Anderson v. Anderson

FREDERICK ANDERSON v. MARILYN ANDERSON

AC 36338

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Argued January 22, 2015

October 13, 2015

Lavine, Mullins and Schaller, Js.

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Hon. Howard T. Owens, Jr., judge trial referee.)

Richard C. Marquette, for the appellant (plaintiff).

James A. Cuddy, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

SCHALLER, J. The plaintiff, Frederick Anderson, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the defendant, Marilyn Anderson, and issuing certain financial orders. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the court erred by (1) awarding $43,158.65 from the plaintiff's retirement account to the defendant, (2) awarding alimony to the defendant, while not awarding alimony to the plaintiff, (3) awarding the defendant certain real property in Jamaica, and (4) awarding attorney's fees to the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our review of the plaintiff's claims. In its memorandum of decision dated October 22, 2013, the court found that the plaintiff was "clearly responsible for the breakdown of the marriage," as a result of an admission by the plaintiff regarding multiple sexual relationships with other women. The court additionally found that there was one child of the marriage, who was twenty years old and presently enrolled in college. As it related to the finances of the parties, the court found that the plaintiff had a retirement account with a value of $95,643.97 and that the defendant had a total of $29,326.67 in two retirement accounts and would receive pension benefits upon retirement that would pay her $516.88 per month. The court further found, in relation to the marital property distribution, that the plaintiff was the sole owner of property located at 64 Terry Place in Bridgeport and that property in St. Mary, Jamaica was owned jointly by the parties.

The court then issued orders after considering the relevant statutory provisions, as well as the parties' assets, liabilities, income, and expenses. Specifically, the court ordered that the property located at 64 Terry Place, the marital home, was to remain the exclusive property of the plaintiff, and the property located at 633 North Ridgefield Road in Bridgeport was awarded to the defendant. Neither party was to be responsible for expenses related to the respective property of the other. The court ordered that the plaintiff's interest in the property in St. Mary, Jamaica, be transferred to the defendant. The court also ordered that the plaintiff pay the defendant $1 per year in alimony for a period of ten years from the date of judgment and $2500 toward the attorney's fees of the defendant. The court ordered that the defendant would retain her pension, with no claim to it by the plaintiff. The court lastly ordered the plaintiff to transfer to the defendant, by way of a qualified domestic relations order, $43,158.65, "due to an outstanding loan of $20,000 in order to equalize the parties' retirement accounts." The plaintiff filed the present appeal, challenging these financial orders.

We begin by setting forth the relevant standard ofreview. "[I]n domestic relations cases . . . this court will not disturb trial court orders unless the trial court has abused its legal discretion or its findings have no reasonable basis in the facts. . . . As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . . In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action. . . . Notwithstanding the great deference accorded the trial court in dissolution proceedings, a trial court's ruling . . . may be reversed if, in the exercise of its discretion, the trial court applies the wrong standard of law." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, 87-88, 995 A.2d 1 (2010).

With respect to the factual predicates for financial awards, the distribution of property and the underlying rationale for awarding attorney's fees, our standard of review is clear. "This court may reject a factual finding if it is clearly erroneous, in that as a matter of law it is unsupported by the record, incorrect, or otherwise mistaken. . . . This court, of course, may not retry a case. . . . The fact-finding function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties, which is not fully reflected in the cold, printed record which is available to us. Appellate review of a factual finding, therefore, is limited both as a practical matter and as a matter of the fundamental difference between the role of the trial court and an appellate court. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sabrowski v. Sabrowski, 105 Conn. App. 49, 53, 935 A.2d 1037 (2007).

General Statutes § 46b-81 (c) provides in relevant part that "the court, after considering all the evidence presented by each party, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the . . . dissolution of the marriage . . . the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates." Furthermore, "[o]ur jurisprudence requires the trial court to consider all the statutory criteria set forth in . . . § 46b-81 in determining how to distribute parties' assets in a disso-lution action. . . . We do not, however, require that courts ritualistically recite the criteria they considered, nor are they bound to any specific formula respecting the weight to be accorded each factor." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Casey v. Casey, 82 Conn. App. 378, 384, 844 A.2d 250 (2004).

I

The plaintiff first claims that the court abused its discretion when it failed to consider evidence presented at trial and awarded the defendant $43,158.65 from his retirement account. He argues that the court's attempt to "equalize the parties' retirement accounts" failed to take into consideration outstanding loans by both parties, rather than just those of the plaintiff. Put another way, the plaintiff claims that the court's financial orders were logically inconsistent with the evidence presented to the court, and, therefore, it could not reasonably have concluded as it did.

Although § 46b-81 (c) requires the trial court to evaluate certain factors before distributing the parties' assets in a marital dissolution action, it has broad discretion when applying the statutory factors to assign the parties' assets. See Emanuelson v. Emanuelson, 26 Conn. App. 527, 530, 602 A.2d 609 (1992). We also note that "[t]he scope of our review of the trial court's exercise of its broad discretion in domestic relations cases is limited to a determination of whether the court's conclusions were correct on the law and reasonably reached on the evidence. . . . The trial court has the best opportunity to observe the parties, pass on the credibility of witnesses, and weigh and interpret the evidence. . . . We will indulge every reasonable presumption that the court's action was correct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Collucci v. Collucci, 33 Conn. App. 536, 540, 636 A.2d 1364 (1994).

The court received exhibits and heard testimony regarding the retirement funds of the parties. The plaintiff testified that the market value of his retirement account was $116,239.06, with a loan balance of $20,595.09, which was the result of a loan he took out for his brother. The plaintiff further testified that he borrowed an additional $11,095.54 against his retirement account to buy a car for his personal use. The defendant testified that she did not know whether her retirement account balance ever exceeded $60,000, but that she withdrew $27,000 to assist with household bills after the plaintiff vacated the marital residence. In addition, the defendant testified that she withdrew $10,000 from her account to purchase a car for the parties' daughter. In sum, the evidence showed that the defendant's withdrawals from her retirement account were for marital and household bills, whereas the plaintiff's withdrawals were for personal expenses, unrelated to the interests of the family.

In the present case, although the plaintiff argues that the order regarding the retirement accounts was inconsistent with the facts presented at trial, we conclude that the trial court's award was supported by the evidence, and its conclusions and orders were in accordance with applicable law. The court therefore did not abuse its discretion in awarding the defendant $43,158.65 from the plaintiff's retirement account.

II

The plaintiff next claims that the court abused its discretion by awarding alimony to the defendant and not awarding alimony to him.¹ Because this claim requires two distinct inquiries, we determine first whether the court acted improperly when it awarded alimony to the defendant, and then we determine whether it acted improperly when it did not award alimony to the plaintiff.

We begin by setting forth the principles necessary to review both claims. "A fundamental...