Anzaldua v. Ne. Ambulance & Fire Prot. Dist.

978 F.Supp.2d 1016

Stevon ANZALDUA, Plaintiff,

v.NORTHEAST AMBULANCE AND FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 4:13CV01257 ERW.

United States District Court,

E.D. Missouri,

Eastern Division.

Oct. 21, 2013.

Lynette M. Petruska, Brandy B. Barth, Pleban and Petruska Law, LLC, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiff.

Gregg M. Lemley, Erin E. Williams, Ogletree and Deakins, St. Louis, MO, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

E. RICHARD WEBBER, Senior District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on a “Motion to Dismiss” filed by Defendants Northeast Ambulance and Fire Protection District (“Fire District”), Derek Mays, Clarence Young, Bridget Quinlisk–Dailey, Robert Lee, Quinten Randolph, and Kenneth Farwell (Fire District and individual defendants moving for dismissal collectively referred to as “Defendants”) [ECF No. 9].

I. BACKGROUND

On July 2, 2013, Plaintiff Stevon Anzaldua (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendants and defendant Kate Welge, alleging his employment with Fire District was terminated on September 26, 2012, as a result of a conspiracy among the Defendants and Kate Welge ¹ [ECF No. 1]. In his Complaint, Plaintiff brings two claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the termination violated his First Amendment right to free speech (Count I, against Defendants Lee, Mays, Quinlisk–Dailey, Randolph, and Farwell, the “Fire District Defendants”), and Defendants and Defendant Kate Welge conspired to violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II, against all defendants). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Kenneth Farwell and Defendant Kate Welge violated federal and state computer privacy laws (Counts III and IV).

Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on August 26, 2013 [ECF No. 9]. Plaintiff filed his “Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Northeast Ambulance and Fire Protection District, Derek Mays, Clarence Young, Bridget Quinlisk–Dailey, Robert Lee, Quinten Randolph and Kenneth Farwell's Motion to Dismiss” on September 16, 2013 [ECF No. 13]. On September 25, 2013, Defendant's filed their Reply [ECF No. 14].

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

For purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, the following facts, as alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint and exhibits incorporated therein, are accepted as true.

Plaintiff was hired as a paramedic by Fire District in January of 2008, and worked for the district as a paramedic and firefighter. Plaintiff and Defendant Welge were involved in a romantic relationship, which ended in July of 2011. During their relationship, Welge gained access to Plaintiff's private email and passwords. At some point, Welge worked for Defendant Farwell at a bar.

Prior to Plaintiff's termination, the state health department accused Fire District of numerous violations, including, but not limited to, the expiration of its license to possess and administer controlled substances, failing to maintain annual inventory of controlled substances, failing to maintain appropriate records to account for drug security, and failing to provide adequate security procedures to detect and prevent the diversion of controlled substances.

In April 2012, the Fire District, through the individually named defendants, began to harass Plaintiff in retaliation for his expression of certain opinions and facts about problems at the Fire District. On July 23, 2012, Plaintiff drafted an e-mail to the Fire District's Medical Director, Dr. David Tan, regarding issues and concerns at the Fire District. However, Plaintiff did not send the e-mail to Dr. Tan.

Plaintiff alleges that, upon information and belief, Fire District Battalion Chief Kenneth Farwell and Kate Welge, either individually or in conspiracy with another, accessed his private e-mail account sometime in July 2012, and sent the draft e-mail to Dr. Tan and the Board.

On August 20, 2012, Plaintiff was suspended for ten (10) days, due to the e-mail forwarded to Dr. Tan. On August 23, 2012, Plaintiff drafted and sent an e-mail to Ms. Elizabeth Holland of the St. Louis Post–Dispatch [ECF Nos. 1, 1–1]. In this e-mail, Plaintiff informed Ms. Holland that he had “tried to reach out to the directors only to be disciplined for 10 days for an email sent to the medical director with critical concerns regarding the service we provide citizens as it pertains to medical emergencies” [ECF No. 1–1 at 1]. Some of the concerns Plaintiff communicated to Ms. Holland included “staffing mishaps,” non-compliant self-contained breathing apparatuses, safety issues, unnecessary expenditures for vehicles, use of publicly-owned vehicles for personal use, and a lapse in the Fire District's license to administer controlled substances [ECF Nos. 1, 1–1].

On August 31, 2012, the St. Louis Post–Dispatch ran a story written by Ms. Holland, “Northeast Fire District is Grilled Over Mishandling State Drug Paperwork,” which reported the expiration of the Fire District's license to possess and administer controlled substances [ECF Nos. 1, 1–2].

On September 13, 2012, Plaintiff received a notice of hearing to appear before the Fire District's Board of Directors (the “Board”), namely defendants Derek Mays, Clarence Young, and Bridget Quinlisk–Dailey. The hearing concerned the August 23, 2012 email Plaintiff sent to Ms. Holland. Plaintiff was suspended pending the hearing.

Plaintiff alleges, “[u]pon information and belief, Defendant Farwell and Defendant Welge, working alone and/or in conspiracy with another,” accessed his e-mail account, and Defendant Farwell obtained, “illegally and without authorization,” a copy of the August 23, 2012 e-mail sent to Ms. Holland, and distributed it to the Board [ECF No. 1 at 5].

On September 26, 2012, the Fire District provided Plaintiff with written notification of his termination, effective immediately [ECF Nos. 1, 1–3]. In this Letter of Termination, Fire District Fire Chief Quinten R. Randolph stated the Board, on April 7, 2012, had extended Plaintiff's probationary period for six additional months for Conduct Unbecoming an Employee, and had suspended Plaintiff for ten shift days and had issued a last chance letter on August 13, 2012, for a second incident of Conduct Unbecoming an Employee [ECF No. 1–3]. Fire Chief Randolph informed Plaintiff of the following finding of facts regarding his most recent violation:

The Board accepted your admission and there from (sic) concluded that you circulated an email publicly defaming and denigrating the District without just cause. It was also determined that your statements were seditiously false and misleading as well as ill-intended, divisive, and retaliatory for prior discipline issued by the Board in good faith. Even though you admitted conveying statements to, at least, one public entity; the number of other people and entities that you actually conveyed them to is unknown. The Board found your explanation for publicly expressing and circulating false and misleading information to others as not credible.

In sum, the Board deemed this conduct to be totally unacceptable. It has therefore decided to terminate your employment effective immediately for again violating the District's Code of Conduct.

[ECF No. 1–3].

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A party may move under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss a complaint for “fail[ing] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test “the sufficiency of a complaint [.]” M.M. Silta, Inc. v. Cleveland Cliffs, Inc., 616 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir.2010).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Ordinarily, only the facts alleged in the complaint are considered for purposes of a motion to dismiss; however, materials attached to the complaint may also be considered in construing its sufficiency. Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir.2011).

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court “must liberally construe a complaint in favor of the plaintiff[.]” Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 592 F.3d 853, 862 (8th Cir.2010). However, if a claim fails to allege one of the elements necessary to recovery on a legal theory, that claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Crest Constr. II, Inc. v. Doe, 660 F.3d 346, 355 (8th Cir.2011). “Threadbare recitals of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937;Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although courts must accept all factual allegations as true, they are not bound to take as true “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotations and citation omitted); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–78, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

IV. DISCUSSION

In their “Motion to Dismiss,” Defendants contend Plaintiff fails to state a claim as to any of the counts alleged in his Complaint, because his allegations lack the specificity and factual support required by Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 669–70, 129 S.Ct. 1937, and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and assert Plaintiff's Complaint consequently should be dismissed in its entirety [ECF Nos. 9, 10]. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has not met, and cannot meet, the statutory requirements of the Federal Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access Act (“the SCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2707, or the Missouri Computer Tampering Act, §§ 569.095–569.099 RSMo. They ask the Court to grant their Motion, dismiss Plaintiff's claims with prejudice, award...