Amos v. Welles

477 F.Supp.3d 408

Michael Don AMOS, Plaintiff,

v.Bill WELLES, and Doug Henry Buick GMC, Inc., Defendants.

No. 4:18-CV-28-D

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Eastern Division.

Signed March 2, 2020

Michael Don Amos, Morehead City, NC, pro se.

Jonathan Travis Hockaday, Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, Raleigh, NC, for Defendants.

ORDER

JAMES C. DEVER III, United States District Judge

On March 27, 2018, Michael Don Amos ("Amos" or "plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, filed suit against Bill Welles ("Welles") and Doug Henry Buick GMC, Inc. ("Henry Buick GMC," or "defendant") alleging that Welles and Henry Buick GMC violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII") and the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111, et seq. ("ADA") [D.E. 5]. Amos alleges that Welles planned to transfer Amos from his role as general sales manager for Henry Buick GMC to another sales position at Doug Henry of Kinston, Inc., and ultimately fired Amos, because of his "health issues." See id. at 2-4; [D.E. 5-1] 1. On October 25, 2018, this court dismissed Amos's Title VII and ADA claims against Welles and dismissed Welles from the action [D.E. 29]. The court also notified Amos that he could file an amended complaint alleging Title VII violations against Henry Buick GMC, but if he failed to do so, any Title VII claim against the company is dismissed. See id. at 3. Amos did not file an amended complaint. Thus, only the ADA claim against Henry Buick GMC remains.

On July 9, 2019, Henry Buick GMC moved for summary judgment [D.E. 48] and filed a memorandum and documents in support [D.E. 49, 50, 51, 52]. Henry Buick GMC argues that it terminated Amos's employment because of Amos's subpar work performance, poor relationship with a co-worker, and a profanity-laden phone conversation with Welles. See Def.’s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. [D.E. 49] 4-10. On the same date, the court notified Amos about defendant's motion for summary judgment, the response deadline, and the consequences of failing to respond [D.E. 52]. See Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam). On September 5, 2019, Amos replied in opposition [D.E. 57] and filed several documents [D.E. 58, 59, 60]. As explained below, the court grants Henry Buick GMC's motion for summary judgment.

I.

Doug Henry ("Henry") owns numerous car dealerships bearing his name in eastern North Carolina, including Henry Buick GMC. See Doug Henry Pep. [D.E. 52-6] 4. On February 22, 2016, Doug Henry of Kinston, Inc., hired Amos as a sales manager, an at-will position. See [D.E. 51] ¶ 1;¹ [D.E. 52-8]; Amos Dep. [D.E. 60-6] 10, 23. Before his hiring, both the general sales manager, Ross Mills ("Mills"), and the general manager, Welles, interviewed Amos. See [D.E. 51] ¶ 2; see also Welles Dep. [D.E. 60-1] 4-5; Mills Dep. [D.E. 60-2] 3-4; cf. [D.E. 58] 2. On the date of hiring, Amos signed a "Receipt & Acknowledgment of DH Auto Group Employee Handbook." [60-16]; see [D.E. 51] ¶ 5; cf. [D.E. 58] 2. Under the heading "Personal Conduct," the handbook states: "Improper conduct by and between employees and/or by and between employees and business associates on company premises or adversely affecting our work will not be tolerated. Any employee demonstrating improper conduct will be subject to disciplinary action including termination of employment." [D.E. 52-7] 8; see [D.E. 51] ¶ 5: cf. Amos Dep. 23; [D.E. 58] 2. The handbook lists as an example of "unacceptable behaviors" the "use of vulgar or profane language, derogatory comments, slurs, or verbal intimidation while on company property." [D.E. 52-7] 10; see [D.E. 51] ¶ 6; cf. Amos Dep. 23-24; [D.E. 58] 3. These behaviors "will generally result in disciplinary action, including immediate discharge." [D.E. 52-7] 10; see [D.E. 51] ¶ 6; [D.E. 58] 3.

On April 1, 2016, Amos was transferred to work as a sales manager at the Henry Buick GMC dealership in Goldsboro. See [D.E. 51] ¶¶ 8-10; Amos Dep. 25-26. At the end of 2016, Welles promoted Amos to General Sales Manager, where Amos reported directly to Welles. See [D.E. 51] ¶¶ 11-13. Very soon into Amos's tenure as General Sales Manager, Welles became dissatisfied with Amos's performance. Specifically, Welles observed Amos employ a sales practice with which he disagreed and received complaints about Amos's job performance from Henry and employee Tony Mallard. See [D.E. 51] ¶ 14-29; cf. [D.E. 58] 4-8.² Additionally, Henry Buick GMC's customer service ratings fell below the dealer-imposed target ratings. See [D.E. 51] ¶¶ 30-32. In February 2017, as Welles considered transferring Amos, Mickey White, Sr. ("White") approached Welles seeking a sales manager job at Henry Buick GMC. See [D.E. 51] ¶¶ 34-36; cf. [D.E. 58] 10-11. Later in February 2017, Welles hired White as General Sales Manager at Henry Buick GMC and spoke with Mills about transferring Amos back to the Doug Henry of Kinston, Inc., store as a sales manager. See [D.E. 51] ¶¶ 38-40; cf. [D.E. 58] 11. Welles planned for Amos's seniority, salary, and benefits at Doug Henry of Kinston, Inc., to match his seniority, salary, and benefits at the Henry Buick GMC store. See [D.E. 51] ¶ 41; cf. [D.E. 58] 11-12.

On March 6, 2017, White began working as General Sales Manager at Henry Buick GMC. See [D.E. 51] ¶ 43. On the same date, Amos was scheduled to leave for vacation. See id. at ¶ 42. Welles planned to notify Amos of his transfer to Doug Henry of Kinston, Inc., after Amos returned from vacation. See id. at ¶¶ 42-44. Another employee, however, told Amos that he had been replaced as General Sales Manager. See id. at ¶ 45. Amos then contacted Welles via text message and called Welles at the Henry Buick GMC store (the "March 6 call"). See id. at ¶¶ 46-47. In the March 6 call, Amos thought he had been fired and cursed and yelled at Welles. See id. at ¶ 48; cf. [D.E. 58] 12-13. When Welles explained that he planned to transfer Amos to Doug Henry of Kinston, Inc., Amos again directed "very vulgar language" toward Welles. [D.E. 51] ¶48; cf. [D.E. 58] 12-13. After this interaction, and while still on the phone with Amos, Welles decided to terminate Amos's employment because he believed that Amos's actions violated company policies. See [D.E. 51] ¶¶ 48-49; cf. [D.E. 58] 12-13. After Welles communicated his decision, Amos directed more profane language at Welles. See [D.E. 51] ¶ 50; cf. [D.E. 58] 13-14.

Amos argues that, before the March 6 call, he had informed Welles "of some health issues" he was experiencing and that he was "undergoing evaluation for the health issues." [D.E. 5] 4; see Amos Dep. 29-32; [D.E. 60-7]. Amos claims that Henry Buick GMC, through Welles, terminated his employment because Henry Buick GMC regarded Amos as being disabled and thereby violated the ADA. See [D.E. 5] 3. Henry Buick GMC responds that it terminated Amos due to Amos's conduct during the March 6 call with Welles. See [D.E. 49] 1-2.

II.

Summary judgment is appropriate when, after reviewing the record taken as a whole, no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ; Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325-26, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-55, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of initially coming forward and demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party then must affirmatively demonstrate that there exists a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. "[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Conjectural arguments will not suffice. See id. at 249-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985) ("The nonmoving party ... cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another."). Nor will a "mere ... scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party's] position ... be [ ]sufficient; there must be evidence on which the [fact finder] could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party]." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In evaluating materials submitted in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the court may reject inadmissible evidence described in such materials. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; Evans v. Tech. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 962 (4th Cir. 1996) : Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991).

A.

Amos has alleged no direct evidence of illegal discrimination under the ADA, and thus relies on the burden-shifting framework described in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 n.3, 124 S.Ct. 513, 157 L.Ed.2d 357 (2003). To survive summary judgment on his ADA claim, Amos must "produce evidence sufficient to demonstrate that (1) he was a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was discharged; (3) he was fulfilling his employer's legitimate expectations at the time of discharge; and (4) the circumstances of his discharge raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination." Reynolds v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 701 F.3d 143, 150 (4th Cir. 2012) (quotations and alterations omitted); see Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 272 n.9 (4th Cir. 2004) ; Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d 373, 387 n.11 (4th Cir. 2001) ; Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 252...