Anderson v. State

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Kari A. Dooley United States District Judge.

The petitioner, Lonnie Anderson (“Anderson”), filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 2011 conviction of assault in the first degree and assault on a peace officer. In response to an order to show cause why the relief sought should not be granted, the respondents assert that the state court decisions were not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court law. For the following reasons, the petition is DENIED.

Procedural History

Anderson was convicted after a jury trial of assault in the first degree and assault on a peace officer. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of eleven years, followed by five years of special parole. Anderson v. Commissioner of Corr., 201 Conn.App. 1, 6-7, 242 A.3d 107, 111-12, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 983, 242 A.3d 105 (2020) (“Anderson I”). In 2012, Anderson withdrew his direct appeal. Anderson v. Warden, No. CV15-4007068S, 2018 WL 6314677, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 2018).

In 2015, Anderson filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court asserting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at both his trial and on appeal. Id. Anderson argued that counsel

failed to present evidence at trial that would have supported a theory of self-defense and gave him unsound advice to withdraw his appeal. Id. at *1, 4. The habeas court denied the claim regarding the adequacy of counsel's representation at trial and denied certification to appeal that decision but granted the petition regarding the appeal and restored Anderson's right to appeal. Id. at *6. Anderson then appealed the denial of certification to appeal the denial of his habeas ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim and he filed a direct appeal in the criminal case, his right to do so having been restored.

As to the habeas appeal, the appellate court determined that the habeas court's factual findings were fully supported by the record. Based on those facts, the court agreed with the habeas court's determination that unheard testimony from the identified witnesses would not have supported a theory of self-defense to warrant a self-defense instruction. The appellate court accordingly determined that the denial of certification to appeal was not an abuse of discretion and dismissed the appeal. Anderson I, 201 Conn.App. at 15-18, 20, 242 A.3d at 115-17, 119.

In the direct appeal, Anderson asserted a related claim, that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense. State v. Anderson, 201 Conn.App. 21, 23, 241 A.3d 517, 518-19, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 984, 242 A.3d 105 (2020) (“Anderson II”). The appellate court concluded that, based on the evidence presented at trial, there was no reasonable basis to believe that Anderson would benefit from a self-defense instruction and affirmed the judgment. Id. at 29-39, 241 A.3d at 522-27.

Anderson commenced this action by petition filed on June 17, 2021. Although he does not clearly articulate his grounds for relief, the respondents have interpreted the petition to assert the two claims Anderson presented to the state appellate courts, that counsel was ineffective in failing to call witnesses who would have supported a justification/self-defense instruction, and relatedly,

that the trial court erred in failing to give a self-defense instruction.

Factual Background

The Connecticut Appellate Court determined that the jury could reasonably have found the following facts.

On the evening of October 6, 2009, State Marshals Arthur Quinn, Charles Valentino, Joseph Butler, and Richard Krueger went to 434 Indian Avenue in Bridgeport to serve a capias warrant authorizing the marshals to take [Anderson] into custody for failing to appear at a court proceeding. At approximately 7:45 p.m., the marshals arrived at the residence. Quinn and Valentino went to the front door, and Butler and Krueger went to the rear of the residence. Quinn and Valentino walked up to the residence and knocked on the door. Quinn and Valentino wore clothing that identified them as state marshals and displayed badges. Neither marshal carried a firearm. Valentino was in possession of the capias warrant and wore a utility belt on which were attached handcuffs, gloves, Mace, and a police baton.

An eight year old relative of [Anderson] answered the door, and the marshals asked to speak with [Anderson]. The child left and returned with Lyman Anderson, [Anderson's] brother. Utilizing a photograph of [Anderson], Quinn and Valentino recognized that Lyman Anderson was not the subject of the capias. Lyman Anderson then went back into the home, and [Anderson] came to the front door.

[Anderson] arrived at the front door armed with a nine millimeter semiautomatic pistol that he kept concealed in his sweatpants. Upon inquiry about his identity, [Anderson] falsely replied that he was John Anderson. The marshals responded that he was Lonnie Anderson, informed him that he had missed a court date, and stated to him that they had a capias warrant for him. The marshals told [Anderson] that they intended to take him into custody. [Anderson] took a step back, drew his pistol, and chambered a round. Valentino spotted the firearm and shouted “[g]un!” The marshals ran off the doorstep and headed in opposite directions.

As they were running away from [Anderson's] residence, Quinn and Valentino heard several gunshots and Valentino perceived a bullet passing near his head. Valentino heard additional gunshots as he sought cover behind a parked van. Valentino observed, through the vehicle's windows, [Anderson] standing on the top step of the stoop and shooting toward Quinn. Valentino also saw [Anderson] discard an ammunition magazine and reload a second magazine into the pistol.

As Quinn was running, he heard multiple gunshots and felt a bullet hit his left foot. Quinn also sustained a second gunshot wound to his right forearm. A neighbor emerged from his home with a towel to help stop the bleeding from Quinn's arm.

A few minutes later, Bridgeport Police Officer Hugo Stern received a call, via a police broadcast, about the incident. Stern arrived at the Indian Avenue residence and saw uniformed state marshals taking cover near a red vehicle. Stern also observed someone matching the description of the shooter. Stern aimed his gun at that person, who was [Anderson], and ordered him to raise his hands. [Anderson] complied.

As Stern cautiously approached [Anderson], he noticed that [Anderson] wore an empty holster on his right hip. Stern ordered [Anderson] to lie on the ground slowly, and [Anderson] complied. Stern directed [Anderson] to spread his arms and legs on the ground, and [Anderson] appeared cooperative. After Stern holstered his own weapon and attempted to handcuff [Anderson], [Anderson] resisted by rising into a crouch and acting combative. Stern saw [Anderson] reach into the waistband of his pants and try to retrieve an item. Bridgeport Police Officer Bobby Jones arrived at the scene subsequent to Stern's arrival and came to Stern's assistance. Both officers subdued [Anderson]. As the officers rolled [Anderson] over, they observed that [Anderson] had been lying on top of a semiautomatic handgun. The officers seized the weapon, and later testing demonstrated that the weapon was the same gun from which several shots had been fired. Additionally, the weapon had been reloaded with a magazine full of cartridges.

Anderson II, 201 Conn.App. at 23-25, 241 A.3d at 519-20.

Standard of Review

Before filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court, the petitioner must properly exhaust his state court remedies. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). He must present the essential factual and legal bases for his federal claims to each appropriate state court, including the highest state court capable of reviewing it, to afford the state courts a full and fair “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The petitioner must have presented his claim to the state courts in a manner sufficient to alert the state court that he is asserting a federal claim. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004). “The exhaustion requirement is designed to avoid the ‘unseemly' result of a federal court ‘upset[ting] a state court conviction without' first according the state courts an ‘opportunity

to … correct a constitutional violation.'” Davila v. Davis, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 2058, 2064 (2017) (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982)).

Further, the federal court will entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging a state court conviction only if the petitioner claims that his custody violates the Constitution or federal laws. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The federal court cannot grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a person in state custody with regard to any claim that was rejected on the merits by the state court unless the adjudication of the claim in state court either:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The federal law defined by the Supreme Court “may be either a generalized standard...