Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Nat'l Found. for Rescued Animals

645 F.Supp.3d 629

ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, a non-profit corporation, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR RESCUED ANIMALS d/b/a Tiger Creek Sanctuary,a non-profit corporation, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 6:22-cv-97-JDK

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Tyler Division

Signed December 9, 2022

Ariel Flint, Animal Legal Defense Fund, Astoria, NY, Caitlin M. Foley, Animal Legal Defense Fund, Chicago, IL, Caroline Sileo Lawhorn, Israel Ramon Silvas, McKenna Brianne Rammell Crisp, Salvador Jason Robles, Dykema Cox Smith, Dallas, TX, Daniel H. Waltz, Animal Legal Defense Fund, Washington, DC, Isabel F. Callejo-Brighton, Pro Hac Vice, Animal Legal Defense Fund, Cotati, CA, for Plaintiff.

Kenneth Patrick Babb, Fox Rothschild LLP, Dallas, TX, Nancy Elizabeth Halpern, Pro Hac Vice, Fox Rothschild LLP, Lawrenceville, NJ, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE

JEREMY D. KERNODLE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This case alleges violations of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531, et seq. ("ESA"). Defendants seek to dismiss the complaint for lack of Article III standing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), or alternatively, for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Docket No. 10 at 1. Defendants also move to strike evidence submitted by Plaintiff in responding to the dismissal motion. Docket No. 18 at 1.

As explained below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has adequately alleged Article III standing with respect to Claims I and II, and has properly stated those claims against Defendants under the ESA. The Court thus DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss those counts. However, because Plaintiff has failed to allege standing to bring Count III, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss that count. The Court also DENIES Defendants' motion to strike (Docket No. 18).

I. Background¹

Plaintiff Animal Legal Defense Fund ("ALDF") is a non-profit organization whose mission is protecting endangered and threatened animals. Docket No. 1 ¶ 6. Defendant, the National Foundation for Rescued Animals ("Tiger Creek"), operates a 173-acre wildlife preserve and animal sanctuary in Tyler, Texas, exhibiting dozens of lions and tigers, as well as ring-tailed lemurs and other animals. Id. ¶ 4; Docket No. 10 at 2. Defendant Brian Ferris founded Tiger Creek and served as its executive director until 2021, when Defendant Emily Owen took over the role. Docket No. 1 ¶ 2; Docket No. 10 at 2.

ALDF brings this action pursuant to the citizen-suit provision of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g), alleging that Defendants "have eviscerated the big cats' population at Tiger Creek" through haphazard management and an inability to provide timely and adequate veterinary care. Docket No. 1 ¶¶ 1-2. ALDF alleges three violations of the ESA, a statute seeking to protect federally designated "endangered" and "threatened" species, 16 U.S.C. § 1531.²

Count I alleges that Defendants have "taken" endangered or threatened species by "harass[ing]" or "harm[ing]" them in violation of 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). Docket No. 1 ¶¶ 87-92. Count II alleges Defendants unlawfully "possess" ESA-protected animals in violation of § 1538(a)(1)(D). Id. ¶¶ 93-95. And Count III alleges Defendants violated the ESA's prohibition against interstate transfer of protected animals in the course of commercial activity. Id. ¶¶ 96-104; 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(E).

Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), Docket No. 10, and to strike certain evidence submitted by ALDF, Docket No. 18.

II. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)

Defendants first argue that ALDF lacks constitutional standing. Docket No. 10 at 3; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Article III of the U.S. Constitution provides that federal courts may decide only "cases" or "controversies[.]" DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006). "[A]n essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III" is that the plaintiff has standing. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The standing requirement is not subject to waiver and requires strict compliance. E.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 n.1, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996).

Article III standing requires a plaintiff to allege: (1) he "has suffered an 'injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"; (2) "the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant"; and (3) "it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." El Paso Cnty. v. Trump, 982 F.3d 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000)).

ALDF bears the burden of establishing standing " 'with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.' " Barilla v. City of Hous., 13 F.4th 427, 431 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff "must allege facts that give rise to a plausible claim of [its] standing." Id. In assessing whether ALDF has met this standard, "we take the well-pled factual allegations of the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Stratta v. Roe, 961 F.3d 340, 349 (5th Cir. 2020). "[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought." Town of Chester v. Laroe Ests., Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650, 198 L.Ed.2d 64 (2017).

Here, Defendants argue that ALDF lacks standing because "it does not have a cognizable injury in fact" and cannot "demonstrate causation and redressability." Docket No. 10 at 4, 8. The Court addresses each argument in turn.

A. Injury in Fact

To allege a cognizable injury under the ESA, ALDF must allege harm to a protected animal and "injury to those who enjoy them." Aransas Project v. Shaw, 775 F.3d 641, 648 (5th Cir. 2014) (plaintiff sufficiently alleged an injury under the ESA by alleging "death to cranes [an ESA-protected species] and injury to those who enjoy them"); see also Ecological Rts. Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 2000) (a plaintiff must allege a "connection" to a "particular" ESA-protected animal and "aesthetic or recreational interest" that is impaired by defendant's conduct). Defendants argue that ALDF has alleged nothing more than a general interest in endangered animals and "has not pleaded any connection on its own behalf to a particular animal at the Sanctuary." Docket No. 10 at 4-8.

ALDF, however, asserts associational standing, and it has adequately pleaded that several of its members have a connection with the animals at Defendants' Sanctuary and are harmed by Defendants' mistreatment of them. Docket No. 1 ¶¶ 7, 30-84. ALDF alleges: "Several ALDF members have visited and worked at Tiger Creek, where they observed, had daily interactions with, and developed aesthetic and emotional connections to the animals there, including the tigers, lions, ring-tailed lemurs, pumas, servals, and bobcats." Docket No. 1 ¶ 7. These "members became distressed and upset due to the animal mistreatment and suffering that they witnessed," and the "inhumane and inadequate conditions prevent ALDF members who worked at Tiger Creek from viewing and enjoying the animals kept there, both during and after their employment at Tiger Creek." Id. ALDF also alleges that if the animals received better treatment or were transferred to proper sanctuaries, ALDF's members would visit the animals again. Id. ¶ 8. And, finally, ALDF identifies dozens of injured or deceased animals by name with which its members previously worked and developed "emotional connections." Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 30-84 (listing specific animals and their injuries).

These allegations sufficiently state an injury in fact. An association like ALDF "ha[s] standing to assert the claims of its members even where it has suffered no injury from the challenged activity." Tex. Ent. Ass'n, Inc. v. Hegar, 10 F.4th 495, 504 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up); see also Aransas Project, 775 F.3d at 646, 648 (holding that environmental conservation organization had standing to bring action under the ESA "on behalf of itself and its members"). And the complaint sufficiently alleges that ALDF's members have suffered a cognizable injury.³ See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 567, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (noting that those who work with animals suffer "esthetic" injury when animals are harmed unlawfully); Aransas Project, 775 F.3d at 648 (expressing "little doubt" that organization has suffered cognizable injury under the ESA by alleging deaths to whooping cranes and aesthetic injury to members who regularly observed them); Medina Cnty. Env't Action Ass'n v. Surface Transp. Bd., 602 F.3d 687, 691 (5th Cir. 2010) (same regarding birding enthusiasts of golden-cheeked warblers who alleged that birds would be harmed and driven from the area because of defendant's actions); Sierra Club v. Madigan, 1992 WL 501733, at *2 (E.D. Tex. July 28, 1992) (same regarding enthusiasts of red-cockaded woodpeckers); Graham v. San Antonio Zoological Soc'y, No. 5:15-cv-01054-XR, ECF No. 16 at *1 n.1 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (same regarding regular viewers of a mistreated captive elephant); see also Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co. Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 556 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that regular users of Galveston Bay had alleged aesthetic injury under the Clean Water Act by alleging that proposed discharges would reduce their recreational enjoyment of the Bay).

B. Causation and Redressability

A plaintiff's injury must be "fairly traceable" to the defendant's action and "redress[able] by a favorable decision." El Paso Cnty., 982 F.3d at 336. Defendants argue that ALDF failed to allege ...