Andrist v. Honeywell Int'l

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GINA ANDRIST, Plaintiff, v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., Defendants.

No. 19 C 2428

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

September 14, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SHEILA FINNEGAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Gina Andrist brought this products liability case under strict liability and negligence theories, claiming that Defendants Honeywell International Inc., Honeywell Safety Products USA, Inc., and all other named Honeywell defendants (together, “Honeywell”) are responsible for injuries she sustained while wearing a defective Miller MiniLite FL11 Self-Retracting Lifeline. Honeywell removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction (Doc 1), and the parties consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 19). Currently before the Court is Honeywell's motion for summary judgment on all claims. For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 322 (1986). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and draws all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Barbera v Pearson Education, Inc., 906 F.3d 621, 628 (7th Cir. 2018). That said, “the opposing party cannot rely on mere conclusions and allegations to create factual issues,” and “[a] court will grant summary judgment if no reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party.” Santiago v. Rabideau, No. 15 C 1856, 2019 WL 1747361, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2019) (citing Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine Div. of Coltec Indus., 328 F.3d 309, 320 (7th Cir. 2003) and Hoppe v. Lewis Univ., 692 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 2012)).

In the Northern District of Illinois, Local Rule 56.1 requires a party moving for summary judgment to submit a statement of material facts consisting of concise numbered paragraphs that are “supported by citation to the specific evidentiary material . . . that supports it.” N.D.Ill. R. 56.1(a), (d). See also Reyes v. Menard, Inc., No. 21 C 359, 2022 WL 2757666, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2022). The opposing party then must file “a concise response to the movant's statement that shall contain . . . a response to each numbered paragraph in the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.” Santiago, 2019 WL 1747361, at *2 (quoting Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 F.3d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 2015) and N.D.Ill. R. 56.1(b)(3)(B)). “Material facts are those that might affect the outcome of the suit under applicable substantive law.” Dawson v. Brown, 803 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted).

Plaintiff did not file any response to Honeywell's motion for summary judgment or challenge the facts set forth in Defendants' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Doc. 78). This failure to respond does not result in an automatic grant of summary judgment, as there is no summary judgment by default. Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2006); Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co. v. ABC Constr. Specialists Inc., No. 18 C 1256, 2018 WL 11190999, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2018). Rather, the facts set forth in Honeywell's Local Rule 56.1 statement are deemed admitted to the extent the cited exhibits and depositions support them. Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc., 667 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing F.T.C. v. Bay Area Bus. Council, Inc., 423 F.3d 627, 634 (7th Cir. 2005)). Honeywell still bears the burden of persuasion that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the facts must still be viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Keeton, 667 F.3d at 884 (citations omitted); Raymond, 442 F.3d at 608. The facts discussed in this opinion are those the Court has deemed supported by the record.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred while Plaintiff was working for nonparty W.W. Grainger (“Grainger”) as an “order picker” (a person who retrieves products from shelves) at the company's facility in Minooka, Illinois. (Doc. 78, ¶ 1). In that position, Plaintiff used two relevant pieces of equipment: a “Multi-Level” (a mobile device that contains a platform that can be elevated, sometimes referred to as a “cherry picker”) and a Miller MiniLite FL11 Self-Retracting Lifeline (the “Miller MiniLite”), a product designed to arrest and stop a person from free falling off the elevated platform. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 5, 33, 34; Doc. 1-1 ¶ 5). A picture of the Miller MiniLite model that was affixed to Plaintiff at the time of the incident is provided below:

(IMAGE OMITTED)

(Doc. 78, ¶ 32).

On March 6, 2017, Plaintiff was standing on a Multi-Level and wearing a full-body harness that had a D-ring on the back between her shoulders to which she affixed the snap hook of the Miller MiniLite. The Miller MiniLite, in turn, was anchored above Plaintiff's head. (Id. ¶¶ 18-20). At some point Plaintiff attempted to slide a 90-pound box off a shelf but the contents broke through the bottom and caught on the shelf. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 22). When Plaintiff pulled on the box, it came loose and pulled her arms down, causing her to bend over the side of the Multi-Level platform before letting go of the box. (Id. ¶ 23). Plaintiff never fell from the platform but bent over too quickly and “pulled her back/buttocks.” (Id. ¶¶ 4, 24, 26).

Though Plaintiff did not fall off the Multi-Level elevating platform, she filed suit against Honeywell in Grundy County Circuit Court alleging that she “suffered bodily injuries” after the Miller MiniLite failed to stop a purported fall. She alleges that her injuries stem from a design defect in the Miller MiniLite and seeks to hold Honeywell responsible under theories of strict liability and negligence. (Doc. 1-1). On April 10, 2019, Honeywell removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, noting that Plaintiff is a citizen of Illinois and the Honeywell entities are Delaware corporations with their principal places of business in New Jersey and South Carolina. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 6-11). Honeywell argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to secure expert testimony supporting her claim of a design defect and, in any event, the Miller MiniLite is not defective or unreasonably dangerous.

DISCUSSION

I. Lack of Expert Testimony

To succeed on either her strict liability or negligence claims, Plaintiff must demonstrate that there was a defect in the Miller MiniLite at the time it left Honeywell's control, and that the defect caused her injury. See Horne v. Elec. Eel Mfg. Co., Inc., 987 F.3d 704, 725 (7th Cir. 2021). Honeywell argues that Plaintiff cannot make such a showing because she failed to present the necessary expert testimony on those issues. (Doc. 77, at 13-15). Illinois courts recognize that products liability actions “often involve specialized knowledge or expertise outside the layman's knowledge.” Stevenson v. Windmoeller & Hoelscher Corp., No. 19 C 52, 2021 WL 1978348, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 18, 2021) (collecting cases), aff'd, 39 F.4th 466 (7th Cir. 2022). For this reason, courts require expert testimony “in at least some products liability cases to prove that a product defect was unreasonably dangerous and proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries.” Id. (quoting Show v. Ford Motor Co., 697 F.Supp.2d 975, 982 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff'd, 659 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2011)). While an expert may not be needed to tell people how to use a simple device such as a walking crutch or a chair that collapses for portability, other products are sufficiently complex that they cannot be evaluated exclusively on the basis of common experience, such as a vehicle's airbag or a surgical implant device. Show, 697 F.Supp.2d at 983; Clark v. River Metals Recycling, LLC, 929 F.3d 434, 440 (7th Cir. 2019).

The Miller MiniLite is an industrial product that most of the population and lay jurors do not commonly see or use. Unlike a chair or walking crutch, it is a specialized piece of equipment designed for use in industrial settings by trained employees to prevent falls from elevated platforms. In that regard, as part of her orientation at Grainger, Plaintiff received specific training on the use and operation of the Miller MiniLite. (Doc. 78, ¶¶ 57). Since common experience is not alone sufficient to understand the proper use of the Miller MiniLite, Plaintiff needed to present expert testimony to show that the device is unreasonably dangerous as designed and caused her injuries. See Baltus v. Weaver Div. of Kidde & Co., 199 Ill.App.3d 821, 836, 557 N.E.2d 580, 590 (1st Dist. 1990) (expert testimony required to establish that the design of a car transmission jack was unreasonably dangerous). She did not, and this is fatal to her claims. See Clark, 929 F.3d at 440; Kirk v. Clark Equip. Co., 991 F.3d 865, 879 (7th Cir. 2021) (affirming summary judgment on design defect claims where the plaintiff lacked admissible expert testimony regarding the design of a wheeled front-end loader, which the court deemed “a specialized piece of industrial equipment that falls outside of a juror's common understanding and experiences.”).

II. Substantive Arguments

Although Defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on Plaintiff's failure to retain an expert, her strict liability and negligence claims also fail on substantive grounds. “It is well established that, to recover in a strict product liability action, a plaintiff must plead and prove that (1) the injury complained of resulted...