Commn., 189 A.D.3d 652, 652, 138 N.Y.S.3d 30 [1st Dept. 2020] ; Columbus 95th St., LLC v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 81 A.D.3d 269, 276, 916 N.Y.S.2d 2 [1st Dept. 2010] ). Furthermore, 29 RCNY 2–01(b)(3) does not conflict with the provisions of the enabling statute, but rather, is consistent with the language of Multiple Dwelling Law § 284(1)(viii). Nor is the rule inconsistent with the design and purpose of the overarching statutory scheme (see Columbus 95th St., 81 A.D.3d at 276, 916 N.Y.S.2d 2 ; Matter of Association of Commercial Prop. Owners v. New York City Loft Bd., 118 A.D.2d 312, 314, 505 N.Y.S.2d 110 [1st Dept. 1986]affd 71 N.Y.2d 915, 528 N.Y.S.2d 537, 523 N.E.2d 824 [1988] ). The Loft Board also proffered a rational basis for treating petitioner's application differently from other, similar applications – namely, that the other applications predated the enactment of 29 RCNY 2–01(b)(3) (see Matter of Mount Bldrs., LLC v. Perlmutter, 200 A.D.3d 616, 616, 155 N.Y.S.3d 772 [1st Dept. 2021], lv...