Anderson v. Moore, Case No: 5:15-cv-26-Oc-30PRL

GEOFFREY H. ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. JOHN MOORE, CHARLES W. RUSSELL, SCOTT PENVOSE,and SHERIFF GARY S. BORDERS, in his official capacity, Defendants.

Case No: 5:15-cv-26-Oc-30PRL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA OCALA DIVISION

August 16, 2016

ORDER

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendant Sheriff Gary S. Borders' ("Sheriff Borders") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 84), Plaintiff's response in opposition (Doc. 98), Defendants Officer John Moore, Officer Charles Russell, and Officer Scott Penvose's (collectively, the "Officer Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 110), and Plaintiff's response in opposition (Doc. 112). The Court, having reviewed the motions and responses, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, concludes that Sheriff Border's motion should be granted and the Officer Defendants' motion should be granted in part and denied in part.

UNDISPUTED FACTS¹

I. Facts Relating to Plaintiff's Claims Against the Officer Defendants

On the morning of January 23, 2011, Groveland Police Department ("GPD") Officer Scott Penvose and his partner were looking for a suspect, Russell Drawdy, who was wanted under an arrest warrant for domestic violence.² Although Drawdy informed the GPD that he was in Orange County, Florida, GPD officers received a tip through dispatch that Drawdy was seen at Plaintiff's residence at 410 Howey Road, Groveland, Florida.

When Officer Penvose and his partner arrived at Plaintiff's residence, Plaintiff saw the police car pull up and met the officers outside. Officer Penvose informed Plaintiff that the GPD was looking for Drawdy and wanted to search Plaintiff's residence. Plaintiff complained that GPD officers had been to his residence the day before looking for Drawdy and did not find him. Plaintiff told Officer Penvose that he was aware of his right to have a search warrant presented. When Plaintiff objected, Officer Penvose told Plaintiff that he could get a search warrant, and that if Plaintiff refused consent, he would arrest Plaintiff for obstruction of justice. Ultimately, Plaintiff consented to the search of his residence.

Officer Penvose searched Plaintiff's home for approximately ten to fifteen minutes; Plaintiff was not permitted to accompany Officer Penvose. Officer Penvose also asked Plaintiff to open a shed on the property, and Officer Penvose spent approximately one minute looking inside. Drawdy was not found at Plaintiff's residence and was later arrestedin Orange County, Florida. Plaintiff was not physically restrained during the search, and officers from the GPD did not return to his home.

Plaintiff had a second encounter with officers from the GPD several months later on August 5, 2011, at his new residence of 126 Jim Payne Road, Apt. F29, Groveland, Florida. Officer John Moore and Officer Charles Russell responded to a call from a neighbor reporting that Plaintiff had broken into the residence. Specifically, a neighbor stated that Plaintiff entered the residence through a window and Plaintiff "was not supposed to be there." (Doc. 110, Ex. B). When the officers arrived at the residence, Officer Moore observed that the front window to the residence was unsecured, and Officer Russell observed that the back window was broken. Officer Moore pulled back the blind on the unsecured front window and observed no furniture or other signs that someone was living there. After making attempts to see if someone would answer the door and receiving no response, Officer Moore entered the residence through the unsecured front window.

Officer Russell checked a rear bedroom and found Plaintiff exiting the door toward him. The officers either ordered Plaintiff to the ground or threw him to the ground, and handcuffed and kicked him. Plaintiff was then placed on his bed while the officers asked him some questions. Plaintiff explained that he entered the residence through the back window because he was the current resident, and the property manager improperly changed the locks. The officers called the property manager who advised that he was in the process of evicting Plaintiff.³ Plaintiff was then released and no further action was taken.

II. Facts Relating to Plaintiff's Claims Against Sheriff Borders

Plaintiff was arrested on August 21, 2011. He complained of chest pains and was taken to the emergency room where he was treated. Following his arrest, a first appearance hearing was held on August 22, 2011. Plaintiff was unable to attend the first appearance due to his hospitalization. His absence was noted on the first appearance form. Plaintiff agreed that his health prevented him from leaving the hospital prior to his release. Plaintiff did not receive any communication from the court regarding his first appearance hearing, and Plaintiff never asked to contact a lawyer while he was in the hospital. A second first appearance hearing was not held for Plaintiff so that he could attend.

After Plaintiff was released from the hospital at 12:00 p.m. on August 22, 2011, he was transported to the Lake County Detention Center in a wheelchair. Plaintiff received a superficial medical screening when he arrived at the jail, but he asserts that his medical issues were not properly recorded by jail personnel. Plaintiff was then placed in booking cell B1A, which he asserts was a maximum security isolation cell. The cell had a bunk bed inside, but Plaintiff was the only person in the cell.

Prior to his incarceration, Plaintiff used a cane at all times to assist him in ambulating because he had a back injury from an incident in 2005 involving an altercation with the Tallahassee police. When he was transported to the jail, Plaintiff was permitted to retain the wheelchair until August 24, 2011. On August 24, the wheelchair was removed from Plaintiff's cell and he was unable to move around the cell to retrieve food or take care of personal needs. After the wheelchair was taken away, Plaintiff urinated on himselfbecause he was unable to get to the toilet unassisted. During this time, a nurse checked on Plaintiff to take his pulse and blood pressure.

Plaintiff alleges that on August 25, after the wheelchair was taken away, he attempted to commit suicide using the sheet from his bunk. Some unidentified individual, who Plaintiff refers to as a "jail trusty," interrupted Plaintiff's attempt by asking him what he was doing. Plaintiff was ashamed and told the "trusty" that he was trying to get to the toilet. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was transferred to the medical ward and provided a walker. He did not inform anyone else at the jail about his suicide attempt.

Prior to his arrest, Plaintiff was only taking aspirin for his heart, but he was prescribed several medications following his release from the hospital on August 22, 2011. Plaintiff cannot recall whether he received the medications at the jail from August 22, 2011, until August 25, 2011, but believes he began receiving medications later in the week after the jail received verification of Plaintiff's medical records from the hospital.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW

Motions for summary judgment should be granted only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 (internal quotation marks omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The existence of some factual disputes between the litigants will not defeat an otherwise properly supported summary judgment motion; "the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive law applicable to the claimed causes ofaction will identify which facts are material. Id. Throughout this analysis, the court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all justifiable inferences in his or her favor. Id. at 255.

Once a party properly makes a summary judgment motion by demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, whether or not accompanied by affidavits, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings through the use of affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The evidence must be significantly probative to support the claims. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.

This Court may not decide a genuine factual dispute at the summary judgment stage. Fernandez v. Bankers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 559, 564 (11th Cir. 1990). "[I]f factual issues are present, the Court must deny the motion and proceed to trial." Warrior Tombigbee Transp. Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 1983). A dispute about a material fact is genuine and summary judgment is inappropriate if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Hoffman v. Allied Corp., 912 F.2d 1379, 1383 (11th Cir.1990). However, there must exist a conflict in substantial evidence to pose a jury question. Verbraeken v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 881 F.2d 1041, 1045 (11th Cir. 1989).

DISCUSSION

I. Claims Against the Officer Defendants

Two claims remain against the Officer Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) violation of the Fourth Amendment by Officer Penvose regarding the January 23, 2011search of Plaintiff's residence (Count II), and (2) violation of the Fourth Amendment by Officers Moore and Russell regarding entry of Plaintiff's residence on August 5, 2011 (Count III). To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must establish that (1) the Officer Defendants' conduct caused the constitutional violation, and (2) the challenged conduct was committed "under color of state law." See Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1276-77 (...