Andrews v. Eaton Metal Prods., LLC

MARINA ANDREWS, Plaintiff, v. EATON METAL PRODUCTS, LLC, and TIM TRAVIS, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-cv-00176-PAB-NYW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

September 8, 2020

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang

This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (the "Motion" or "Motion to Dismiss") [#18, filed March 4, 2020]. The undersigned considers the Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the Memorandum dated March 4, 2020 [#20]. This court concludes that oral argument will not materially assist in the resolution of this matter. Accordingly, having carefully reviewed the Motion and associated briefing, the docket, and applicable law, this court respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

The court draws the following facts from the Complaint,¹ and presumes they are true for purposes of the instant Motion.

Ms. Andrews began employment at Defendants Eaton Metal Products, LLC ("Eaton Metal") in or around March 2018. [#1 at 8]. In or around April or May of 2018, "an agent" of Eaton Metal asked Ms. Andrews if she was pregnant, to which she answered in the affirmative. [Id.]. Between April 2018 and July 2018, she asked to be moved closer to the restroom, but was denied. [Id.]. Between July 2018 and January 2018 Ms. Andrews took time off for doctor's visits and "maternity leave type situations," which she alleges were always approved. [Id.]. On or about January 13, 2019, Ms. Andrews was discharged from her employment at Eaton Metal. [Id.].

Proceeding pro se, Ms. Andrews initiated this case on January 21, 2020, by filing a form Employment Discrimination Complaint against Eaton Metal and Tim Travis ("Mr. Travis"; collectively with Eaton Metal, "Defendants") alleging discrimination based on sex and disability related to her employment with Eaton Metal and subsequent termination. See generally Plaintiff invokes Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1979 ("PDA") as the bases for her two claims. [Id. at 2]. Her first claim, in its entirety, states:

I was fired after I did not disclose my pregnancy in the interview. They did not make accommodations for me [and] fired me due to 'accessive [sic] absences' related to pregnancy [and] car accident. I was not given paid time off or FMLA. I was given a b[a]d review and can not find work because of it.

[Id. at 3]. The second claim states, in its entirety: "retaliated against my sons dad [sic] who also worked for company [and] fired him because of me." [Id. at 4].

On January 22, 2020, the Honorable Gordon P. Gallagher granted Ms. Andrews leave to proceed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and ordered the case drawn to a presiding judge. [#4]. Upon the filing of a Consent/Non-consent Form indicating all parties did not consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction, this case was reassigned to the Honorable Philip A. Brimmer, [#8], who referred the case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. [#9]. On March 4, 2020, Defendants filed an Answer and the instant Motion to Dismiss. [#15; #18]. The court held a Telephonic Status Conference in this matter on April 16, 2020, at which it set May 15, 2020 as the deadline for Plaintiff to respond to the pending Motion to Dismiss. [#28].

On May 8, 2020, Plaintiff sent the court an unsolicited e-mail message with the subject "Fwd: PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS." [#30-1]. The court advised Ms. Andrews that ex parte communications with the court are strictly prohibited, unless otherwise ordered, and directed the Clerk of the Court docket the email as Plaintiff's Response to the Motion to Dismiss. [#30]. On May 22, 2020, Defendants filed a Reply, [#43], and thus the Motion is ripe for Recommendation.

On May 26, 2020, after engaging in further unsolicited ex parte communications with the court, see [#45], Ms. Andrews filed a "Petition to amend claim due to excusable negligence" ("Motion to Amend"). [#48]. At a Status/Discovery Conference held the following day, the Parties agreed to stay discovery pending a Recommendation on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and ordered Defendants respond to Ms. Andrews's Motion to Amend on a normal briefing schedule. [#50]. On June 10, 2020, unrelated to her pending Motion to Amend, Ms. Andrews filed an Amended Complaint. [#52]. On June 24, 2020, in an Order addressing several pending discovery motions, the court struck the Amended Complaint from the docket because Ms. Andrews could not amend her Complaint without written consent of Defendants or leave from the court,neither of which had she obtained. [#58]. On July 10, 2020, after a Response from Defendants, the undersigned Magistrate Judge issued a Recommendation that Plaintiff's "Petition to amend claim due to excusable negligence" be denied. [#59]. Judge Brimmer accepted the Recommendation on July 27, 2020, and denied Plaintiff's "Petition to amend claim due to excusable negligence." Therefore, Plaintiff's Complaint [#1], remains the operative pleading in this case.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Rule 12(b)(1)

Under Article III of the United States Constitution, federal courts only have jurisdiction to hear certain "cases" and "controversies." Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014). As such, courts "are duty bound to examine facts and law in every lawsuit before them to ensure that they possess subject matter jurisdiction." The Wilderness Soc. v. Kane Cty., Utah, 632 F.3d 1162, 1179 n.3 (10th Cir. 2011) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Indeed, courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party. 1mage Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds, Co., 459 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006)).

Standing is an essential component of subject matter jurisdiction. See Chrisman v. C.I.R., 82 F.3d 371, 373 (10th Cir. 1996). To establish standing to invoke this court's subject matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff is required to demonstrate "(1) an 'injury in fact,' (2) sufficient 'causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,' and (3) a 'likel[ihood]' that the injury 'will be redressed by a favorable decision.' " Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). The elements of standing "are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. "[A] federal court can't'assume' a plaintiff has demonstrated Article III standing in order to proceed to the merits of the underlying claim, regardless of the claim's significance." See Colo. Outfitters Ass'n v. Hickenlooper ("Colorado Outfitters II"), 823 F.3d 537, 543 (10th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff must establish standing to bring each of the two proposed claims separately. See Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1106 (10th Cir. 2007).

II. Rule 12(b)(6)

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560 (2007)); Walker v. Mohiuddin, 947 F.3d 1244, 1248-49 (10th Cir. 2020) ("To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." (internal quotation marks omitted)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Cummings v. Dean, 913 F.3d 1227, 1238 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Allegations that are "so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent," will not be sufficient. Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012) (citation and quotation omitted). In making it analysis, the "court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in [the] complaint and views those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Straub v. BNSF Ry. Co., 909 F.3d 1280, 1287 (10th Cir. 2018). But, even so, a plaintiff may not rely on mere labels or conclusions, "and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110 (holding that even pro se litigants cannot rely on conclusory,unsubstantiated allegations to survive a 12(b)(6) motion). The ultimate duty of the court is to "determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed." Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007).

In applying these legal principles, this court is mindful that Ms. Andrews proceeds pro se and is entitled to a liberal construction of her papers. Smith v. Allbaugh, 921 F.3d 1261, 1268 (10th Cir. 2019). But the court cannot and does not act as an advocate for a pro se party. United States v. Griffith, 928 F.3d 855, 864 n.1 (10th Cir. 2019). Nor does a party's pro se status exempt her from complying with the procedural rules that govern all civil actions filed in this District, namely, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Practice for the District of Colorado. See Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1205 (10th Cir. 2018); Murray v. City of Tahlequah, 312 F.3d 1196, 1199 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008).

ANALYSIS

Upon review of the Complaint, the court understands Ms. Andrews to assert two claims, each under three federal statutes: Title VII, the ADA, and the PDA. The court considers each in turn.

I. Plaintiff's First Claim

Plaintiff's first claim alleges:

I was

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