Anthony v. Datcher

321 So.3d 643

Cynthia ANTHONY; William Ashley, in his official capacity as president of Shelton State Community College; and Jimmy Baker, in his official capacity as chancellor of the Alabama Community College System

v.Scheree DATCHER, Khristy Large, and Robert Pressley

1190164

Supreme Court of Alabama.

September 4, 2020

Roger L. Bates and Tracy R. Davis of Hand Arendall Harrison Sale LLC, Birmingham, for appellants.

Frederick L. Fohrell and Katie G. Mooty of Wilmer & Lee, P.A., Huntsville; Sam Heldman of The Gardner Firm, P.C., Washington, D.C.; and Sarah Thompson, Northport, for appellees.

BRYAN, Justice.

Cynthia Anthony, former interim president of Shelton State Community College ("Shelton State"); William Ashley, then president of Shelton State;¹ and Jimmy Baker, chancellor of the Alabama Community College System ("the ACCS") (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the college defendants"), appeal from a judgment entered by the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court in favor of Khristy Large and Robert Pressley, current instructors at Shelton State, and Scheree Datcher, a former instructor at Shelton State (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the instructor plaintiffs"). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

Shelton State is a two-year college that is part of the ACCS. Large and Pressley are instructors in the Office Administration Department ("OAD") at Shelton State. Datcher was an OAD instructor at Shelton State but is now retired. The ACCS has a policy, Board Policy 605.02 ("the policy"), that establishes how community-college instructors are credentialed for salary purposes. Under the policy, an instructor is placed into one of three groups based on the instructor's "teaching area": Group A, Group B, or Group C. After an instructor is placed into a group, the instructor is then ranked within the group for salary purposes according to criteria listed in the policy. The primary issue in this case is whether the instructor plaintiffs should be placed in Group A or Group B (the parties agree that Group C is inapplicable). In relevant part, the policy provides that instructors are to be classified as Group A if they teach credit courses in "professional, occupational, and technical areas that are components of associate degree programs designed for college transfer." Conversely, the policy provides that instructors are to be classified as Group B if they teach in "professional, occupational, and technical areas that are components of associate degree programs not usually resulting in college transfer to senior institutions."

In 1999, Fred Gainous, then chancellor of the Alabama Department of Postsecondary Education, the predecessor to the ACCS, issued a document to the presidents of Alabama's two-year colleges regarding placement of instructors in the appropriate group under the policy ("the credentialing document").² The credentialing document lists each department of study in Group A, Group B, or Group C. The credentialing document lists OAD, the department at issue here, as being in Group A. The credentialing document was accompanied by a memorandum from Chancellor Gainous stating, in substantive part, that the groupings in the credentialing document "are utilized by the Alabama College System to reference appropriate credential placement, to complement rank or level placements as noted in the [policy], and to recommend placement and/or advancement on designated salary schedules." The credentialing document has been updated over time, but OAD has remained in Group A throughout the updates.

Thus, under the credentialing document, OAD instructors, like the instructor plaintiffs in this case, are classified as Group A.

In 2013, Joan Davis, then interim president of Shelton State, concluded that Datcher and Pressley, the two instructor plaintiffs then working at Shelton State as OAD instructors, should be reclassified from Group A to Group B, contrary to the credentialing document. Davis asked Mark Heinrich, then chancellor of the Department of Postsecondary Education, to approve the reclassification, and he did so. Datcher and Pressley received higher salaries by being reclassified to Group B. When the other instructor plaintiff in this case, Large, was hired by Shelton State to be an OAD instructor in 2013, she was also placed in Group B. However, in 2016, Chancellor Heinrich directed Anthony, then interim president of Shelton State, to review instructors’ classifications to make sure they were properly classified. Anthony determined that the instructor plaintiffs should be classified as Group A, in accordance with the credentialing document. Thus, she reclassified the instructor plaintiffs to Group A, which resulted in decreased salaries for the instructor plaintiffs.

The instructor plaintiffs subsequently sued Anthony, in her individual capacity and in her official capacity as interim president of Shelton State. When Anthony was later replaced by Jason Hurst as interim president, Hurst was automatically substituted for Anthony with respect to the official-capacity claims, Rule 25(d)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., but the individual-capacity claims against Anthony remained pending. William Ashley later became president of Shelton State and was substituted for Hurst with respect to the official-capacity claims originally alleged against Anthony. The instructor plaintiffs also sued Jimmy Baker, in his official capacity as chancellor of the ACCS. The instructor plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment, a writ of mandamus, and injunctive relief. Specifically, the instructor plaintiffs asked the trial court for a judgment declaring that they are entitled to be in Group B, ordering them to be placed in Group B, and awarding them backpay for the period following Anthony's reclassification of them to Group A.

The trial court held a three-day bench trial. At trial, the college defendants argued, among other things, that the policy requires that the instructor plaintiffs be in Group A, and the instructor plaintiffs argued, among other things, that the policy requires that they be in Group B. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the instructor plaintiffs, concluding that they are properly classified in Group B under the policy and ordering that the instructor plaintiffs be placed in Group B. The trial court also awarded the instructor plaintiffs backpay for the period following Anthony's reclassification, during which they were classified as Group A instead of Group B. The judgment awarded backpay to Pressley in the amount of $11,271.75, to Datcher in the amount of $8,568, and to Large in the amount of $35,402.12.

Discussion

I.

On appeal, the college defendants first argue that the trial court erred by concluding that the policy requires that the instructor plaintiffs be classified as Group B instead of Group A. The college defendants argue that the chancellor of the ACCS has the authority to interpret the policy, that then Chancellor Gainous interpreted the policy in 1999 by issuing the credentialing document placing OAD instructors in Group A, that then interim president Anthony correctly relied on that credentialing document in placing the instructor plaintiffs in Group A, and that the trial court usurped Chancellor Gainous's authority by concluding that the instructor plaintiffs should be placed in Group B. As the college defendants note, § 16-60-111.5, Ala. Code 1975, provides that the chancellor of the ACCS "shall ... [i]nterpret the rules and regulations of the [B]oard [of Trustees of the ACCS] concerning the community and technical colleges" such as Shelton State. As the college defendants further observe: " ‘ "[A]n agency's interpretation of its own regulation must stand if it is reasonable, even though it may not appear as reasonable as some other interpretation." ’ " Ex parte Board of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile Cty., 824 So. 2d 759, 761 (Ala. 2001) (quoting State Pers. Bd. v. Wallace, 682 So. 2d 1357, 1359 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996), quoting in turn Ferlisi v. Alabama Medicaid Agency, 481 So. 2d 400, 403 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985) ). "An agency's interpretation of its own policy is controlling unless it is plainly erroneous." Ex parte Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 824 So. 2d at 761. The ACCS is indisputably a State agency, and the chancellor of the ACCS has the power to interpret ACCS policies. The college defendants argue that Chancellor Gainous "interpreted" the policy in this case by issuing the credentialing document that placed OAD instructors in Group A. The college defendants do not explain why Chancellor Gainous's merely placing the OAD instructors in Group A should be considered an agency interpretation that is due deference on appellate review; the record contains no rationale for Chancellor Gainous's decision. Assuming, without deciding, that Chancellor Gainous "interpreted" the policy, we conclude, based on the information before us, that the placement of OAD instructors in Group A was plainly incorrect.

The policy provides, in pertinent part:

"The credentials are organized according to teaching areas. The following groups are presented:

"... Group A. This group of requirements shall be used for instructors teaching credit courses in the following areas: humanities/fine arts; social/behavioral sciences; natural sciences/mathematics; and in professional, occupational, and technical areas that are components of associate degree programs designed for college transfer. ...

"... Group B. This group of requirements shall be used for instructors teaching credit courses in professional, occupational, and technical areas that are components of associate degree programs not usually resulting in college transfer to senior institutions."

Thus, instructors belong in Group A if they teach in "professional, occupational, and technical areas" that "are components of associate degree programs designed for college transfer." Conversely, instructors belong in Group B if they teach in "professional,...