Anderson v. State

692 S.W.3d 94

Courtney ANDERSON

v.STATE of Tennessee

Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, AT JACKSON.

September 7, 2023 Session

FILED October 18, 2023

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County, Nos. 9709924, 9701093, 9701094, 9701095, 9701096, 9701097, 9706852, 9706853, 9706854, 9706855, 9706856, 9706857, 9708272, 9708273, 9709654, 9709655, 9709656, 9709657, 9709658, 9709659, 9709660, 9708497, 9708498, Paula L. Skahan, Judge

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Andree Sophia Blumstein, Solicitor General; Nicholas W. Spangler, Deputy Attorney General; Steve Mulroy, District Attorney General; and Danielle McMollum, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellant, State of Tennessee.

Terrell Tooten, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Courtney Anderson,

OPINION

J. Ross Dyer, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Robert L. Holloway, Jr., and Tom Greenholtz, JJ., joined.

This is a State appeal, filed by the State Attorney General and Reporter, from the entry of an order granting the petitioner’s, Courtney Anderson’s, motion to reopen his post-conviction and amending/reducing his original sentence of 162 years, 11 months, and 29 days to a time served sentence of 25 years. The State appealed, arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitioner’s motion as it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations and the petitioner failed to prove the statute should be tolled. Additionally, the State submits that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to amend the petitioner’s sentence under the post-conviction statute and that the trial court’s actions amount to an improper commutation of the petitioner’s sentence. The petitioner contends that the State waived any challenge to the statute of limitations by failing to raise the issue below and that his claim meets the requirements of the statute and allows for the tolling of the statute, and therefore, the trial court properly granted the relief requested. Upon our thorough review of the applicable law and the briefs and arguments of both parties, we conclude that the instant petition is barred by the one-year statute of limitations and that the petitioner failed to establish and the trial court failed to find a proper basis for tolling the statute. Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitioner’s motion and amend the petitioner’s sentence. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court, reinstate the petitioner’s original sentence, and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Procedural and Factual Background

The petitioner was indicted for eight counts of felony theft of property, seventeen counts of forgery, and one misdemeanor count of possession of a handgun in a public place. See State v. Anderson, No. W2000-02071-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 912835, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 13, 2001), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 25, 2001). He proceeded to trial on one count of theft and one count of forgery, and a Shelby County jury convicted him of these offenses for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-one years. See id. After this Court affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal, the petitioner entered guilty pleas to the twenty-one remaining charges. See id.; see also State v. Anderson, No. W2000-00244-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 91734, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2001). The trial court initially imposed an effective sentence of 171 years, 11 months, and 29 days but later modified it to a sentence of 168 years, 11 months, and 29 days. See Anderson, 2001 WL 912835, at *2. The petitioner appealed his sentence, and this Court held that the trial court erred in finding the petitioner to be a career offender for his Class C felonies and remanded the case for clarification or correction of the sentences imposed and for resentencing regarding the petitioner’s Class C felony convictions. See id. at *3.

At the resentencing hearing, the petitioner received an effective sentence of 141 years, 11 months, and 29 days, which was to be served consecutively to his previous sentence of 21 years for a total effective sentence of 162 years, 11 months, and 29 days. See State v. Anderson, No W2001-02764-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 57421, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 6, 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 12, 2006). The petitioner again appealed his sentence as excessive, and this Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Following the appointment of counsel, the petitioner filed an amended post-conviction petition on October 5, 2004, claiming that counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the trial and appellate court levels. On November 15, 2005, the petitioner filed a "Memorandum on Post-Conviction Court’s Authority to Grant Relief," asserting for the first time that counsel failed to perfect his appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11. On November 18, 2005, following a hearing, the post-conviction court entered an order allowing the petitioner to file a delayed application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court and staying the post-conviction proceedings pending the final disposition of the delayed appeal. On June 12, 2006, the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the petitioner’s application.

On November 24, 2008, the post-conviction court entered an order dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief, and on December 16, 2008, the petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On December 18, 2008, in response to the petitioner’s first "Motion to Re-Open his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief," the post-conviction court entered an order finding that all issues raised in the "Motion to Re-Open" had been resolved pursuant to the November 24, 2008 order denying post-conviction relief. Anderson v. State, No. W2008-02814-CCA-R3-PC, 2010 WL 432414, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 12, 2010).

On December 5, 2022, the petitioner filed his second "Motion to Re-Open Post-Conviction and Reduce Sentence," seeking a sentence reduction under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(3). Per the motion, the petitioner alleged he was entitled to relief because his "sentence was enhanced based on prior felony convictions that are no longer considered felonies in Tennessee." The petitioner also alleged that he could overcome the applicable one-year statute of limitations because he diligently pursued his rights and the 2017 amendment to the theft-graduation statute was an extraordinary circumstance that prevented him from timely filing his motion.

The parties appeared before the trial court on December 13, 2022. At the outset of the hearing and prior to any argument or proof being presented, the trial court stated it had reviewed the petitioner’s sentence and determined it was "excessive." The court then confirmed it had prepared and signed an order granting the petitioner’s motion, resentencing the petitioner to a time-served sentence of 25 years, and releasing the petitioner that day. After the terms of the amended judgments were read into the record, the trial court voir dired the petitioner. The petitioner testified he was fifty-four years old and confirmed that he had been in custody for twenty-five years. He also stated that he had received his barber’s license While incarcerated and was going to live with his sister and work as a barber upon being released. The trial court then informed the petitioner that when his motion "came to [her] desk," she found his sentence was excessive and contacted the District Attorney’s office to "try to do something if we can" because "you were done wrong." The court went on to state,

So[,] it was all timing with Amy Weirich out of the office and the right judge who might be willing to do something to help you, it was all timing. It’s just the way I guess God looking down on you. So[,] don’t blow it.

….

Don’t blow it. Because things don’t usually work out like this, okay? So, that’s just the way I feel about it. It just worked out for you. You’ve done a whole lot of time. You got yourself in a whole lot of trouble. You messed up - I’m sure these forgeries and whatever, ID theft, all these things, you messed up people, you know, back in the 90’s. But that’s too much time, obviously, way too much time, and I know how Judge Dailey was. I - believe me, I practiced in there. It was not fun. They just piled up on people. But, anyway, I really, really hope we’re not going to see you back down here, okay?

Upon concluding its voir dire of the petitioner, the trial court entered its written "Order Granting Petitioner’s Motion to Re-Open the Post-Conviction and Reducing Petitioner’s Sentence." Despite the requirements of the statute, the trial court’s order did not cite the post-conviction reopening statute or include any of the findings necessary to grant reopening under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(3). Rather, the order summarily states that "[p]etitioner has articulated the required statutory grounds to reopen the post-conviction, as well as grounds to toll the statute of limitations." The order further states, "this court believes the original sentence to be excessive and a reduction is necessary." The only "analysis" offered by the trial court in its order was as follows: "This court took into consideration that [p]etitioner’s convictions are all nonviolent offenses, three of [p]etitioner’s prior felony [theft] convictions are now misdemeanors under Tennessee statute, and [p]etitioner has served 25 years so far on these sentences." The order concludes that "[p]etitioner’s new sentence will be an effective time[-]served sentence." The court then entered 23 amended judgments reflecting that time-served sentence.

This timely appeal followed.

Analysis

On appeal, the State insists the trial court 1) lacked jurisdiction "to reopen post-conviction proceedings because the motion was filed...