Andrews v. Highmark Health

1

MARCHELE ANDREWS, Plaintiff, v. HIGHMARK HEALTH doing business as GATEWAY HEALTH, Defendant.

No. 2:22-cv-917

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

October 25, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Marilyn J. Horan, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Marchele Andrews, filed suit against Defendant, Highmark Health doing business as Gateway Health, pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. (ECF No. 1). Presently, before the Court, is Gateway Health's Motion to Dismiss Ms. Andrews's Complaint. (ECF No. 8). The Motion to Dismiss has been fully briefed and is now ripe for decision. For the reasons that follow Gateway Health's Motion to Dismiss will be granted.

I. Statement of Facts

Ms. Andrews began working for Gateway Health as an associate provider file representative. (ECF No. 1-3, at ¶ 6). During her employment, Ms. Andrews developed post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, and depression as a result of traumatic events that occurred outside of the workplace. (ECF No. 1-3, at ¶ 7). After developing such PTSD, anxiety, and depression conditions, Ms. Andrews continued her work at Gateway Health without any issues. (ECF No. 1-3, at ¶ 8).

Ms. Andrews took short-term disability leave from March 2019 until July 2019 for her PTSD, anxiety, and depression conditions. (ECF No. 1-3, at ¶ 11). Ms. Andrews continued to suffer from her PTSD, anxiety, and depression conditions when she returned to work. (ECF No. 1-3, at ¶ 12).

While Ms. Andrews was on short-term disability leave, Gateway Health updated its processing systems, which changed Ms. Andrews's job duties. (ECF No. 1-3, at ¶ 13). The Complaint alleges that upon her return from work, Ms. Andrews requested additional training in the new system on numerous occasions. (ECF No. 1-3, at ¶ 14). Ms. Andrews also requested an accommodation of reduced hours and the ability to take one day off per week, if necessary. (ECF No. 1-3, at ¶ 15). Gateway Health provided Ms. Andrews her requested accommodations of a reduced work schedule and an additional day off per week. (ECF No. 1-3, at ¶ 16). Ms. Andrews requested additional accommodations to transfer to a less demanding job and that she be permitted to work from home. (ECF No. 1-3, at ¶ 17-18). Gateway Health denied Ms. Andrews's requests for a job transfer and to work from home. (ECF No. 1-3, at ¶ 20). The Complaint alleges that other non-disabled coworkers were permitted to work from home on a regular basis. (ECF No. 1-3, at ¶ 19). The Complaint further alleges that Ms. Andrews did not receive sufficient additional training on the new system, which was different from how other non-disabled coworkers were treated. (ECF No. 1-3, at ¶ 21).

The Complaint alleges that, following Ms. Andrews's requests for a transfer and to work from home, her supervisor and manager began to over-schedule her hours and refused to permit her to take time off from work for her PTSD, anxiety, and depression conditions. (ECF No. 1-3, at ¶ 23). The Complaint further alleges that Gateway Health began issuing warnings to Ms. Andrews that she was not meeting expectations and that her employment was in jeopardy. (ECF No. 1-3, at ¶ 24, 26). On November 21, 2019, Gateway Health terminated Ms. Andrews's employment. (ECF No. 1-3, at ¶ 27). Ms. Andrews filed her online EEOC charge on September 16, 2020. (ECF No. 9-1, at 4; No. 12, at 5).

II. Standard of Review

When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Supreme Court clarified that this plausibility standard should not be conflated with a higher probability standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations of a complaint must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

A pleading party need not establish the elements of a prima facie case at this stage; the party must only “put forth allegations that ‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s].'” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Graff v. Subbiah Cardiology Assocs., Ltd., 2008 WL 2312671 (W.D. Pa. June 4, 2008)); see also Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 790 (3d Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, a court need not credit bald assertions, unwarranted inferences, or legal conclusions cast in the form of factual averments. Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997). The primary question in deciding a motion to dismiss is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but rather whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to establish the facts alleged in the complaint. Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 2000). The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to “streamline[] litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989).

Furthermore, “in evaluating a motion to dismiss, courts are not limited to the complaint, but may also consider evidence integral to or explicitly relied upon therein.” Tanksley v. Daniels, 902 F.3d 165, 172 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotations omitted). “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

In a civil rights case, when the court grants a motion to dismiss for a failure to state a claim, the court must offer the plaintiff leave to amend, even if it was not requested by the plaintiff, “unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 246; Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). Further, amendment is inequitable where there is “undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, [or] unfair prejudice.” Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Amendment is futile “where an amended complaint ‘would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.'” M.U. v. Downingtown High Sch. E., 103 F.Supp.3d 612, 631 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 175 (3d Cir. 2010)).

III. Discussion

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Gateway Health argues that Ms. Andrews failed to exhaust her administrative remedies because she did not file her EEOC Complaint within the statute's 180-day deadline. (ECF No. 9, at 6). Ms. Andrews argues that exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that should not be raised at the motion to dismiss stage. (ECF No. 12, at 3). Ms. Andrews further argues that she was only required to file her EEOC Complaint within 300 days of the last discriminatory action. (ECF No. 12, at 4).

It is well-established under Third Circuit law that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is appropriately raised in and is an appropriate basis for granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Angelino v. New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1999). Thus, the Court will analyze whether Ms. Andrews properly exhausted her administrative remedies pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Title VII sets forth EEOC administrative procedures that a plaintiff must exhaust prior to bringing a civil action in court. See Burgh v. Borough Council of Borough of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 469 (3d Cir. 2001). The plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. Id. at 469-70. Also, a charging party has up to 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice to file a charge if the charging party “initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

To pursue administrative remedies under the PHRA, a plaintiff must file a charge with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC) within 180 days of the allegedly discriminatory act. 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 959(a)(h). If a claimant fails to timely initiate and exhaust the PHRC remedies in this manner, he or she cannot bring an action in court. Yeager v. UPMC Horizon, 698 F.Supp.2d 523, 535 (W.D. Pa. 2010).

Here Ms. Andrews initiated her charge with the EEOC rather than the PHRC, and therefore, the 180-day deadline applies. The Complaint alleges that Gateway Health terminated Ms. Andrews's employment on November 21, 2019. Ms. Andrews filed her online EEOC charge on September 16, 2020, which was 300 days after she was terminated. As Ms. Andrews did not meet the requirements for filing her...