Anglin v. United States

STUART ANGLIN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

C.A. No. 20-276 (MN)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

March 18, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Charles J. Brown, III, GELLERT SCALI BUSENKELL & BROWN, LLC, Wilmington, DE; Michael Lynn Gabriel, THE LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL LYNN GABRIEL, East Palo Alto, CA - Attorneys for Plaintiff

David C. Weiss, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wilmington, DE; Shamoor Anis, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wilmington, DE - Attorneys for Defendant.

March 18, 2021

Wilmington, Delaware

NOREIKA, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Presently before the Court is Defendant the United States of America's ("Defendant" or "the United States") motion to dismiss (D.I. 14) Plaintiff Stuart Anglin's ("Plaintiff") First Amended Complaint (D.I. 12). The motion is filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that: (1) Plaintiff has failed to establish Article III standing; (2) this Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter; and (3) Plaintiff's claims are barred by sovereign immunity and well as pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim because Plaintiff's claims are time-barred. For the reasons set forth below, this Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.¹

I. BACKGROUND

Prior to the colonization of the now-United States by mainly-European settlers, the land was populated by an array of indigenous peoples and cultures. As the fledgling United States expanded westward throughout the eighteenth and nineteen centuries, the young nation encountered these peoples, many of whom belonged to cultures for whom the European system of private land ownership was foreign. Eventually, the United States, by way of a series of treaties culminating in the 1835 Treaty of New Echota, acquired enormous tracts of land from a people known in today's parlance as the Cherokee. (See generally D.I. 12). Plaintiff, who claims descendance from Cherokee Chief Crane Eater, brought this action alleging that the United States severely undervalued the land acquired in the Treaty of New Echota and seeking to recover damages on behalf of all Cherokee.

Plaintiff filed the present action by way of class action Complaint on February 25, 2020. (D.I. 1). Therein he alleged that the United States' acquisition of the land in question was, in fact,an unconstitutional taking; Plaintiff sought return of the land, fair compensation for the land taken, and declaratory relief declaring the Treaty of New Echota invalid. (See D.I. 1 at 17-20).

On June 25, 2020, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See D.I. 5; D.I. 6). The motion was fully briefed by both parties. (See D.I. 6; D.I. 8; D.I. 10). With Defendant's June 25, 2020 motion still pending, this Court dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint sua sponte after finding that Plaintiff failed to allege therein that he was a member of the Cherokee or was of Cherokee descent and therefore lacked standing to bring the present action. (See D.I. 11).

On October 27, 2020, Plaintiff filed the now-operative First Amended Complaint, alleging that he is a direct descendant of Cherokee Chief Crane Eater. (D.I. 12 ¶ 5). Plaintiff alleged the same three counts. (See id. at 19-22). On December 7, 2020, Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. (D.I. 14).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Federal district courts, like this one, are courts of limited jurisdiction. Article III of the United States Constitution "extends the 'judicial Power' of the United States only to 'Cases' and 'Controversies;'" namely, those cases and controversies of the sort amenable to resolution by judicial process. Steel Co., 549 U.S. at 102 (quoting Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1911)). "Without jurisdiction the [C]ourt cannot proceed at all in any cause . . . [and] it may not assume jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the merits of the case." Sinochem Intern. Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Intern. Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 93-102 (1998)) (internal quotation omitted).

"A district court has to first determine, however, whether a Rule 12(b)(1) motion presents a 'facial' attack or a 'factual' attack on the claim at issue, because that distinction determines how the pleading must be reviewed." Constitution Party of Pennsylvania v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357 (3d Cir. 2014). A facial attack is an argument that considers a claim on its face and asserts that the claims are "insufficient to invoke the subject matter of the court" for various reasons, including because the claims do not present a question of federal law, or because there exists some other jurisdictional defect. Id. at 358. A factual attack is an argument that the facts of the case do not support the grounds for jurisdiction set forth in the complaint. Id.

In reviewing a facial attack, a court applies the same standard of review used in evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6): all facts alleged in the complaint are to be construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. When considering a factual attack, however, a court may consider evidence outside the pleadings. Id.

1. Standing

Of the various justiciability doctrines, "perhaps the most important" inquiry before a district court is whether a plaintiff has "'standing' to invoke the power of a federal court." In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 245 (3d Cir. 2012). "Standing to sue is part of the common understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case." Steel Co., 549 U.S. at 102.

The "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing" contains three requirements. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, supra, at 560, 112 S.Ct., at 2136. First and foremost, there must be alleged (and ultimately proved) an "injury in fact" - a harm suffered by the plaintiff that is "concrete" and "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" Whitmore v. Arkansas, supra, at 149, 155, 110 S.Ct., at 1723 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1665, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)). Second, there must be causation - a fairly traceable connection between the plaintiff's injury and the complained-of conduct of the defendant. Simon v.Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1925-1926, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). And third, there must be redressability - a likelihood that the requested relief will redress the alleged injury. Id., at 45-46, 96 S.Ct., at 1927-1928; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2208, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). This triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability constitutes the core of Article III's case-or-controversy requirement, and the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its existence.

Id. at 102-104 (footnote omitted).

The Third Circuit has recognized that of the three required elements of standing, "injury-in-fact . . . is often determinative." In re Schering Plough Corp., 678 F.3d at 245 (quoting Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 2009)). To satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff's alleged injury must be "particularized;" put differently, the injury must "affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." In re Schering Plough Corp., 678 F.3d at 245 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992)). Requiring more than just injury to a cognizable interest, the injury-in-fact test requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563.

2. Sovereign Immunity

Neither the United States nor the agencies thereof may be sued unless Congress expressly waives sovereign immunity. Nederland Shipping Corp. v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 3d 584, 590 (D. Del. 2020). Absent such a waiver, sovereign immunity "not only protects the United States from liability, it deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction over claims against the United States." Id. (quoting Richards v. United States, 176 F.3d 652, 654 (3d Cir. 1999)).

3. Federal Claims Court

In addition to the "cases and controversies" requirement, the Constitution gives Congress "nearly 'plenary' power to shape" the scope of federal court jurisdiction by statute. Guerra v.Consolid. Rail Corp., 936 F.3d 124, 131 (3d Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Indeed, Congress has the power to limit the jurisdiction of federal district courts, including by passing laws which strip jurisdiction over certain claims from the district courts. See Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S.Ct. 897, 906-08 (2018).

III. DISCUSSION

A. This Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff's Claims

1. Plaintiff Lacks Standing

Defendant's challenge to Plaintiff's standing is a facial challenge - Defendant contends that even if the factual allegations in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint are true, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring these claims. (See D.I. 15 at 3-6). This Court agrees with Defendant and will dismiss the present action because Plaintiff lacks standing.

To have standing, Plaintiff must show three elements: (1) injury-in-fact; (2) causation; and (3) redressability. Even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff is able to satisfy the causation and redressability elements of standing, Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate the requisite injury-in-fact necessary to have standing to sue.

An injury-in-fact, with regard to standing, must be "concrete" and "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" Steel Co., 549 U.S. at 102. Plaintiff faces a high hurdle, as the events leading to Plaintiff's alleged injury occurred nearly two hundred years ago - doubtless, several scores at minimum before Plaintiff was born.

Plaintiff's theory that he has suffered an injury-in-fact is based upon Plaintiff's assertion that Plaintiff is a direct...