Animal Legal Defense Fund v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.

223 F.Supp.3d 1008

ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND; Sarah Evans; Michelle Schurig; Caroline Lee; Farm Sanctuary; Compassion Over Killing; Animal Protection and Rescue League, Plaintiffs,

v.UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; Tom Vilsack, Secretary of Agriculture; Food Safety and Inspection Services; and Alfred V. Almanza, Deputy Under Secretary for Food Safety, Defendants.

Case No. 2:12–cv–04028–ODW(PJWx)

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Signed December 14, 2016

Carter Dillard, Kelsey Rinehart Eberly, Animal Legal Defense Fund, Cotati, CA, Lawrence P. Riff, Morgan L. Hector, Steptoe & Johnson LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Daniel E. Bensing, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [67] AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [61]

OTIS D. WRIGHT, II, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This is an action for judicial review of a final agency decision under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). In 2009, the Food Safety and Inspection Services ("FSIS")—which administers the Poultry Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 451 –72 ("PPIA")—denied a rulemaking petition aimed at banning force-fed foie gras¹ from the food supply. Plaintiffs, comprised of four animal rights organizations and three individuals, allege that FSIS's denial of the petition was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law because force-fed foie gras is clearly unfit for human consumption. Defendants respond that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing, that the PPIA does not protect the interests asserted by the animal rights organizations, and that in any event FSIS acted within its discretion in denying the petition. Both parties now move for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that the animal rights organizations have standing to bring this action and that their interests fall within the "zone" of interests protected by the PPIA, but that Defendants did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to law in denying the petition. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 61, 67.)

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Foie gras is a luxury food product made from the liver of a duck or goose. (Administrative Record ("AR") at 138, ECF No. 18.) Before slaughter, the bird is force-fed a special mix of food using a feeding tube (a process also known as gavage ). (AR at 143–45.) This causes a large buildup of fat in the bird's liver, which gives the product its signature taste. (Id. )

A. The Petition

On November 28, 2007, several individuals and animal rights organizations (including some of the Plaintiffs in this action) petitioned FSIS to initiate rulemaking "to exclude force-fed foie gras from the food supply as an adulterated and diseased product that is ‘unsound, unhealthful, unwholesome, or otherwise unfit for human food.’ " (AR at 5 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 453(g)(3) ).) The petitioners argued that (1) the force-feeding process causes hepatic lipidosis in ducks and geese, rendering the birds "unhealthful" under the PPIA, and (2) the consumption of force-fed foie gras may trigger the onset of secondary amyloidosis in humans. (AR at 10–23.) The petitioners state that hepatic lipidosis also causes "various secondary infections and illnesses" in poultry, but they did not develop those points further. (AR at 17, 20, 21.) The petition was accompanied by 65 exhibits, totaling 1150 pages. (AR at 32–1150.)

On August 27, 2009, FSIS denied the petition. (AR at 1547–48.) FSIS acknowledged that one could characterize the livers of force-fed birds as affected by hepatic lipidosis due to the buildup of excess fat in the liver. (AR at 1547.) However, FSIS reasoned, unlike fat buildup resulting from disease, fat buildup resulting from a "physiologic condition, i.e. the [purposeful] overwhelming of the hepatocyte's ability to process and export fat," does not render the liver unsafe to consume. (Id. ) FSIS also found that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate a connection between the consumption of force-fed foie gras and the onset of secondary amyloidosis in humans. (AR at 1548.) FSIS explained that the one scientific study on which the petitioners relied concerned only "the administration of amyloid to genetically susceptible mice under experimental conditions," and that "additional scientific study" was required to show "the potential effect on human health of consuming amyloid." (Id. )

B. The Plaintiffs

1. Animal Rights Organizations

The four organizations bringing this action are Animal Legal Defense Fund ("ALDF"), Farm Sanctuary, Compassion Over Killing, and Animal Protection and Rescue League. ALDF "has spent over three decades focusing on issues involving animals and the law," and "its main focus is preventing animal cruelty and advancing the protection of the interests of animals through the legal system." (Wells Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 61–1.) To this end, "ALDF advocates concerning the health consequences of consuming animal products because the practices that exacerbate the harmful health effects of consuming animal products are the same practices that greatly contribute to animal cruelty in animal farming." (Id. ¶ 5.) ALDF has spent resources "raising awareness about the health effects on ducks being raised for foie gras and the human health consequences of the force-feeding process," including issuing press releases, initiating letter-writing campaigns, and petitioning administrative agencies. (Id. ¶ 8; see also id. ¶¶ 6, 7, 9–11.) According to ALDF, "had [it] not diverted these resources to combat force-fed foie gras, it would have suffered a loss of credibility, support, and organizational goodwill among its donors, its peers, and the legal community." (Id. ¶ 12.) The parties generally agree that Farm Sanctuary, Compassion Over Killing, and Animal Protection and Rescue League are similarly situated to ALDF for standing purposes. (See generally Defs.' Opp'n at 12, 14 n.10, ECF No. 67; Pls.' Stmt. of Undisputed Facts 98, 101, ECF No. 61–6; Friedrich Decl., ECF No. 22–3 (Farm Sanctuary); Meier Decl., ECF No. 61–3 (Compassion Over Killing); Pease Decl., ECF No. 22–7 (Animal Protection and Rescue League).)

2. Individual Plaintiffs

The individual Plaintiffs in this action are Sarah Evans, Caroline Lee, and Michelle Schurig. Evans previously consumed force-fed foie gras, but now "avoid [s]" doing so "due to the cruelty involved in the force-feeding process and the nature of the resulting diseased product." (Evans Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 61–3.) Evans continues to consume other types of duck and goose dishes, however, and is concerned that restaurants may inadvertently serve her force-fed foie gras. (Id. ¶¶ 6–9.) Lee, like Evans, also "avoid[s]" eating force-fed foie gras, and is likewise concerned about the possibility of eating force-fed foie gras unknowingly; however, unlike Evans, it does not appear that Lee has ever consumed foie gras. (Lee Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 61–4.) In addition, Lee contends that she is genetically susceptible to developing secondary amyloidosis,² and is therefore worried that any inadvertent consumption of force-fed foie gras "could increase [her] risk" of developing the disease. (Id. ¶¶ 5–9.) Finally, Schurig, who previously ate force-fed foie gras but who is now a vegan, asserts that she too is concerned that she will inadvertently consume foie gras at social events "because [she is] not always fully informed about the ingredients of the dishes [she is] served." (Schurig Decl. ¶¶ 2, 6, ECF No. 61–5.)

C. Procedural History

In May 2012, Plaintiffs filed this action. (ECF No. 1.) In March 2013, the Court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that an agency's decision not to initiate rulemaking was not subject to judicial review under the APA. (ECF No. 45.) Plaintiffs appealed from the ensuing judgment. (ECF Nos. 46, 49.) In December 2015, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the denial of a petition to initiate rulemaking is reviewable under the APA. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep't of Agric. , 632 Fed.Appx. 905, 908 (9th Cir. 2015). Defendants argued on appeal that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring this action, but the panel declined to consider those arguments in the first instance. Id. Judge Chhabria, however, issued a concurring opinion expressing skepticism that the animal rights organizations could establish standing based solely on their "choice to spend money to counteract challenged conduct germane to [their] mission." Id. (Chhabria, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Following remand, both parties moved for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 61, 67.) Those motions are now before the Court for decision.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Courts must view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). A disputed fact is "material" where the resolution of that fact might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and the dispute is "genuine" where "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1968).

The district court "is not required to resolve any facts in a review of an administrative proceeding"; rather, "the function of the district court is to determine whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did." Occidental Eng'g Co. v. I.N.S. , 753 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1985). As a result, summary judgment is an appropriate vehicle for deciding APA cases. Id.

IV. DISCU...