Anderson v. Hansen

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KATHERINE ANDERSON, et. al., Plaintiffs, v. JEFFREY HANSEN, Defendant.

No. 4:20-CV-00991-JAR

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

April 28, 2023

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN A. ROSS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Jeffrey Hansen's Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 101). The motion is fully briefed and ready for disposition. For the reasons outlined below, the Court will grant, in part, and deny, in part, the Motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Katherine Anderson and Jeff Hansen (“Hansen”) attended the American Family Life Insurance Company (“AFLAC”) Galaxy Group Meeting in St. Louis on August 29-30, 2018. (ECF No. 104-2). Ms. Anderson was an independently contracted Regional Sales Coordinator for AFLAC, and Hansen worked for AFLAC as a Business Development Manager. On the evening of August 29, Ms. Anderson consumed approximately five alcoholic drinks, and reported feeling “tipsy.” (ECF No. 115-2 at 4-5). Later that night, Hansen offered to buy Ms. Anderson a drink, but she declined. Hansen allegedly took a drink out of Ms Anderson's hands, handed her the drink he had purchased and encouraged her to finish the drink. Id. at 5. Ms. Anderson claims that her colleague, Laura Marcotte, tried a sip of the drink, but Hansen took it back and returned it to Ms. Anderson. Id. Ms. Marcotte recalls trying Ms Anderson's drink, but denies Hansen took the drink from her. (ECF No. 125-1 at 10).

After finishing the drink, Ms. Anderson began feeling dizzy. (ECF No. 115-2 at 5). Ms. Marcotte recalled that Ms. Anderson was unable to hold up her head or talk in a normal manner, and Ms. Marcotte believed Ms. Anderson was intoxicated. Id. at 6. Although Ms. Anderson believes she was drugged, no witness saw Hansen place a drug in her drink. (ECF No. 104-2 at 5).

Later that night, Ms. Anderson claims that Hansen knocked on her hotel room door, refused to leave, and raped her. (ECF No 115-2 at 6). Ms. Anderson further contends that, during the rape, Ms. Anderson felt she had no control over her body. Id. The next morning, she felt dizzy and sick, and she threw up multiple times. Id.

Ms. Anderson went to the emergency room at Barnes Jewish West County Hospital (“BJC”) the following morning. (ECF No. 115-2 at 6). Attending physician Dr. Philip Chan stated that Ms. Anderson was too “lethargic” to resist Hansen's advances. Id. at 7. Dr. Chan ordered a urine drug screening test, which returned negative results. A toxicology screening from the Missouri State Highway Patrol Crime Laboratory Division also returned negative results, except for some residual traces of marijuana. (ECF No. 104-2 at 6, 10). Dr. Chan stated that the negative results did not rule out the possibility that Ms. Anderson was administered a drug, as also opined by Plaintiffs' toxicology expert, Dr. Sarah Riley. (ECF No. 115-2 at 6).

After the assault, Ms. Anderson experienced trauma-related symptoms. (ECF No. 115-2 at 7). She believes these symptoms made her unable to maintain a leadership position with AFLAC or, ultimately, to work with AFLAC. Id. at 7-8. Although she had the strongest sales and recruitment numbers out of the Central Territory for AFLAC, id. at 8, she did not apply for a promotion to Marketing Director when the position became available. (ECF No. 104-1 at 13).

Plaintiffs Katherine Anderson and her husband, Jason Anderson, entered into a settlement agreement with AFLAC on July 26, 2019 (the Settlement Agreement and General Release of Claims, or “SAGRC”). (ECF No. 104-2 at 1). Pursuant to the SAGRC, Plaintiffs released their claims against AFLAC in exchange for $750,000, $450,000 of which is compensation for Plaintiffs' “pecuniary and non-pecuniary” damages related to their claims against AFLAC. (ECF No. 104-3).^[1]The SAGRC defines these claims as invasion of privacy, infliction of emotional distress, defamation, tortious interference, personal injury, breach of contract, harassment, and discrimination. (ECF No. 104-2 at para. 2). The SAGRC explicitly excludes Plaintiffs' claims against “Jeffrey Hansen in his individual capacity” from consideration. Id. Finally, the SAGRC states that AFLAC has no obligation to continue an independent contractor or employment relationship with Ms. Anderson. (ECF No. 104-2 at 4-5).

On July 30, 2020, Plaintiffs commenced this action against Hansen for: (i) Battery by the administration of an intoxicating substance without Ms. Anderson's consent, (Count I); (ii) Assault, (Count II); (iii) False Imprisonment, (Count III); (iv) Battery by forcible sexual contact with Ms. Anderson, (Count IV), and (v) Loss of Consortium for Mr. Anderson, (Count VI).^[2](ECF No. 1).

On February 6, 2023, Hansen moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims for damages in Counts I, II, III and IV of her complaint, as well as for summary judgment on the merits of Count I. (ECF No. 101). As to Plaintiffs' damages claim, Hansen argues that Plaintiffs waived their right to pursue past therapy bills and have been fully satisfied for any injury after settling their claims with AFLAC. (ECF No. 104-1). Hansen further asserts that Ms. Anderson did not suffer any lost income. Finally, Hansen argues he is entitled to summary judgment as to Count I because no evidence supports Ms. Anderson's claim that Hansen placed a drug in her drink. Id.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists in the case and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The initial burden is placed on the moving party. City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988). If the record demonstrates that no genuine issue of fact is in dispute, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party, who must set forth affirmative evidence and specific facts showing a genuine dispute on that issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The Court must review the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, give that party the benefit of any inferences that logically can be drawn from those facts, and resolve all conflicts of evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. Osborn v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 853 F.2d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 1988).

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiffs' Ability to Recover Future Medical Damages

Initially, Hansen argued that Plaintiffs' counsel sent an email, dated January 25, 2023, withdrawing their claim for past and future medical expenses. (ECF No. 104-1 at 6). Plaintiffs clarified that the January 25, 2023 email did not mention waiving any claim for medical expenses. (ECF No. 115-1 at 11). Instead, the email waived reimbursement for the costs of Ms. Anderson's “current and ongoing therapy” only, leaving her claims for “past” therapy outstanding. Id. In his reply brief, Hansen conceded that the January 25, 2023 email waived only future and current therapy bills. (ECF No. 125 at 15). Hanson, for the first time, argued that Plaintiffs provided no evidence of payment for her past therapy bills, and therefore they cannot submit these damages to a jury. Id. at 16.

“Absent some reason for failing to raise an argument in an opening brief, this [C]ourt will not consider an argument first raised in a reply brief.” Torres v. City of St. Louis, 39 F.4th 494, 503 n.5 (8th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations omitted) (modification in original). Hansen failed to raise his argument regarding Plaintiffs' therapy bills in his Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 104-1), thus waiving this argument. In any event, whether Plaintiffs provided sufficient proof of damages is a question for the jury, rather than for the Court. See Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. Reynolds, Inc., No. 4:05CV1116 CDP, 2007 WL 1198889, at *2-3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 19, 2007).

The Court holds that there was no waiver of Ms. Anderson's claim for these damages and denies Hansen's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' medical damages.

II. Plaintiffs' Ability to Recover Compensatory Damages

A. The SAGRC

Hansen argues that the SAGRC precludes Plaintiffs' claims for loss of income. (ECF No. 104-1 at 5-6). The SAGRC states that Plaintiffs and AFLAC agreed that $450,000 of the total $750,000 settlement compensated Plaintiffs for “any and all” alleged lost 1099 income with AFLAC, as well as emotional distress, humiliation, and embarrassment Plaintiffs suffered in connection with the claims. Id. at 6. Hansen contends that the SAGRC satisfies any damages to which Plaintiffs might be entitled in three ways: (i) it satisfies damages for which both Hansen and AFLAC are jointly and severally liable as joint tortfeasors; (ii) it fully satisfies Plaintiffs' damages for their stated injury; and (iii) it released Ms. Anderson's claim of future lost earning capacity.

1. Joint Tortfeasor Liability

Hansen asserts that he and AFLAC are joint tortfeasors because Plaintiffs' damages arose out of the alleged assault on August 28-29, 2018. (ECF No. 104- 1 at 6-7). Hansen maintains that Plaintiff suffered a “single indivisible injury”, although caused by independent and concurring wrongful acts, making them joint tortfeasors. Id. at 7; ECF No. 125 at 6-7.

In response, Plaintiffs note that their settlement demand asserted separate claims against Hansen and AFLAC. (ECF No 115-1 at 3). That is, Plaintiffs alleged assault, battery, and outrageous conduct claims against Hansen, are separate from claims for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, and violations of Title VII against AFLAC. Id. The SAGRC limits the settlement release to Plaintiffs' claims asserted “against AFLAC”. (ECF No. 115-1 at 3). The SAGRC defines the claims...