Anthony T. v. Kijakazi

1

ANTHONY T., Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

No. 21-cv-327

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

August 10, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JORGE ALONSO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Anthony T.0F^[1] filed this lawsuit seeking to overturn the Commissioner of Social Security's (the “Commissioner”) denial of his application for social security benefits. The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment. For the reasons below, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion and grants the Commission's motion.

I. Background

The Court takes the following facts from the administrative record. Plaintiff applied for social security benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act on March 31 2010. Plaintiff's case oscillated several times between federal court and the Social Security Administration (“SSA”)-mostly recently being remanded back to the SSA for further proceedings after an agreed motion for reversal. On September 23, 2020, after a hearing on September 1, 2020, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied Plaintiff's application. Plaintiff did not file exceptions to that decision and the Appeals Council did not assume jurisdiction therefore, the ALJ's decision become the final decision of the SSA. 20 C.F.R. § 414.1484.

In her decision, the ALJ found, among other things, that Plaintiff had several severe impairments, including depressive disorder/bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, and obesity; that these impairments did not meet or medically equate to the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; and that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined by 20 C.F.R. 416.967(b). Based on those findings, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's application. Plaintiff seeks review of that order per 42 U.S.C. § 405.

II. Legal Standard

The Court reviews the ALJ's decision to determine whether substantial evidence supported her opinion. Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699 (7th Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Butler v. Kijakazi, 4 F.4th 498, 501 (7th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “An ALJ need not specifically address every piece of evidence, but must provide a ‘logical bridge' between the evidence and his conclusions.” Id. (quoting O'Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2010)). The Court will not “reweigh the evidence or substitute [its] judgment for that of the ALJ.” Summers v. Berryhill, 864 F.3d 523, 526 (7th Cir. 2017). That said, the Court cannot let a decision stand if it lacks sufficient evidentiary support, inadequately discusses the issues, or is undermined by legal error. Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003).

III. Discussion

The SSA uses a five-step process to evaluate whether someone qualifies for Supplemental Security Income or Disability Insurance Benefits, which Plaintiff applied for. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d), 1382c(3); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 443 (7th Cir. 2002). At step one, the ALJ asks whether the claimant engages in “substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If no, step two asks whether the claimant has a severe mental or physical impairment. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If yes, step three requires the ALJ to decide whether the claimant's condition “meets or equals” the severity of one or more impairments listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Sub-part P, Appendix 1. If a claimant's impairment matches or is equivalent to something on the list, then she qualifies for benefits without more. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If no listing applies, then the ALJ moves to step four and must ascertain the claimant's “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”), which is the maximum work that someone seeking benefits can sustain considering their impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). With the benefit of the RFC, the ALJ may deny benefits if a claimant with the described RFC can perform her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If not, the ALJ moves to step five, where they must decide whether a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant could perform, given her impairments, age, education, and work experience. See Ruenger v. Kijakazi, 23 F.4th 760, 761 (7th Cir. 2022); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). The claimant bears the burden of proof on steps one through four; it shifts to the Commissioner for step five.

At step three, the ALJ in this case found that Plaintiff's impairments did not rise to the level of a disabling condition; specifically, any of the listed impairments at 12.04 or 12.06 in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P Appendix 1.1F^[2] At step four, she found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform light work, albeit with certain restrictions. Accordingly, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's application for social security benefits.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ made several errors with respect to the unfavorable decision. Specifically, he argues that the ALJ erred in assessing Consultative Examiner Dr. Michelle Krucek's opinion, that the ALJ's RFC finding was untethered to the evidence, and that the ALJ did not properly evaluate his symptoms. The Court addresses each argument in turn.

A. Dr. Krucek's Opinion

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ failed to properly assess Dr. Krucek's opinions. Dr. Krucek was an independent consultative examiner paid by the SSA to evaluate Plaintiff. Dr. Krucek evaluated Plaintiff one time on May 7, 2018, for about 30 minutes. (AR 1404-1409.) The medical records indicate that Krucek reviewed two prior consultative examinations and records from Gozi Health Services. (Certified Copy of Administrative Record (“AR”) 1404, ECF No. 8.) She further noted that these records diagnosed Plaintiff with alcohol dependence, panic disorder with agoraphobia and an unspecified bipolar disorder. (AR 1408.) Dr. Krucek opined that Plaintiff was mildly limited in all aspects of understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple work due to bipolar mood fluctuation and panic symptoms; moderately limited in all aspects of understanding, remembering, and carrying out complex work; and markedly limited in all aspects of interacting with others if he were to become highly anxious and/or panicked and isolate himself. (AR 1411-1412.)

The ALJ afforded little weight to this opinion for two reasons. First, the ALJ noted that Dr. Krucek's findings were inconsistent with Plaintiff's prior medical treatment. For instance, records from Aunt Martha's Clinic and Dr. Sherrie Godbolt-Plaintiff's primary psychiatric clinic and physician-noted that Plaintiff's bipolar disorder was in remission for years. (See, e.g., AR 1866 (noting bipolar disorder in partial or unspecified remission).) The ALJ also found Krucek's assessment inconsistent with Plaintiff's mental status exam findings at several prior appointments and contradicted by his prior statements to providers. (AR 1553.) In short, the ALJ concluded that Krucek's opinion contradicted contemporaneous medical evidence from Godbolt and other providers.

Second, the ALJ noted that the potential for pecuniary gain by obtaining social security benefits may have induced Plaintiff to exaggerate, and thereby taint, Krucek's evaluation of Plaintiff. Thus, the ALJ found that this further supported her decision to afford little weight to Krucek's opinion.

The Court finds that the ALJ did not improperly weigh Dr. Krucek's opinion. How much weight an ALJ affords to a physician's opinions depends on several factors, such as the length, nature, and extent of the physician and claimant's treatment relationship, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)(I)-(ii), whether the physician supported his or her opinions with sufficient explanations, see id. § 404.1527(d)(3), and whether the physician specializes in the medical conditions at issue, see id. § 404.1527(d)(5); see also Hofslien v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 2006). If an ALJ discounts a physician's opinion after considering these factors, courts must allow that decision to stand so long as the ALJ “‘minimally articulate[s]'” his reasons[.]” Edler v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir. 2008).

Here, the Court finds that the ALJ based her analysis on the evidence and articulated her reasons for discounting Krucek's opinion. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting with others; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting or managing oneself. With respect to each of these areas, the ALJ relied on functional reports, various psychological consultative examinations (including Dr. Krucek's and prior exams), and psychiatric treatment records from Dr. Godbolt and Aunt Martha's Clinic. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff's alleged limitations were inconsistent with his activities of daily living. For this, the ALJ cited evidence in the record that Plaintiff cared for his elderly mother and uncle, regularly shopped in stores, and managed household chores and finances. (AR 1540-42.)

The Court does not agree with Plaintiff's characterization that the ALJ did not consider certain evidence, or afforded disproportionate weight to stale evidence, or substituted her own judgment for that of a medical provider. To be sure, the ALJ discounted Dr. Krucek's opinion and did not find Plaintiff to be as limited as Dr. Krucek had with respect to Plaintiff's ability to interact with others. But the ALJ was not required to adopt Dr. Krucek's opinion uncritically. See Simila v. Astrue, 573, F.3d...