Antoninetti v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.

49 F.Supp.3d 710

Maurizio ANTONINETTI, Jean Riker, James Perkins, Karen Friedman Jay Rifkin, Susan Chandler, Laura Williams, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff

v.CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL, INC., a Delaware Corporation, and Does 1–10, Inclusive, Defendants.

Case No. 06–CV–02671–BTM–JLB.

United States District Court, S.D. California.

Signed Sept. 29, 2014.

Amy B. Vandeveld, Law Office of Amy B. Vandeveld, San Diego, CA, Thomas Joseph Vandeveld, III, Vandeveld Law Offices, Bonita, CA, for Plaintiff.

Charles C. Cavanagh, Edward J. Hafer, Messner & Reeves, LLC, Denver, CO, David R. Sugden, Kent Roger Christensen, Melinda Evans, Call & Jensen, Newport Beach, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES & COSTS

BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ, Chief Judge.

On December 2, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking attorneys' fees and costs of $1,671,197.27, plus fees incurred in litigating this motion. (Docs. 183, 207.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and costs is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The parties are familiar with the facts of the case.¹ Due to the unique procedural posture of this motion, however, it bears noting that:

1. Maurizio Antoninetti filed a lawsuit against Defendant in August 2005. Antoninetti v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., No. 05–cv–1660. In that case, Mr. Antoninetti alleged injury arising from visits to two of Defendant's restaurants whose serving area layout violated the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) as well as California's disability access laws.

2. This case was filed on December 6, 2006, as a six-count class action alleging the same facts. Antoninetti et. al. v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., No. 06–cv–2671. Discovery in the two pending cases proceeded jointly.

3. On May 7, 2008, in the Central District of California, a second class action was filed by plaintiffs residing outside of this district who were represented by the same counsel as those litigating here:

Perkins et. al. v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., No. 08–cv–3002. The Compliant and Second Amended Complaint similarly alleged violations of the ADA as well as California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ.Code §§ 51 et seq.

4. After granting partial summary judgment and holding a bench trial, Mr. Antoninetti prevailed in part in the individual action, but was not granted injunctive relief because the Court found that Chipotle's “Customers With Disabilities Policy,” as amended in 2007, brought it into compliance with the ADA.

5. Mr. Antoninetti appealed that judgment. Both putative class actions were stayed pending the appeal. On July 26, 2010, Mr. Antoninetti prevailed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case with instructions “to enter a judgment that Chipotle violated the Disabilities Act and to issue appropriate injunctive relief.” Antoninetti v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 643 F.3d 1165, 1177 (9th Cir.2010).

6. The stay of the Antoninetti putative class action was lifted on August 28, 2010. The stay in the Perkins case remained in place until a settlement was reached.

7. Mr. Antoninetti died on May 9, 2011. The Court granted Mrs. Antoninetti's unopposed motion to substitute as the plaintiff in this case.

8. Class certification was denied. The parties thereafter negotiated a global settlement of the individual claims in this class action, in the Perkins class action, and in fifteen additional individual suits, all of which were consolidated before this Court. More specifically, the individual plaintiffs in state court cases were added to the Antoninetti class action, and the Perkins case was transferred and consolidated with Antoninetti on December 3, 2013. (Order Consolidating Cases, No. 06–2671, December 3, 2013 (Doc. 187).)

9. Under the global settlement agreement, Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (“Chipotle” or “Defendant”) agreed to pay Plaintiffs' reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in all of these related cases. (Doc. 182, Ex. A ¶¶ 2.1.C.1, 2.1.C.6.)

10. As of July 2011, none of the Chipotle locations in California had the type of wall that formed the basis for these suits.

11. The twenty-one named plaintiffs collectively recovered $225,000 in damages for their individual claims.

12. On July 17, 2012, the Court amended a prior judgment in the individual Antoninetti case, awarding $545,079.05 in attorneys fees and costs. (No. 05–cv–1660, Doc. 377.) That amount accounted for time and expenses spent litigating the individual Antoninetti case, including time spent opposing certiorari to the Supreme Court, and time spent on remand through the date of the award. On December 26, 2012, the plaintiff was awarded an additional $353,469.95 for fees and costs related to proceedings before the Ninth Circuit. (No. 05–cv–1660, Doc. 382.) Thus, counsel has already been awarded $898,549 in fees and expenses related to these cases.

13. The pending motion addresses only heretofore uncompensated fees and costs for work on the putative class actions pursuant to the settlement agreement.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under 42 U.S.C. § 12205, the “prevailing party” in an Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) action may, in the Court's discretion, recover “reasonable attorney's fees, including litigation expenses, and costs.” See also 28 C.F.R. § 36.505. The prevailing plaintiff is also entitled to fees and costs under California's applicable disability access laws. See Cal. Civ.Code §§ 52(a). The amount of the prevailing party's reasonable attorneys' fees is calculated using the lodestar method. Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial, Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir.2008). Under the lodestar method, “[t]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). Hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary should be excluded from an award of fees. Id. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ; Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial, Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir.2008). To calculate the “lodestar,” the court multiplies the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable rate. Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir.1996). The hourly rates to be employed in calculating reasonable fees are determined by the “prevailing market rates in the relevant community, regardless of whether the plaintiff is represented by private or nonprofit counsel.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) ; see also Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir.2001). “The burden is on the plaintiff to produce evidence that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “Affidavits of the plaintiffs' attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.”United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir.1990). Generally, the relevant community “is the forum in which the district court sits.” Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir.1997). The relevant rates in that community are those charged “for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). “The defendant may introduce rebuttal evidence in support of a lower hourly rate.” S orenson, 239 F.3d at 1145. As to the number of hours reasonably expended, a fee applicant “should make a good-faith effort to exclude ... hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The movant bears the burden of submitting detailed time records justifying the hours claimed to have been expended. Id. at 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ; In re Washington Public Power Supply Sys. Secs. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1305 (9th Cir.1994).

There is a strong presumption that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee award. Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 18 (9th Cir.1994) ; United Steelworkers, 896 F.2d at 407 (holding that, absent competent rebuttal evidence or a finding that counsels' rates are unwarranted by their level of performance, the requested rates are presumed reasonable); Stonebrae L.P. v. Toll Bros., 521 Fed.Appx. 592, 595 (9th Cir.2013) (“Where, as here, a party achieves an excellent result, the court should refuse to reduce the lodestar amount.”). Yet courts may adjust the lodestar figure upward or downward based upon the factors enunciated in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir.1975) : (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. See Camacho, 523 F.3d at 978 ; Cunningham v. Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 484 (9th Cir.1988) (same). See also Wood v. Sunn, 865 F.2d 982, 991 (9th Cir.1988) (noting that many factors previously identified by courts as probative on the issue of reasonableness of a fee award are now subsumed within the initial calculation of the lodestar amount); Morales, 96 F.3d at 363–64. Generally, the most...