Andrews v. Taylor

FREDERICK J. ANDREWS, Plaintiff, v. VICTOR L. TAYLOR, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-533

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division

May 7, 2018

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on the Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Social Services, Division of Child Support Enforcement ("DCSE")'s MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 9) and the Chesterfield County Jail ("the Chesterfield Jail")'s MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 14). For the following reasons, the motions will be granted but the dismissal shall be without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

In this action, Plaintiff Frederick J. Andrews, proceeding pro se, sues the Virginia DCSE and the Chesterfield Jail on claims arising out of Virginia child custody and support proceedings. Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 5) with prejudice.

I. Andrews' Factual Allegations

Andrews alleges a variety of harms stemming from child custody and support proceedings. Andrews mainly claims that these proceedings did not afford proper due process in revoking his parental rights, granting custody to others, and imposing child support obligations.

Andrews also asserts that he was harmed in other ways apparently related to these proceedings. He contends that he received sentences of incarceration in the Chesterfield County Jail and the Richmond City Jail and that he was fined on one occasion. Additionally, he avers that the DCSE and the Chesterfield County Sheriff's office "carried out an abuse of process against [him] and/or malicious prosecution by servicing a bad address" and that the "Richmond City Sheriff's Department carried out an abuse of process by servicing a subpoena" at a certain address. He also sets forth a lengthy list of injuries that he claims to have suffered as a result of the conduct of Defendants and others, such as: pain and suffering, suspension of his commercial driver's license, the loss of his apartment and memorabilia, being placed at risk of stroke or heart attack, the repossession of his vehicle, emotional distress, 18 years of bad credit, and being rendered unable to attend family events.

The Amended Complaint concludes by asserting that "historically the [DCSE], DCSE business partners- local courts in Richmond, Virginia, Chesterfield & Henrico County, local sheriff's offices and Judges Surrogates have been bias [sic] and consistent with violating [his] constitutional rights."

II. Andrews' Claims & Prayer for Relief

After reviewing the Amended Complaint and Andrews' numerous (and often incomprehensible) filings, the Court concludes that Andrews seeks to assert a federal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim challenging, on due process grounds, the child custody and support proceedings, certain Virginia state statutes related to child custody and support, and his treatment by Defendants more generally. Additionally, although Andrews indicated in the Amended Complaint that the basis for jurisdiction is federal question, not diversity, he appears to raise state law claims, such as abuse of process and malicious prosecution.¹

Andrews seeks as relief "that all DCSE cases be voided, debts removed, drivers license reinstated, punitive damages and monies paid to DCSE/Treasurer of Virginia refunded immediately." He enumerates actual damages, describes "Personal, Emotional, Family & Health Damages," and provides a calculation of punitive damages.

III. Procedural History

Andrews filed the initial Complaint on August 1, 2017. It named ten defendants, including judges and sheriffs, as well as administrative agencies. By ORDER (ECF No. 2), the Court advisedAndrews to file a complaint that did not proceed against the Richmond Sheriff and the judges, and otherwise "to assess what, if any claim, he may genuinely have against someone other than the judges and the Sheriff." The Amended Complaint named the Virginia DCSE, the Richmond City Jail, and the Chesterfield County Jail as defendants. DCSE and the Chesterfield Jail then filed their motions to dismiss.

THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(1) & 12(b)(6) STANDARDS

DCSE seeks to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and the Chesterfield Jail seeks to do so under Rule 12(b)(6). Def. DCSE's Br. 1; Def. Chesterfield Jail's Br. 1.

The principles governing Rule 12(b)(1) are well established:

A party may file a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). If a court finds that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case or controversy, it must dismiss the action. Of course, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that federal jurisdiction is proper.

Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be made in two ways. First, a facial challenge to jurisdiction may be made by arguing that the complaint does not allege facts that permit the exercise of federal subject matter jurisdiction. If that type of challenge is raised, the court must assume that all facts alleged in the complaint are true. Second, the challenge can be made under the theory that the complaint's assertion of subject matter jurisdiction is not true. In that event, a court may consider evidence outside the pleadings.

Rashad v. Jenkins, 3:15-cv-655, 2016 WL 901279, at *3-4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 3, 2016) (citations omitted).

Rule 12(b)(6) motions are evaluated under the following standards:

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must "provide 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." A court "will accept the pleader's description of what happened . . . along with any conclusions that can be reasonably drawn therefrom," but "need not accept conclusory allegations encompassing the legal effects of the pleaded facts." "[Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)] and [Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)] also made clear that the analytical approach for evaluating Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss requires courts to reject conclusory allegations that amount to mere formulaic recitation of the elements of a claim and to conduct a context-specific analysis to determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief."

Rashad, 2016 WL 901279, at *4 (citations omitted).

Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) share certain features. Under both Rules, "a court must typically construe the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally," but it must still consider the "pleadings according to the standards developed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Harrison v. U.S. Social Sec. Admin., 3:13-cv-435, 2014 WL 29042, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 2, 2014). And, in addition to thecomplaint, courts may consider, inter alia, documents attached to the complaint, public records, and indisputably authentic documents that are central to the plaintiff's claims. See Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Peters, 3:17-cv-259, 2018 WL 1425965, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Va. Mar. 22, 2018); Weaver v. AEGON USA, LLC, 4:14-cv-3436, 2015 WL 5691836, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 28, 2015); Bland v. Fairfax Cnty., 1:10-cv-1030, 2011 WL 2580343, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 29, 2011).

DISCUSSION

DCSE argues that Andrews' action is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Def. DCSE's Br. 6-7. The Chesterfield Jail similarly contends that state sovereign immunity precludes the abuse of process tort claim if the Court interprets Andrews' suit as against Chesterfield County. Def. Chesterfield Jail's Br. 6. The Court agrees with DCSE that Andrews' action against it is barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, and it further holds that this immunity precludes Andrews' action against the Chesterfield Jail. This conclusion resolves Defendants' motions, so the Court need not consider all of Defendants' remaining assertions.²

I. The Applicable Rule

As a threshold matter, the Court considers the applicable rule under which to evaluate Eleventh Amendment immunity. As this Court has noted, that issue is unresolved but may not be necessary to determine:

The Fourth Circuit has yet to decide whether courts should address Eleventh Amendment immunity under Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6). The trend in this District and other districts within this Circuit is toward considering Eleventh Amendment immunity under Rule 12(b)(1). Nevertheless, the distinction makes little practical difference when [a defendant's immunity argument is based on the] insufficiency of the pled facts rather than inaccuracy. In that situation, the analysis is the same under either rule: the Court accepts the pled allegations as true and construes them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Quigley v. McCabe, 2:17-cv-70, 2017 WL 3821806, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 30, 2017) (citations omitted); see also Fleming v. Va. State Univ., 3:15-cv-268, 2016 WL 92718 6, at *1 n.4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 4, 2016), aff'd as modified on other grounds, 671 F. App'x 117, 118 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).³

Here, DCSE raises its Eleventh Amendment immunity argument pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), whereas the Chesterfield Jail invokes state sovereign immunity under Rule 12(b)(6). Def. DCSE's Br. 6-7; Def. Chesterfield Jail's Br. 6. However, neither Defendant alleges, as to these immunity arguments, that the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint are untrue. Def. DCSE's Br. 6-7; Def. Chesterfield Jail's Br. 6. Thus, the analysis will be the same under either Rule, and it is unnecessary to resolve which Rule is the proper procedural vehicle.

II. The Eleventh Amendment

A. The Basic Framework

The Fourth Circuit has described the standards governing Eleventh Amendment immunity in the following manner:

Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,

...