Anyanwu v. City of N.Y.

EVARISTUS ANYANWU, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.

10 Civ. 8498 (AJN) (THK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Dated: September 16, 2013

OPINION & ORDER

ALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge:

This case arises from Plaintiff Evaristus Anyanwu's employment at the New York City Administration for Children's Services ("ACS"). Plaintiff brings claims against Defendant New York City ("the City") and the former Commissioner of ACS, Defendant John Mattingly, as well as several of Plaintiff's former supervisors, Defendants Shirley Sealey, Rosalind Hay-Stevens, and Diana Cortez, for violations of federal and state antidiscrimination laws. (The Court will sometimes refer to Mattingly, Sealey, Hay-Stevens, and Cortez as the "Individual Defendants.") Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against him based on his age and national origin, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; 42 U.S.C. §§1981 and 1983 ("sections 1981 and 1983"); the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 et seq.; and the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107. He also alleges retaliation in violation of Title VII and sections 1981 and 1983, and disability discrimination in violation of NYSHRL and NYCHRL.

Before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 47. Although their motion asks the Court to "dismiss[] the Complaint," Defendants have not briefed Plaintiff's retaliation and disability claims, and they concede in their Reply Brief that they have not moved for summary judgment on those claims. Def. Reply 10 n.6. Accordingly, the Court will not consider those claims in this opinion. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's other claims is granted in part and denied in part.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Nabisco, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 220 F.3d 43, 45 (2d Cir. 2000). For summary judgment purposes, a genuine issue exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could decide in the non-moving party's favor. Nabisco, 220 F.3d at 45.

In a summary judgment setting, "the burden is upon the moving party to demonstrate that no genuine issue respecting any material fact exists." Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994). However, "[w]hen the burden of proof at trial would fall on the nonmoving party, it ordinarily is sufficient for the movant to point to a lack of evidence . . . on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim." Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 204 (2d Cir. 2009). "Where the moving party demonstrates 'the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,' the opposing party must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact." Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). "More specifically, it 'must do more than simply show that there is somemetaphysical doubt as to the material facts' and 'may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.'" Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 975 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); and FDIC v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 607 F.3d 288, 292 (2d Cir. 2010)).

II. BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed or taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff.

Plaintiff is a U.S. citizen of Nigerian national origin. As of November 10, 2010 (the date of the Complaint in this action), he was 61 years old. Compl., Def. Ex. B, ¶¶ 6-7, at 2. He holds two master's degrees, including a Master's Degree in Social Work ("MSW") from Fordham University School of Social Work. Pl. Decl., Pl. Ex. 16, ¶ 4, at 1-2.

In 1999, Plaintiff was hired as a social worker at ACS, which is an agency of the City of New York. By June 2002, he had been promoted to the position of Child Welfare Specialist Supervisor 1 ("CWSS 1"), in which he was responsible for supervising a team of case workers. Id. ¶¶ 3, 8, at 1-2. According to applicable civil service laws and collective bargaining agreements, this title was "provisional," meaning that in the event of layoffs at ACS, he could be returned to his "underlying" title, Child Welfare Specialist 2 ("CWS 2"). Def. Ex. C.

Starting in 2005, after being reassigned following the elimination of his previous unit, he worked in ACS's Office of Case Management ("OCM") under the supervision of Cortez, Hay-Stevens, and Sealey. Pl. 56.1 ¶ 3(h), at 3. Plaintiff expressed his disappointment with the reassignment in an email memorandum to Mattingly in February 2006. Pl. Ex. 10.

In 2005, 2006, and 2007, Plaintiff applied to be a Child Evaluation Specialist in ACS's division of Family Permanency Services ("FPS"); in each case, he was not offered the job. Pl. Decl., Pl. Ex. 16, ¶¶ 10-14, at 2-3.

In the fall of 2007, Mattingly announced that ACS would be undertaking an initiative called "Improved Outcomes for Children" ("IOC"), which was essentially a reorganization of the agency. As part of the initiative, OCM would be eliminated, and ACS would seek to fill a number of new positions in other units with existing ACS employees. Pl. 56.1 ¶ 3(1), at 4; Stephens Dep., Pl. Ex. 5, at 97. The hiring took place in two phases, Phase I and Phase II. Phase I took place in 2007, and Phase II took place in 2008. Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 3(m)-(p), 3(x)-(z), at 5, 8. All of the new positions required an MSW, as well as a Licensed Master of Social Work ("LMSW") license, but the job notices stated that selected applicants would have 18 months to receive their LMSW licenses. Plaintiff received his LMSW license in 2008. Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 3(1)-(m), at 4-5.

Plaintiff applied for several Phase I positions and was interviewed for the jobs of Team Facilitator in FPS and Conference Facilitator in ACS's division of Family Support Services ("FSS"). He was not selected for either position. Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 3(n)-(o), at 5.

In August 2007, Plaintiff was assigned to a new unit, "unit 902," and placed under the supervision of Melanie Duncan, who had less experience than Plaintiff. Pl. Decl., Pl. Ex. 16, ¶ 23, at 5. There, he learned that Duncan had been awarded the FSS Conference Facilitator job that Plaintiff had been denied in Phase I. Id. ¶ 24, at 5. Shortly thereafter, on August 27, 2007, Plaintiff suffered a heart attack, which he claims was brought on in part by the repeated denial of promotions that he had experienced since 2005. Id.

Plaintiff returned to work in April 2008, where he again came under the supervision of Cortez, Hay-Stevens, and Sealey. Concerned that being assigned to the same office would posea risk to his health, he requested a transfer to a different office, which was accompanied by a supporting opinion from his physician. The transfer was denied on the ground that it was not necessary based on the relevant "medical documentation." Pl. 56.1 ¶ 3(aa), at 8-9; Pl. Ex. 40.

In the spring of 2008, in connection with Phase II of the IOC initiative, Plaintiff applied for a number of positions, Pl. 56.1 ¶ 3(z), at 8, including FPS Conference Manager, FPS Borough Manager, FPS Conference Facilitator, and FSS Conference Facilitator. Pl. Ex. 41. In May 2009, Plaintiff became aware that Phase II applicants had been notified of their selection, in part because he was instructed to release one of his subordinates, who had been chosen for a position; as a result, he inquired about his application status. In June 2009, he was told that he had not been selected for any positions. Pl. 56.1 ¶ 3(bb), at 9. On June 19, 2009, Plaintiff wrote again to Mattingly about his failure to be selected for the Phase II positions; he listed his various qualifications and asked about his status with respect to his interviews. Pl. Ex. 11.

During Phase II, Lorraine Stephens, a Deputy Commissioner at ACS who was on the team charged by Mattingly with implementing the IOC initiative, called a staff meeting with OCM to discuss the initiative. At the meeting, a Nigerian employee named Ernest Enoma expressed concern that Nigerian employees were being passed over in the hiring process. Enoma followed up his complaint with an email to Stephens expressing similar concerns. Stephens Dep., Pl. Ex. 5, at 64-65, 95-101.

In March 2009, Plaintiff's immediate supervisor, Vincent Sanchez, evaluated Plaintiff as "Very Good" in his performance evaluation. However, Cortez changed the evaluation to "Good." Pl. 56.1 ¶3(ee), at 10.

In the spring of 2009, as a result of budget cuts at ACS, the agency was preparing for layoffs and the demotion and reassignment of provisional employees. Def. Ex. C. In a letterdated May 11, 2009, Plaintiff was told that these cutbacks meant that employees with his title might be laid off. The letter stated that provisional employees would be laid off first but could be reassigned under their previously held permanent titles. Id. attach. B.

On July 2, 2009, Plaintiff was informed that his job was being eliminated, and that he would be reassigned. He was asked to prioritize among available CWSS 1 positions at ACS, and was ultimately reassigned to the Community Partnership office. Def. Ex. C. In his new role, he had no job description and no subordinates to supervise. Pl. 56.1 ¶ 3(hh), at 11.

On September 4, 2009, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the New York Division of Human Rights and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging age and national origin discrimination. Def. Ex. A.

In a letter dated September 14, 2009, Plaintiff...