Anselme v. Fluvanna Corr. Ctr. for Women

VIVIANA ANSELME & ALYSHA HONEYCUTT, Plaintiffs, v. FLUVANNA CORRECTIONAL CENTER FOR WOMEN, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:20-cv-5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA CHARLOTTESVILLE DIVISION

December 17, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON

Alleging unconstitutional conduct at Fluvanna Correctional Center for Women ("FCCW"), Viviana Anselme and Alysha Honeycutt ("Plaintiffs") seek damages and injunctive relief against FCCW, the warden, and three other prison officials. Plaintiffs assert three 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Defendant Eric Aldridge, the warden at the time, and Defendant Perez, a prison official who allegedly harassed Plaintiff Anselme, move for dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Defendants Eric Griffin and Raheem Rumsey did not file a motion. Claims against Griffin and Rumsey will proceed and are not subject to this motion to dismiss.

The Court will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss in part. Counts I and II will be dismissed with prejudice. Count III will be dismissed without prejudice against FCCW and Aldridge. The Court will afford Plaintiffs leave to amend, permitting Plaintiffs to request more specific and tailored relief and to properly name Defendant Rumsey.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint to determine whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim; it "does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). On a motion to dismiss, the Court must take as true all factual allegations in the complaint, draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, disregard any legal conclusions, and not credit any formulaic recitations of the elements. See Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007).

II. BACKGROUND AS ALLEGED

The earliest incident involves the claim that Griffin sexually assaulted and psychologically tortured Anselme. Not long after her arrival in 2017, Griffin began "lurk[ing] around" Anselme's cell and "pac[ing] back and forth to look at Anselme." Dkt. 1 ¶ 13. On April 8, 2017, Anselme disrobed and bathed at the sink in her cell. Id. ¶ 14. After putting on a towel and applying lotion, she noticed Griffin standing at the door. Id. Before he moved on, he whispered that her actions were an "indecent exposure charge." Id. ¶ 15. Just a few minutes later, Griffin returned. At this point, Griffin told Anselme, "I love your ass. I won't write you up. Just let me see it again[;] ... [j]ust let me feel it." Id. ¶ 17. He then sexually assaulted Anselme, repeatedly plunging his fingers in and out of her vagina—so violently that she began to bleed. Id. ¶ 18.

After this incident, Griffin subjected Anselme to sexual comments, which Plaintiffs contend amounted to psychological abuse. Id. ¶ 56. He began calling her "Juicy," and he attempted to check on her several times a day, often asking "Are you O.K.?" Id. ¶¶ 21-22, 25. Anselme was terrified during her exchanges with Griffin. Id. ¶¶ 20-26. On one occasion, another inmate heardAnselme say to Griffin that she would not "show [Griffin] her pussy" or "touch herself" for him. Id. ¶ 33. Anselme told Griffin she was going to report his behavior. In response, he laughed and said "Go ahead. They will never believe you." Id. ¶ 32. On May 24, 2017, Anselme filed a formal grievance. She requested a transfer from FCCW and reported the details of Griffin's assault to Defendants FCCW and then-warden Aldridge. Id. ¶ 34. After the prison completed its investigation, it referred Griffin's case for prosecution. Id. ¶ 37. Griffin was later convicted of felony carnal knowledge of an inmate. Id.

The second incident concerns Officer Perez. Anselme alleges that Perez ordered Anselme to show him her genitals in October 2018. Id. at ¶ 39. On multiple occasions Perez commented to Anselme that he had "a big dick," that she "made his dick hard," and that Anselme made him lose "control." Id. ¶¶ 39-41. Perez was responsible for receiving and evaluating sexual assault complaints at FCCW. Id. ¶ 41. Perez misstated to Anselme the requirements under the Prison Rape Elimination Act ("PREA") to report sexual assault, and discouraged Anselme from "making so much noise" by reporting sexual assaults. Id. ¶ 42.

The third incident involves the claim that another officer, Defendant Rumsey, raped Plaintiff Honeycutt on November 20, 2019. The complaint states that Rumsey removed her from her cell, took her through a door in an employee-only area where there was no video surveillance footage. Id. ¶ 43. He forced Honeycutt to perform oral sex before raping her. Id. ¶ 46. Rumsey left the area after being summoned over the intercom by another officer but instructed Honeycutt to remain where she was. Id. ¶ 47. He returned shortly thereafter and again forced her to perform oral sex and raped her. Id. ¶¶ 48-49. Honeycutt filed a complaint and grievance against Rumsey, but the FCCW grievance department told her that her allegations fell under PREA and that the department "ha[d] no authority to investigate [her] PREA allegation." Instead, the departmentstated that it had referred her complaint to "SIU," the Virginia Department of Corrections' Special Investigations Unit. Id. ¶¶ 51-52.

The complaint further alleges that Aldridge knew of the sexual misconduct within the prison and that knowledge should also be imputed to FCCW. To establish such knowledge, Plaintiffs specifically assert that: (1) Anselme's cell was always monitored by video camera, so Griffin's assault on Anselme was visible, id. ¶¶ 54-55; (2) Griffin has a long history of sexual misconduct at FCCW, including an assault on an inmate in 2010, id. ¶¶ 57-60; (3) Rumsey was "well known" for trading sexual contact for favors, id. ¶ 61; (4) Perez engaged in sexual misconduct as well, id. ¶ 62; and (5) Perez did not take sexual assaults at the facility seriously, even though he was the officer responsible for fielding complaints about sexual assaults, id. The complaint also provides testimony, reports, and surveys documenting a history of sexual misconduct issues at FCCW. Id. ¶¶ 64-73.

Plaintiffs originally filed suit in Fluvanna County Circuit Court on April 4, 2019. Dkt. 18-1. The initial state filing was against only Griffin and FCCW. Id. The state court action was nonsuited on August 16, 2019,¹ with Plaintiffs filing the present action on February 14, 2020.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983 Violations Against Plaintiff Anselme (Count I)

Plaintiffs' first count seeks damages against Defendants Griffin, Perez, and Aldridge for violating Plaintiff Anselme's rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendants Aldridge and Perez move to dismiss Count I. The Court grants both motions. Plaintiffs are time barred from asserting claims against Aldridge arising from Griffin's assault. Plaintiffsalso have failed to state a claim against Aldridge as it related to Perez, as his actions did not amount to a constitutional violation.

1. Aldridge—Statute of Limitations and the Continuing Violation Doctrine

For Section 1983 cases in Virginia, federal courts borrow the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury suits. See Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014); Va. Code § 8.01-243(A). Because Virginia law allows for tolling of personal injury claims in circumstances where a nonsuit was taken by a plaintiff, the Court looks to Virginia's nonsuit tolling provision.

Under Virginia law, when a case is nonsuited, the statutes of limitations on the claims asserted in the nonsuit are tolled for six months. Va. Code § 8.01-229(E)(3). Additionally, the provision bars plaintiffs who take a nonsuit from tolling claims against a new defendant who was not part of the original suit. See Hampton v. Meyer, 847 S.E.2d 287, 288 (Va. 2020). Nonsuit tolling applies when "'there [is an] identity of the parties' in the initial action and the recommenced action." Richmond v. Volk, 781 S.E.2d 191, 194 (Va. 2016) (quoting Casey v. Merck & Co., 722 S.E.2d 842, 846 (Va. 2012)). The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed such an understanding in Hampton, 847 S.E.2d at 288. The Hampton Court recognized an exception to the identity-of-the-parties requirement where, assessing the complaint as a whole, it is clear that a plaintiff intended to bring suit against a specific person, but used the wrong name—a "misnomer." Id. at 291.

At question here is whether Plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of Virginia's nonsuit tolling provision, Va. Code § 8.01-229(E)(3), as against Aldridge. They are not. Plaintiffs did not name Aldridge as a defendant (or party) in the state-court complaint. Nor did they misname him in that case, remedying their error in the later filing. Because Aldridge was not named in the previoussuit, there is no tolling, which means that any claim against Aldridge under Count I would have had to have occurred within the two-year limitations window.

The Griffin assault occurred on April 8, 2017 and the Perez incident took place in October 2018. Because Plaintiffs' complaint against Aldridge was not filed in this Court until February 14, 2020, Aldridge might be held accountable for the Perez incident, but not the Griffin assault.

The statute of limitations inquiry typically stops here. However, Plaintiffs argue that the continuing violation doctrine applies. Dkt. 27 at 8. Plaintiffs' argument is misplaced, as the applicable case law precludes a finding that Aldridge committed a continuing violation.

In a case concerning deliberate indifference to medical needs,² the Fourth Circuit has held that "[a] plaintiff's claim of a continuing violation may extend back to the time at which the prison officials first learned of the serious medical need and unreasonably failed to act." DePaola...