Anglin v. City Facilities Mgmt. (FL)

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JEAN ANGLIN and GENE ANGLIN, Plaintiffs, v. CITY FACILITIES MANAGEMENT (FL) LLC; and WINN DIXIE STORES, INC. d/b/a Winn Dixie Store Number 19, Defendants.

No. CV 2:22-058

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Brunswick Division

February 16, 2024

ORDER

HON LISA GODBEY WOOD, JUDGE

Before the Court are motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. (“Winn Dixie”) and City Facilities Management (FL) LLC (“CFM”). Dkt. Nos. 37, 39. The motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for review. Dkt. Nos. 37, 39, 42, 43, 45. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motions are GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

This case arises from injuries caused by automatic sliding doors at a Winn Dixie store. On June 24, 2020, Plaintiff Jean Anglin fell at the Winn Dixie located in St. Simons Island Georgia, when the store's automatic sliding doors (or “Doors”) closed on her and struck her. Dkt. No 7. She brought this premises liability and negligence lawsuit based on the injuries she sustained. Id. Plaintiff's husband, Gene Anglin, also brought a claim for loss of consortium arising from Plaintiff's injuries.^[1]Id.

Before her fall, Plaintiff frequently shopped at this Winn Dixie store. Dkt. No. 37-5 at 27:13-19. She usually visited the store twice a month. Id. Plaintiff's injury occurred during one of her typical grocery trips to the store. Dkt. No. 7 ¶ 5. During this visit on June 24, 2020, Plaintiff bought her groceries, unloaded the groceries in her car, and walked back to the store to return her shopping cart. Dkt. No. 37-5 at 26. After handing off her cart to a store employee, Plaintiff turned to leave through the automatic sliding doors in the store's entryway. Dkt. No. 376. As she walked through the open entryway, the Doors began to close shut. Id. The Doors then struck Plaintiff on her right hip and lower back, causing her to fall to the ground. Id. This fall caused Plaintiff to break her left ankle. Dkt. No. 37-5 at 25:79. Plaintiff subsequently underwent multiple ankle surgeries and spent months in recovery at a hospital and rehabilitation facility. Id. at 36-38. Because of her fall, Plaintiff has significant longterm mobility problems and suffers from ongoing leg pain. Id. at 41-45.

Plaintiff and her husband first filed suit against BI LO, LLC, Assa Abloy Entrance Systems U.S. Inc., and Stanley Access Technologies, LLC for various tort claims stemming from Plaintiff's fall. See generally Anglin v. BI LO, LLC, 640 F.Supp.3d 1393 (S.D. Ga. 2022). In that first case, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Plaintiff's premises liability, negligence, and failure-to-warn claims. Id. The Court also granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Plaintiff Gene Anglin's loss of consortium claim. Id. Plaintiffs appealed the Court's summary judgment Order, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Court's decision. See generally Anglin v. BI LO, LLC, No. 22-13912, 2023 WL 6232511 (11th Cir. Sept. 26, 2023).

In the present case involving the same fall, the Anglins sued Defendants Winn Dixie and CFM. Dkt. No. 7. Although the second suit showed some improvements over the first-mainly getting the name of the grocery store right this time-the second bite at the apple suffers from the same fatal flaws as the first. As explained below, Plaintiffs have once more come forward with no evidence that the store knew of a hazard or that repairs were negligently made. Plaintiff claims Winn Dixie was negligent because it failed to keep its premises safe and failed to properly maintain the Doors. Id. ¶ 13; id. at 2 (negligence claim against Winn Dixie, Count I). Plaintiff also claims CFM was negligent in maintaining or repairing the Doors, and CFM failed to place warnings on the Doors “to adequately inform persons near the door[s] that the doors might close while a person was within the threshold of the doors.” Id. ¶ 20; id. at 5 (negligence claim against CFM, Count II) . Finally, Plaintiff Gene Anglin claims loss of consortium based on Plaintiff's injuries.^[2]Id. ¶ 15.

LEGAL AUTHORITY

The Court should grant summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Facts are “material” if they could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute of those material facts “is ‘genuine' . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant's] position will be insufficient” for a jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 252. Additionally, the party opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in [his] pleadings. Rather, [his] responses . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir. 1990).

The Court views the record evidence “in the light most favorable to the [nonmovant],” Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), and will draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmovant's favor, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff's Premises Liability & Failure-to-Warn Claims Against Defendant Winn Dixie

A. Georgia Premises Liability Law

To recover against Winn Dixie on her premises liability claim, Plaintiff must prove four elements: a duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and damages. Johnson v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 578 S.E.2d 106, 108 (Ga. 2003). A plaintiff's status as an invitee, trespasser, or licensee determines the duty owed by the defendant. Howard v. Gram Corp., 602 S.E.2d 241, 243 (Ga.Ct.App. 2004) . An invitee is “someone who, by express or implied invitation, has been induced or led to come upon [the defendant's] premises for any lawful purpose.” Matlack v. Cobb Elec. Membership Corp., 658 S.E.2d 137, 139 (Ga.Ct.App. 2008) (citing O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1). A person may be considered an invitee if “his presence on the property is of mutual benefit to both him and the landowner.” Id. A trespasser, on the other hand, “is one who, though peacefully or by mistake, wrongfully enters upon property owned or occupied by another.” Barber v. Steele, 211 S.E.2d 133, 134 (Ga.Ct.App. 1974) (citations omitted). Licensee status falls in between invitee and trespasser status. Matlack, 658 S.E.2d at 139. A licensee “is one who is permitted, either expressly or impliedly, to go on the premises of another, but merely for his own interest, convenience, or gratification.” Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 51-3-2). There is no dispute in this case that Plaintiff was an invitee.

The duty owed to an invitee is greater than the duty owed to a trespasser or a licensee. Jarrell v. JDC & Assocs., LLC, 675 S.E.2d 278, 280-81 (Ga.Ct.App. 2009). To an invitee, a defendant owner or occupier owes a duty of ordinary care to protect the invitee from unreasonable risks of harm of which the owner or occupier has superior knowledge. Robinson v. Kroger Co., 493 S.E.2d 403, 408 (Ga. 1997); see also O.C.G.A § 51-3-1 (one who owns or occupies land and “by express or implied invitation, induces or leads others to come upon his premises for any lawful purpose . . .is liable in damages to such persons for injuries caused by his failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe”). This duty owed to invitees is nondelegable. Carpenter v. Sun Valley Props., LLC, 645 S.E.2d 35, 37 (Ga.Ct.App. 2007) (“[A] nondelegable duty exists under O.C.G.A. § 51-31, which requires a property owner to exercise ordinary care in keeping its premises and approaches safe for invitees.”).

“As a general rule, owners or occupiers of land are not insurers of the safety of invitees.” Orff v. Stonewood Rest. Grp., LLC, 646 S.E.2d 702, 704 (Ga.Ct.App. 2007). The mere fact that a plaintiff was injured, without more, does not give rise to liability on the part of the owner/occupier. Id.

To recover on a premises liability claim, an invitee plaintiff must show “(1) that the defendant had actual or constructive^[3]knowledge of the hazard; and (2) that the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the hazard despite the exercise of ordinary care due to actions or conditions within the control of the owner/occupier.” Robinson, 493 S.E.2d at 414. Accordingly, “the fundamental basis for an owner or occupier's liability [is] that party's superior knowledge of the hazard encountered by the plaintiff.” Id. at 405. A plaintiff cannot recover if “the undisputed evidence demonstrates that the plaintiff's knowledge of the hazard was equal to or greater than that of the defendant.” Norman v. Jones Lang LaSalle Ams., Inc., 627 S.E.2d 382, 386 (Ga.Ct.App. 2006); see also Forest Cove Apartments, LLC v. Wilson, 776 S.E.2d 664 (Ga.Ct.App. 2015) (denying recovery where the evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff had equal knowledge of the dangerous condition).

In premises liability actions, “summary judgment is appropriate only in plain, palpable, and undisputed cases.” McCoy v. Winn Dixie Stores, 519 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ga.Ct.App. 1999) . Generally,

to survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must come forward with evidence

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