Applewhite v. Sawyer

1

KRISTI RUTH APPLEWHITE, Plaintiff, v. BARRY SAWYER, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL No. 4:21-CV-985-P-BJ

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Fort Worth Division

August 22, 2022

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING DEFENDANTS BETH POULOS, JEROME HENNIGAN, CASEY CONINE, TROY LAWRENCE, VINCENT RUMSEY, BARRY SAWYER, AND LANDON ROLLINS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

JEFFREY L. CURETON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pending before the Court are Defendants Beth Poulos (“Judge Poulos”), Jerome Hennigan (“Judge Hennigan”), Casey Conine (“Judge Conine”) Fort Worth Police Department (“FWPD”) Sergeant Troy Lawrence (“Sgt. Lawrence”), and FWPD Sergeant Vincent Rumsey (“Sgt. Rumsey”), FWPD officer Barry Sawyer (“Officer Sawyer”), and FWPD officer Landon Rollins (“Officer Rollins”) (collectively, “Defendants”)'s motions to dismiss.^[1] The Court, having carefully considered the motions, responses, replies, supplemental briefing, and all relevant applicable law, recommends that the Defendants' motions be GRANTED and that all claims against them be DISMISSED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Kristi Ruth Applewhite (“Applewhite”) is discontented with the rulings in a family law matter and alleges various individuals wronged her throughout the family court proceedings. (Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint (“Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl,”) at 1.) On August 19, 2021, Applewhite, pro se, filed the above-styled and numbered cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, violations of her civil rights.^[2] The case was initially referred to United States Magistrate Judge Hal R. Ray [doc. 3], Applewhite filed her Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis [doc. 5] on August 26,2021.^[3] On September 1, 2022, Applewhite filed her First Amended Complaint with Jury Demand [doc. 6]. On September 7, 2022, Judge Ray issued an Order [doc. 7] instructing Applewhite to file another amended complaint that sets forth only her claims and instructing her to file a proper application to proceed in forma pauperis. On September 18, 2022, Applewhite filed her Second Amended Complaint with Jury Demand [doc. 9], the live pleading before the Court. On January 4, 2022, the undersigned was assigned to the case.

In her Second Amended Complaint, Applewhite argues, inter alia, that Judges Poulos, Hennigan, and Conine (collectively, “Judges”), in their individual capacities, violated her rights while presiding over Applewhite's family law court proceedings.^[4] Applewhite requests various injunctive relief against Judges Poulos, Hennigan, and Conine,^[5] Applewhite also alleges § 1983 violations against her by Sgts. Lawrence and Rumsey and Officers Sawyer and Rollins, though she fails to request specific relief from the sergeants or officers.^[6]

The facts before the Court, as provided by Applewhite, are, at best, unclear. Applewhite asserts Judges Poulos, Hennigan, and Conine, “the 324th Court, Title IV-D Court, [and members of] FWPD” violated her civil rights as follows:

[The Defendants] worked in concert and conspired to deprive Plaintiffs property, slander Plaintiffs reputation, blacklisted Plaintiff from employment, and interfere[d] with custody of son, AC. The Defendants have deprived Plaintiffs ability to live like other American Citizens. My inalienable Constitutional Rights are still recognized. Plaintiff currently has been retaliated against as if she were a ‘whistleblower.' Plaintiff is denied all access to the listed courts to seek remedy in judgments made against her[,] Plaintiff was not allowed to fully participate in proceedings that resulted in these judgments. Plaintiff is denied court transcripts, yet these courts demand she face loss of liberty, deprive Plaintiff of property as late as June 2021, while interfering with the Constitutional Right to Parent her sons . . . Many listed defendants participated in the violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants acted under Color of Law and violated Plaintiffs rights under Amendments I, IV, V, XIV derived from the Constitution of the United States. Illegal surveillance.

(Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl. at 1.)

In their respective motions to dismiss, the Judges set forth several bases for prevailing on Applewhite's claims, including, inter alia^[7] threshold arguments that Applewhite lacks standing to bring her claims against the Judges, that Applewhite's claims against the Judges are barred by §1983's statute of limitations, and that Applewhite is unable to seek injunctive relief against them. (See Defendant Poulos' Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support (“Def. Poulos' Br.”) at 1; Defendant Hennigan's Motion to Dismiss (“Def. Hennigan's Mot.”) at 3-10; Defendant Conine's Motion to Dismiss (“Def. Conine's Mot.”) at 3-10.)

Similarly, in their respective motions to dismiss, FWPD Sgts. Lawrence and Rumsey, and Officers Sawyer and Rollins also argue, inter alia^[8] that Applewhite's claims against them should be dismissed because her claims lack standing and that any claims are barred under § 1983 's statute of limitations. See (Defendant Lawrence's Motion to Dismiss (“Def. Lawrence's Mot.”) at 7-12; Defendant Rumsey's Motion to Dismiss (“Def. Rumsey's Mot.”) at 3-9; Defendant Sawyer's Motion to Dismiss (“Def. Sawyer's Mot. to Dismiss”) at 5-10; Defendant Rollins' Motion to Dismiss (“Def. Rollins' Mot. to Dismiss”) at 6-9.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint that fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” This rule must be interpreted in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which sets forth the requirements for pleading a claim for relief in federal court. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). Rule 8(a) calls for “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(A)(2); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (holding that Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to most civil actions). The Court must accept as true all well-pleaded, non-conclusory allegations in the complaint and liberally construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F,2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).

The plaintiff must, however, plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, to avoid dismissal. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992). Indeed, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555 (citations omitted). The Court need not credit bare conclusory allegations or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Generally, a court ruling on a motion to dismiss may rely on only the complaint and its proper attachments. A court is permitted, however, to rely on documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the Court may consider a “written document that is attached to a complaint as an exhibit” as well as “documents attached to a motion to dismiss that are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to the plaintiffs claim.” Tex. Health and Hum. Servs. Comm. v. U.S., 193 F.Supp.3d 733, 738 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (citations are internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standing

The first threshold issue before the Court is whether Applewhite has standing to bring her claims against the Judges, Sgts. Lawrence and Rumsey, and Officers Sawyer and Rollins. A federal court must have standing before it can exercise subject matter jurisdiction. Arbraugh v. Altimus, 26 F. 4th 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). In ruling on motions to dismiss, the court is free to weigh evidence and satisfy itself that subject matter jurisdiction exists. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 2(B)(1). There are two types of standing: Constitutional Article III standing and prudential standing.^[9] To satisfy Article III standing, a plaintiff must show (1) injury in fact; (2) causation; and (3) redressability. U.S. Const, art. 3, § 2, cl. 1; Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997).

Specific to the first prong-injury in fact-a plaintiff must “implicate ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”' Gabriel v. Outlaw, No 3:20-CV-60-K-BK, 2002 WL 617628, at * 1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2022), quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Next, the causation prong requires the injury to be “fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct.” Nat'l Park Hosp. Ass'n v. Dept, of Interior, 538 U.S. 803 (2003) quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Lastly, “redressability requires that it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Consumer Data Indus. Ass'n v. Texas through Paxton (564 F.Supp.3d 506, 512 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2021) citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. Notably, “the party invoking federal subject matter jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing each element [of the standing...