Anderson v. Barkley

BRENDA ANDERSON, Administratrix of the Estate of Kimberly Anderson, Plaintiff, v. NATHANIEL BARKLEY, individually and in his official capacity as a correctional officer of

the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation;

THE WEST VIRGINIA DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS AND

REHABILITATION, an agency of the State of West Virginia;

JAMES E. JAMISON, individually and in his official capacity as a correctional officer of

The West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation;

DEVIN M. BROWN, individually and in his official capacity as a correctional officer of

The West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation;

SGT. ROBERTA M. EVANS, individually and in her official capacity as a correctional officer of

The West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation;

SGT. MARK A. GOODMAN, individually and in his official capacity as a correctional officer of

The West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation;

ADMINISTRATOR DEBRA MINNIX, individually and in her official capacity as administrator of

The West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation; and

JOHN DOE, unknown person or persons, individually and in their official capacity as correctional

officers of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Defendants.

KARA FALKNER, Plaintiff, v. NATHANIEL BARKLEY, individually and in his official capacity as a correctional officer of

the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation;

THE WEST VIRGINIA DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS AND

REHABILITATION, an agency of the State of West Virginia;

JAMES E. JAMISON, individually and in his official capacity as a correctional officer of

The West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation;

DEVIN M. BROWN, individually and in his official capacity as a correctional officer of

The West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation;

SGT. ROBERTA M. EVANS, individually and in her official capacity as a correctional officer of

The West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation;

SGT. MARK A. GOODMAN, individually and in his official capacity as a correctional officer of

The West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation;

ADMINISTRATOR DEBRA MINNIX, individually and in her official capacity as administrator of

The West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation; and

JOHN DOE, unknown person or persons, individually and in their official capacity as correctional

officers of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-00198

Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-00199

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA AT CHARLESTON

December 29, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending are motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants West Virginia Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Sgt. Roberta M. Evans, Sgt. Mark A. Goodman, and Administrator Debra Minnix in the related above-styled cases on April 6, 2020 (Anderson v. Barkley, No. 2:19-cv-00198, ECF No. 104; Falkner v. Barkley, No. 2:19-cv-00199, ECF No. 95).

I. Background

The original plaintiffs, Kimberly Anderson¹ and Kara Falkner, initiated separate civil actions against the West Virginia Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("WVDCR"); three WVDCR correctional officers, Nathanial Barkley, James E. Jamison, and Devin M. Brown; and three WVDCR supervisory or administrative officials, Sgt. Roberta M. Evans, Sgt. Mark A. Goodman, and Administrator Debra Minnix (together, the "Supervisor Defendants"). See Anderson, ECF No. 1; id., ECF No. 47 (Anderson Amended Complaint, hereinafter, "AAC"); Falkner,ECF No. 1 at 2; id., ECF No. 53 (Falkner Amended Complaint, hereinafter, "FAC").

The plaintiffs' operative amended complaints allege the following. Anderson and Falkner were female inmates residing at Tygart Valley Regional Jail, which is operated by WVDCR. See AAC ¶ 2-3; FAC ¶ 2-3. Barkley, as well as Jamison and Brown, were correctional officers at Tygart Valley, while Sgt. Evans and Sgt. Goodman were Barkley's supervisors, and Administrator Minnix was Tygart Valley's administrator. See AAC ¶¶ 4, 7-9; FAC ¶¶ 4, 7-9.

The plaintiffs allege that Barkley had a pattern of "act[ing] inappropriately with the female inmates at [Tygart Valley], including committing sexual assault, sexual harassment, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, and other illegal, threatening, or oppressive behavior." AAC ¶ 19; FAC ¶ 19. They allege that other WVDCR officials, including the Supervisor Defendants, were aware of Barkley's conduct. For instance, they allege that Barkley engaged in inappropriate conduct openly in front of the Supervisor Defendants; that he had been reprimanded or monitored by the Supervisor Defendants based on his inappropriate conduct with female inmates; and that he had been temporarily relieved of his duties of supervising female inmatesbecause of inappropriate conduct with them. See AAC ¶¶ 20, 22-24; FAC ¶¶ 20, 22-24.

The plaintiffs further allege that the Supervisor Defendants, despite knowing of Barkley's actions, allowed him to return to his duties supervising female inmates. See AAC ¶¶ 24-25; FAC ¶¶ 24-25. Upon returning to these duties, Barkley "sexually assaulted [Anderson and Barkley], sexually harassed [them], sexually abused [them], threatened [them] and oppressed [them] under threat of retaliation" on several occasions. AAC ¶ 25; FAC ¶ 25; see AAC ¶¶ 26-27.

After one incident in which Barkley sexually assaulted both the plaintiffs, they reported Barkley's actions to WVDCR officials at Tygart Valley. See AAC ¶¶ 40-41; FAC ¶¶ 39-40. The plaintiffs allege that the ensuing investigation was inadequate and found the plaintiffs' report unsubstantiated. See AAC ¶¶ 41-42; FAC ¶¶ 40-41. The plaintiffs further allege that the Supervisor Defendants retaliated against them by transferring both of them out of cells where they wished to remain housed, by ordering Anderson to be tested for drugs, and by firing Anderson from her position as a trustee for possessing contraband clothing. See AAC ¶¶ 43-46; FAC ¶¶ 42-43.

Based on these allegations, the plaintiffs, in Count I of their operative complaints, assert that the SupervisorDefendants were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs' safety by not sufficiently protecting them from sexual assault and retaliation, which amounted to cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the West Virginia Constitution and that the Supervisor Defendants deprived the plaintiffs of their "liberty interests, bodily integrity, right to equal protection of law and right to due process, and right to be protected from discrimination." AAC ¶¶ 53-55; accord FAC ¶¶ 50-52. In Count II, the plaintiffs assert that the conduct of WVDCR and the Supervisor Defendant was "atrocious, intolerable, and so extreme and outrageous as to exceed the bounds of decency and so outrageous as to offend community notions of acceptable behavior" and "so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure [it]," causing them to "suffer severe emotional distress, giving rise to a claim of compensatory damages against [WVDCR and the Supervisor Defendants] . . . and punitive damages against [the Supervisor Defendants]." AAC ¶¶ 57-59; accord FAC ¶¶ 54-56. In Count III, the plaintiffs assert causes of action for the "[t]ort[s] of civil battery," "civil assault," and "intentional infliction of emotional distress/outrage" against the Supervisor Defendants. AAC ¶ 61; accord FAC ¶ 58. In Count IV, the plaintiffs assert a civil conspiracy claim against the Supervisor Defendants. See AAC ¶¶62-64; FAC ¶¶ 59-61. In Count V, the plaintiffs assert that the Supervisor Defendants retaliated against them; that the Supervisor Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the abuse they suffered at Barkley's hands as well as in hiring, training, and supervising Barkley; and that WVDCR is vicariously liable for the Supervisor Defendants' deliberate indifference. See AAC ¶¶ 65-71; FAC ¶¶ 62-68. Both complaints seek monetary damages. AAC at 15; FAC at 14.²

Following the close of discovery, WVDCR and the Supervisor Defendants filed the current motions for summary judgment. See Anderson, ECF No. 36; id., ECF No. 104; Falkner, ECF No. 71; id., ECF No. 95. The motions have been fully briefed and are ready for disposition.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it "might affect theoutcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651, 657 (2014) (per curiam).

III. Discussion

A. Section 1983 claims against WVDCR and the Supervisor Defendants in their official capacities

WVDCR and the Supervisor Defendants first argue that they are entitled to summary judgment to the extent the plaintiffs assert § 1983 claims against WVDCR and against the Supervisor Defendants in their official capacities.

Although the operative complaints specify that the Supervisor Defendants are sued in both their individual and official capacities, see AAC at 1; FAC at 1, the plaintiffs state in their summary-judgment briefing that they are "only alleging federal claims under . . . § 1983 against [the Supervisor Defendants] in their individual capacities" and "not . . . in their official capacities." Anderson, ECF No. 112 at10 & n.1; accord Falkner, ECF No. 101 at 9 & n.1. Further, although Count V appears to assert a federal constitutional claim against WVDCR for deliberate indifference, the plaintiffs reiterate that the...