Ancherani v. City of Scranton

NELSON ANCHERANI, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SCRANTON, et al., Defendants.

3:13-CV-02595

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

August 8, 2014

(Judge Mariani)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 8) filed by the Defendants in this wrongful termination lawsuit. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will deny the Motion. Specifically, Defendants' Motion cannot be granted because the factual allegations that Plaintiff alleges do support his causes of action for procedural due process and First Amendment violations. At the same time, however, a lack of clarity in Plaintiff's pleadings prevents a thorough analysis of the connection that certain defendants had to the causes of action alleged. Accordingly, the Court perceives that the only fair and expeditious method of resolving this lack of clarity as to the actors against whom Plaintiff's valid causes of action are alleged is to require Plaintiff, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), to file a more definite statement setting forth with clarity and specificity what actions the defendants against whom this suit is brought actually engaged in to giverise to this cause of action, as well as which actions, as part of City custom or otherwise, might give rise to Monell liability against the City of Scranton.

II. Factual Allegations and Procedural History

This action stems from Plaintiff, Nelson Ancherani's, termination from his employment as a police officer with the City of Scranton Police Department on November 7, 2011. (Compl., Doc. 1, at ¶ 11.) According to the Plaintiff, "[b]efore being terminated, [he] was not given notice of the charges against him, explanation of the evidence against him, or an opportunity to rebut such allegations, which are all required before Defendants can terminate an employee," as part of a Collective Bargaining Agreement which has not been submitted to the Court. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Nor was Plaintiff given a pretermination hearing, as also required. (Id. at ¶14.)

Plaintiff then filed this federal lawsuit, which alleges two Counts: Violation of the Constitutional Right to a Pretermination Due Process Hearing (Count I) and Retaliation for the Exercise of his First Amendment Freedoms of Speech, Petition, and Association (Count II).

In support of the second Count, Plaintiff pleads that he "was an active speaker at City Council meetings, discussing many topics of public concern, including but not limited to union issues, budgeting issues, and the administration." (Id. at ¶ 17.) In discouragement of this activity, "[t]he Police Chief wrote an email prohibiting such public speech and any 'opinions of agency' at City Council meetings" and threatened "any officer who publiclydisagrees, contradicts, or questions the operations of [the] agency." (Id. at ¶ 18.) Nonetheless, approximately two weeks before his termination, "Plaintiff, as a citizen, spoke at a City Council meeting and criticized the administration [sic] handling of the financial affairs of the City and union issues." (Id. at 19.)

Plaintiff was also the recording secretary for the Fraternal Order of Police "and was extremely active in [that] union." (Id. at ¶ 20.) As part of his role in the union, "Plaintiff had approved the filing of an unfair labor practice . . . petition in or around April 2011 against the Police Chief for violating the Collective Bargaining Agreement and violating state law." (Id.) This petition "received wide news coverage" and was scheduled for a hearing approximately one week before Plaintiff's termination, though that hearing was continued. (Id. at ¶¶ 21-22.) "Yet within less than a week from the scheduled [unfair labor practices] hearing, which dealt with the unfair labor practice that was approved by Plaintiff along with other union officials, Plaintiff was terminated." (Id. at ¶ 23.)

Named as Defendants in the Complaint were the City of Scranton, Plaintiff's employer, (id. at ¶¶ 1-2); Christopher Doherty, the Mayor of Scranton during the time in question, (id. at ¶ 3); and an "unknown additional decision maker," (id. at ¶ 4). Plaintiff alleges that Doherty and the unknown additional decision maker both acted under color of state law to deprive him of his due process and First Amendment rights, (id. at ¶ 5), and that the City of Scranton failed to train its officials to avoid such conduct and "acquiesced in all actions taken by its public officials and personnel," (id. at ¶¶ 6-7).

Defendants then filed the present Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the Complaint should be dismissed on several different grounds, which are discussed below. (See generally Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. 8.)

III. Standard of Review

A complaint must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570,127 S. Ct. 1955,1974,167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).

"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,127 S. Ct. at 1964-1965 (internal citations and alterations omitted). In other words, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. A court "take[s] as true all the factual allegations in the Complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts, but . . . disregard[s] legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements."Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Laboratories, 707 F.3d 223, 231, n.14 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Twombly and Iqbal require [a court] to take the following three steps to determine the sufficiency of a complaint: First, the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.

Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013).

"[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not show[n]—that the pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). This "plausibility" determination will be a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.

However, even if a "complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).

[E]ven when plaintiff does not seek leave to amend his complaint after a defendant moves to dismiss it, unless the district court finds that amendment would be inequitable or futile, the court must inform the plaintiff that he or she has leave to amend the complaint within a set period of time.

Id.

IV. Analysis

a. Information Extraneous to the Pleadings

Much of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss hinges on the allegation that Plaintiff was seventy years old at the time of termination. (See, e.g., Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. 12, at 7.) According to Defendants, "[t]he gist of this matter is that the Plaintiff's employment ended when he turned 70 years of age in accordance with a plainly worded and long-standing Scranton City Ordinance that required Scranton City police officer's [sic] employment to end when he or she reaches the age of 70." (Id.)

In response, Plaintiff attaches a document to his Brief in Opposition that purports to be the decision of a labor arbitrator chosen by the City of Scranton and the Fraternal Order of Police to hear and decide a grievance filed by Plaintiff challenging his termination. (See generally Pl.'s Br. in Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. 15, Ex. A.) The arbitration purportedly resulted in Plaintiff's grievance being sustained with a remedy that required the City to reinstate Plaintiff to his former position without loss of seniority and with full back pay and benefits, less interim earnings. (Id. at 10.)

Neither the information provided by the Defendants nor the arbitration award provided by the Plaintiff is properly before the Court on a motion to dismiss. "To decide a motion to dismiss, courts generally consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). A "court mayconsider an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss; if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document." Id. (emphasis added). Courts outside this Circuit have found that in "the atypical situation where plaintiffs submit extrinsic documents in their opposition to [defendant's] motion to dismiss — if the extrinsic evidence is a part of the pleadings, it may be considered on a motion to dismiss." See Madu, Edozie & Madu, P.C. v. SocketWorks Ltd. Nigeria, 265 F.R.D. 106,122-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); ...