Anglin v. BI LO, LLC

640 F.Supp.3d 1393

Jean ANGLIN, Plaintiff,Gene Anglin, Intervenor Plaintiff, v. BI LO, LLC d/b/a Winn Dixie Store Number 19;

Assa Abloy Entrance Systems US Inc.;

and Stanley Access Technologies, LLC, Defendants.

BI LO, LLC, Cross Claimant, v. Assa Abloy Entrance Systems US Inc.;and Stanley Access Technologies, LLC, Cross, Defendants.

No. 2:21-CV-14

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Brunswick Division

Signed November 1, 2022

ORDER

LISA GODBEY WOOD, JUDGE

Before the Court are motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants BI LO, LLC, Assa Abloy Entrance Systems U.S. Inc., and Stanley Access Technologies, LLC. Dkt. Nos. 60, 62, 65. After reviewing the briefs and holding a hearing, the Court GRANTS the motions.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of personal injuries Plaintiff Jean Anglin ("Plaintiff")¹ sustained in a fall after automatic sliding doors (the "Doors") at her local Winn-Dixie store on St. Simons Island, Georgia (the "Store"), closed on her. Dkt. No. 25 ¶¶ 8-13; Dkt. No. 62-2 ¶¶ 1, 4; Dkt. No. 65-1 ¶ 13. On June 24, 2020, Plaintiff went to the Store to purchase merchandise. Dkt. No. 25 ¶ 7; Dkt. No. 62-2 ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 65-1 ¶ 4. After making her purchases, Plaintiff left the store with her groceries in her shopping cart and unloaded the groceries into her car. Dkt. No. 62-3 at 13:17-14:7. After doing so, Plaintiff re-entered the Store and returned her shopping cart to a Store employee. Id. at 14:2-20. As Plaintiff exited the Store, the Doors began to close and struck her on her right hip and lower back, knocking her to the ground. Dkt. No. 75 at 1.² As a result of her fall, Plaintiff contends she suffered injuries to her left ankle, left leg, back and hips. Dkt. No. 25 ¶ 9; Dkt. No. 62-2 ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 65-1 ¶ 13; Dkt. No. 60-3 at 19:36:9-22; Dkt No. 62-3 at 22:18-23, 31:8-23.

On February 9, 2021, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants BI-LO, LLC ("Defendant BI-LO"), Assa Abloy Entrance Systems US Inc. ("Defendant Assa Abloy"), and Stanley Access Technologies LLC ("Defendant Stanley"), asserting various claims against each Defendant. Dkt. Nos. 1, 25. Each Defendant has a different relationship with the Store and the Doors. The only connection Defendant Stanley has with the Store and the Doors is that it serviced the Doors twice, with its last service about five months before Plaintiff's accident. Dkt. No. 60 at 3; Dkt. No 60-2 ¶¶ 19, 20, 29. The only connection Defendant Assa Abloy has with the Store and the Doors is that it manufactured, but did not install, the Doors and provided service, maintenance, and repairs to the Doors pursuant to a series of service agreements. Dkt. No. 62 at 2; Dkt. No. 62-2 ¶¶ 6, 7, 8; Dkt. No. 74-1 ¶¶ 6, 7, 8 (all stating only that the interrogatories are "unverified" or that the evidence is insufficient support for the fact that this was the "only" work performed by Defendant Assa Abloy at the Store). Defendant Assa Abloy's last recorded date of service on the Doors was May 30, 2018. Id. Defendant BI-LO allegedly shares a parent corporation, and a claims management service with Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., the entity Defendant BI-LO claims operates the Store. Dkt. No. 65-2 at 11-12; Dkt. No 65-1 ¶¶ 1, 2; Dkt. No. 73-1 ¶¶ 1, 2, 3.

Plaintiff's various claims sound in premises liability, products liability, and negligence. Each Defendant has moved for summary judgment in opposition to all claims asserted against them. Dkt. Nos. 60, 62, 65. The Court will address each motion, in turn.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment "shall" be granted if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is "genuine" where the evidence would allow "a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." FindWhat Inv. Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A fact is "material" only if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). Factual disputes that are "irrelevant or unnecessary" are not sufficient to survive summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant must show the court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The text of Rule 56 precisely outlines how a party can support factual positions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Specifically, Rule 56(c)(1)(A) states that a party can assert that a fact is or is not genuinely disputed by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). And these supporting documents may be challenged if a party "object[s] that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). "Nevertheless, evidence that can be reduced to an admissible form at trial should be considered at summary judgment." Carrizosa v. Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 47 F.4th 1278, 1304 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Smith v. Marcus & Millichap, Inc., 991 F.3d 1145, 1156 n.2 (11th Cir. 2021) ("[E]vidence does not have to be authenticated or otherwise presented in an admissible form to be considered at the summary judgment stage, as long as the evidence could ultimately be presented in an admissible form." (quotation marks omitted))).

If the moving party discharges this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of fact does exist. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The nonmovant may satisfy this burden in one of two ways. First, the nonmovant "may show that the record in fact contains supporting evidence, sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion, which was 'overlooked or ignored' by the moving party, who has thus failed to meet the initial burden of showing an absence of evidence." Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 332, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Second, the nonmovant "may come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency." Id. at 1117. Where the nonmovant attempts to carry this burden with nothing more "than a repetition of his conclusional allegations, summary judgment for the [movant is] not only proper but required." Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 1981) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

DISCUSSION

I. Defendant BI-LO's Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant BI-LO breached its duty "to exercise reasonable care to keep its premises safe," and "fail[ed] to adequately warn that the door could close while a person was in the doorway." Dkt. No. 25 ¶ 15. For the reasons below, however, Defendant BI-LO is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims.

Under Georgia law, an owner or occupier of land "owes its invitees a duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe. A proprietor is not the insurer of the safety of its invitees, but it is bound to exercise ordinary care to protect its invitees from unreasonable risks of which it has superior knowledge." Fair v. CV Underground, LLC, 340 Ga.App. 790, 792, 798 S.E.2d 358 (2017). This duty "includes inspecting the premises to discover possible dangerous conditions of which the owner/occupier does not have actual knowledge[ ] and taking reasonable precautions to protect invitees from dangers foreseeable from the arrangement or use of the premises." Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 493 S.E.2d 403, 408-09 (1997).

The ultimate basis for liability to an invitee "is the superior knowledge of the proprietor of the existence of a condition that may subject the invitee to an unreasonable risk of harm." Kmart Corp. v. Morris, 251 Ga.App. 753, 555 S.E.2d 106, 109 (2001) (citing Zellers v. Theater of the Stars, 171 Ga.App. 406, 319 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1984)). "The mere fact that [Plaintiff] was injured, without more, 'does not give rise to liability.' " River Place at Port Royal Condo. Ass'n, Inc., v. Sapp, 358 Ga.App. 632, 856 S.E.2d 28, 32 (2021) (quoting Williams v. Johnson, 344 Ga.App. 311, 809 S.E.2d 839, 841-42 (2018)).

In its motion for summary judgment, Defendant BI-LO contends, first, that it is not the correct defendant-entity because it does not operate the Store. Dkt. No. 65-2 at 11-14. Defendant BI-LO explains that Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. operates the Store, and that the two companies "are related, but separate corporations under parent company Southeastern Grocers, Inc." Dkt. No. 65-2 at 2 n.2, 11. In the alternative, Defendant BI-LO contends there is a lack of evidence that it failed to exercise ordinary care because Plaintiff has not shown "why the [D]oors began to close while she was in the threshold, and has no knowledge of any defects or malfunctions in the door." Dkt. No. 65-2 at 15. Defendant BI-LO further contends it is also not liable under a failure to warn theory because it did not operate the Store, and, even if it did, "it did not have actual or constructive knowledge of any danger or defect inherent in the automatic [D]oors." Dkt. No. 65-2 at 21.

In response, Plaintiff argues that the evidence to which Defendant BI-LO cites—i.e., its responses and objections to Plaintiff's first interrogatories—does not support that Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc....