Anderson v. Qdoba Restaurant Corp.

AMY ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. QDOBA RESTAURANT CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. 1:18-cv-03578-JPH-MJD

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division

July 15, 2021

PRETRIAL ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE AND RELATED ISSUES

James Patrick Hanlon United States District Judge.

Amy Anderson has sued Qdoba Restaurant Corporation for negligence, alleging that "a large Qdoba table umbrella . . . struck [her] in the back of the head with force" on a windy day in May 2017. Dkt. 1-1 at 4-5 ¶ 5. Both parties have filed motions in limine. Dkt. [63]; dkt [74].^[1] Ms. Anderson has also moved to admit the deposition of expert witness Bryan K. Rappolt, dkt. [59], and Qdoba has objected, dkt. [76].

Motions in limine are designed to "streamline trials and settle evidentiary disputes in advance, so that trials are not interrupted mid-course for the consideration of lengthy and complex evidentiary issues." United States v Tokash, 282 F.3d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 2002). Courts "have broad discretion in ruling on evidentiary questions . . . on motions in limine." Jenkins v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 316 F.3d 663, 664 (7th Cir. 2002).

I. Ms. Anderson's Motion in Limine

A. 2018 car accident and related medical records

Ms. Anderson was involved in a car accident in 2018, about a year after she was allegedly struck by the umbrella. She seeks to exclude evidence of injuries she sustained in that car accident and the corresponding medical treatment she received. Dkt. 63 at 3-4 ¶¶ 2, 4.

1. Similar or dissimilar injuries

Ms. Anderson contends that evidence about the car accident and her resulting injuries have "no probative value[, ] . . . would be calculated to mislead and confuse the jury, and work to . . . prejudice [her]." Id. at 3 ¶ 2. Qdoba argues that "relevancy will be established by both [Ms. Anderson's] treating physicians and [by its] expert, who will be able to provide the competent proof necessary to connect Ms. Anderson's injuries with her prior and subsequent events." Dkt. 87 at 1-2 ¶ 2.

"Evidence concerning prior similar injuries may be admissible for both substantive and impeachment purposes." Couch v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 F.3d 455 (7th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision) (citing O'Shea v. Jewel Tea Co., 233 F.2d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 1956)). In negligence actions, Indiana courts have held that "testimony as to a prior accident is relevant where there is competent proof from which it could be inferred that the injury complained of is attributable to the prior or subsequent event." Flores v. Gutierrez, 951 N.E.2d 632, 640 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011).

Ms. Anderson appears to concede admissibility if Qdoba offers "competent medical testimony" showing "a connection between this line of questioning and [her] . . . injuries." Dkt. 63 at 3 ¶ 2. Because Qdoba claims that its medical expert will connect Ms. Anderson's car-accident injuries to the damages at issue in this case, dkt. 87 at 1-2 ¶ 2, the Court DENIES Ms. Anderson's motion to exclude all evidence of similar and dissimilar injuries.

2. Healthcare treatment "unrelated" to conditions in issue

At the October 29, 2020 hearing, Qdoba's counsel stated that they plan to introduce medical records from ATI Physical Therapy indicating that the 2018 car accident caused "pain in [Ms. Anderson's] hips and legs, . . . swelling in [her] ankles, [a] fracture in her back, [and] bruising and bleeding." Qdoba contends that these records show that the accident was "severe" and that physical therapy would help "get her pain under control."

a. Relevance

Ms. Anderson contends that this evidence is not relevant to the shoulder injury that she claims to have sustained when she was struck by the umbrella. See, e.g., dkt. 63 at 4. Qdoba responds that the evidence is relevant for two reasons. First, its "expert will opine on [Ms. Anderson's] medical history that is causally and historically related to the issues in this case." Dkt. 87 at 2 ¶ 4. Second, Ms. Anderson previously claimed that the umbrella accident hurt both her shoulder and her hip.

Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make a fact" of consequence "more or less probable than . . . without the evidence." Fed.R.Evid. 401. Here, the medical records related to Ms. Anderson's car-accident may affect the jury's assessment of the source of her claimed injuries. For example, the jury may determine that a portion of Ms. Anderson's injuries were caused by the car accident, not from being struck by the umbrella. Or it may not. Either way, the evidence is relevant.

Ms. Anderson also makes the generic argument that the probative value of any evidence about the car accident is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues. Dkt. 63 at 3 ¶ 2; see Fed.R.Evid. 403. But Ms. Anderson has not explained how these specific medical records give rise to dangers of undue emotionalism or juror misuse. See dkt. 63. The Court DENIES Ms. Anderson's motion to exclude these medical records on this ground.

b. Privilege

Ms. Anderson claims that the ATI records relating to the 2018 car accident "remain[] privileged" under Indiana law because she "did not waive, nor . . . consent to, an invasion of her privacy with respect to medical/mental health records completely unrelated to conditions at issue in this lawsuit." Dkt. 63 at 4 ¶ 4. Qdoba responds that these records are not protected by the privilege because Ms. Anderson's "medical history is relevant to the condition at issue." Dkt. 87 at 2 ¶ 4.

Under Indiana law, a patient-physician privilege protects "matters communicated" to physicians by patients in their professional relationship. See Ind. Code § 34-46-3-1(2).^[2] However, "when a patient who is a party to a lawsuit places his mental or physical condition in issue, . . . he has impliedly waived the privilege to that extent." Doherty v. Purdue Properties I, LLC, 153 N.E.3d 228, 238 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020) (quoting Canfield v. Sandock, 563 N.E.2d 526, 529 (Ind. 1990)). There is an exception to the implied waiver that may apply in "rare cases" when the "party seeking to assert the privilege" specifically identifies documents that are "irrelevant to the condition in issue" and are "of a highly intimate or embarrassing nature." Owen v. Owen, 563 N.E.2d 605, 608 (Ind. 1990). Upon such a showing, the information "remains privileged and therefore protected from discovery." Canfield, 563 N.E.2d at 530.

Here, Ms. Anderson has placed her physical condition at issue in this lawsuit by alleging that she was injured and that Qdoba's negligence was the cause of her injury. See dkt. 1-1 at 5 ¶ 7 (Ms. Anderson alleging "severe and permanent injuries to numerous parts of her body" as a "direct and proximate result" of Qdoba's conduct). Thus, Ms. Anderson has waived the patientphysician privilege to that extent. See Doherty, 153 N.E.3d at 238. And Ms. Anderson has not designated any documents as irrelevant and highly intimate, or explained why certain specific documents should qualify for the exception to the implied waiver and be protected from discovery. See Owen, 563 N.E.2d at 608.

Because these treatment records relating to her car accident are relevant and not privileged, the Court DENIES Ms. Anderson's motion to exclude them.

B. Medical bills and payments

Ms. Anderson also seeks to exclude "[a]ny testimony or evidence of [her] medical bills and payments, adjustments and write offs by collateral sources or any evidence . . . concerning the amount of medical expenses she has incurred or paid." Dkt. 63 at 9 ¶ 17. She argues that she has "withdrawn all claims . . . for past medical expenses" and "will not offer any evidence as to the amount of the medical expenses." Id. Because she seeks only "general damages," Ms. Anderson contends that any admission of her medical expenses is irrelevant, prejudicial, confusing to the jury, unnecessarily cumulative, and protected by Indiana's "collateral source" doctrine. Id. at 9-14 ¶ 17.

Qdoba argues that the medical bills are "relevant and admissible to aid the jury in assessing the extent of [Ms. Anderson's] injuries." Dkt. 87 at 5. Qdoba also contends that Ms. Anderson has not withdrawn her claims for past medical expenses because she has not filed an amended complaint and that she has a Medicare lien against any recovery from this action. Id. at 4-5; see dkt. 94 at 2.

Federal Rule 403 allows a district court to "exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence."

Here the probative value of the medical bills is limited because Ms. Anderson does not seek reimbursement for medical expenses, see dkt. 63 at 9 ¶ 17, and Qdoba has not shown a correlation between the financial information on the medical bills and the nature or degree of Ms. Anderson's claimed damages. Moreover, evidence of medical bills may confuse a jury and cause undue delay. The bills' descriptions of medical services could require testimony of witnesses from medical offices about the office's labeling procedures and the treatments listed on each bill. And more probative evidence on this point is available, such as Ms. Anderson's testimony and the testimony of her treating physicians, see dkt. 58 (listing witnesses), which would make the medical bills needlessly cumulative. To the extent that the medical bills reflect reimbursements from insurance providers, this could violate Indiana's collateral source rule which disallows evidence about certain insurance benefits in personal injury suits. See Ind. Code § 34-44-1-2; In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., On May 25, 1979, 803 F.2d 304, 308 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that "...