Apuri v. Parkview Health Sys.

BHALTAVATSALA R. APURI, M.D., Plaintiff, v. PARKVIEW HEALTH SYSTEM, INC. PARKVIEW HOSPITAL, INC.and ROY ROBERTSON, M.D., Defendants.

Cause No. 1:16-CV-363-HAB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA FORT WAYNE DIVISION

January 23, 2020

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Petition for Defense Costs and Attorney Fees (ECF No. 98) and supporting Memorandum (ECF No. 99), filed on April 10, 2019. In their Motion, Defendants ask this Court for deposition transcript costs and attorney's fees by virtue of their claimed status as prevailing parties in this case. Plaintiff filed his Response in Opposition (ECF No. 100) on April 24, 2019. After being granted several extensions, Defendants filed their Reply (ECF No. 111) on October 7, 2019. Defendant's Petition is now ripe for review.

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed his Complaint and Jury Demand (ECF No. 1) on October 14, 2016, and a First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 25) on May 18, 2017. Generally, Plaintiff alleged that his privileges at Defendants' hospital were not renewed due to racial discrimination. The Complaints alleged four causes of action: (1) a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (2) Non-Renewal of Privileges; (3) Breach of Contract; and (4) Intentional Interference with Business Relationship. The final three causes of action were brought under Indiana state law.

Although discovery closed on December 1, 2017, several discovery motions were filed and heard after the deadline. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel (ECF No. 39) on December 1, 2017, and a Second Motion to Compel (ECF No. 42) on December 11, 2017, seeking responses to Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents and Third Request for Production of Documents, respectively. A hearing was held on Plaintiff's motions on February 14, 2018, by Magistrate Susan Collins. The docket indicates that, following argument on the motions, the parties came to an "agreement to limit discovery requests and to terms of document production," thus mooting the motions.

On May 24, 2018, Plaintiff filed his Third Motion to Compel (ECF No. 57). In that motion, Plaintiff advised the Court that, despite previously agreeing to provide certain mortality medical charts subject to one or both of Plaintiff's earlier motions to compel, Defendants were now demanding $176,000.00 to produce 175 charts. Plaintiff sought an order from the Court requiring Defendants to produce the agreed-upon materials. Defendants responded on June 7, 2018. (ECF No. 60). Rather than address the cost issue, Defendants argued that the requested charts were privileged and irrelevant, and that the requests for production of documents were unduly burdensome. Defendants also filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Third Motion to Compel (ECF No. 61) on June 7, 2018, arguing that Plaintiff's motion was untimely. Magistrate Collins again held a hearing on the parties' discovery dispute on July 27, 2018. The docket indicates that Plaintiff's Third Motion to Compel was granted and Defendants' Motion to Strike was denied "for the reasons stated on the record."

During the pendency of the Third Motion to Compel, Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment and Designation of Evidence (ECF No. 70) and Memorandum of Law in Support (ECF No. 71) on July 23, 2018. Plaintiff filed his Response Brief in Opposition toDefendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 83) and Designation of Evidence (ECF No. 84) on December 11, 2018. The parties also filed and briefed evidentiary issues as part of the summary judgment proceedings. (ECF Nos. 87-95).

This Court issued its Order and Opinion on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 96) on March 27, 2019. This Court initially found that Plaintiff's claim was subject to the burden-shifting analysis created by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). (Id. at 5). As such, Plaintiff was required to establish:

(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he performed his job to his employer's expectations; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) one or more similarly situated individuals outside his protected class received better treatment.

(Id. at 6). Plaintiff failed on both the second and fourth elements.

The Plaintiff has not established the second element of his prima facie case. The Plaintiff argues that, because he had some of the lowest mortality rates of physicians at Parkview, he must therefore have been qualified to hold medical privileges. However, the Defendants decided not to renew the Plaintiff's hospital privileges at least in part because of issues unrelated to the Plaintiff's medical outcomes, including conducting rounds late at night and communication issues with nursing staff and Emergency Room personnel. The Plaintiff has not disputed the fact of his continued problems in these areas. The Plaintiff also does not contest the legitimacy of the standards to which the Defendant held him.

The Plaintiff's argument as to the fourth element suffers from a similar problem. The Plaintiff presents evidence that he was a superior cardiologist, based on record outcomes from procedures performed by Caucasian cardiologists, whom the Plaintiff maintains did not lose their medical privileges as he did. However, the Plaintiff is again failing to respond to the Defendant's articulated reasons for the termination of his medical privileges: the Plaintiff had documented problems with timely rounding and availability during call. Thus, the doctors the Plaintiff identifies are not valid comparators, because they did not have the same problems in performance. Because he has not presented evidence regarding instances of comparable misconduct, the Plaintiff cannot claim that he engaged in similar conduct, but nonetheless received disparate treatment for no apparent legitimate reason.

(Id. at 7-8).

This Court further concluded that, even had Plaintiff satisfied his burden under McDonnell Douglas, his claim would still fail. Plaintiff failed to designate any evidence demonstrating that the adverse employment action against him was due to his race. Notably, Plaintiff himself offered a race-neutral reason for his termination which, in and of itself, defeated his claim under the "but-for standard required for § 1981 claims." (Id. at 10).

This Court did not reach the merits of Plaintiff's state law claims. Rather, "considering judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity," the Court dismissed those claims without prejudice to enable Plaintiff to refile those claims in an Indiana state court. (Id. at 10-12). Plaintiff re-filed his state law claims in the Allen County Superior Court on March 28, 2019.

B. Legal Analysis

1. Costs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)

Defendants first ask that this Court award them $3,810.98 in costs, representing Defendants' payments to secure the deposition transcripts in this matter. Defendants assert that they are entitled to these costs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) since they were the "prevailing party."

"Unless a federal statute, [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure], or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney's fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). "There is a presumption that the prevailing party will recover costs, and the losing party bears the burden of an affirmative showing that taxed costs are not appropriate." Beamon v. Marshall & Ilsley Tr. Co., 411 F.3d 854, 864 (7th Cir. 2005). This presumption "is difficult to overcome" and therefore, "the district court's discretion is narrowly confined—the court must award costs unless it states good reasons for denying them." Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., 126 F.3d 926, 945 (7th Cir. 1997). Generally, only the losing party's inability to pay or misconductby the prevailing party worthy of a penalty will suffice to justify denying costs. Bonds v. Fizer, 69 F. Supp. 3d 799, 803 (N.D. Ill. 2014).

For the purposes of Rule 54, a party is deemed "prevailing" if it prevails as to a substantial part of the litigation. Testa v. Village of Mundelein, Ill, 89 F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1996). In a case with mixed results, the district court has the discretion to determine whether a party meets that standard. Gavoni v. Dobbs House, Inc., 164 F.3d 1071, 1075 (7th Cir. 1999); Testa, 89 F.3d at 447; Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 924 F.2d 633, 641 (7th Cir. 1991).

The question of whether Defendants are a "prevailing party" for the purposes of Rule 54(d) does not appear to be in dispute. Defendants obtained judgment in their favor on Plaintiff's sole federal claim and the remaining state law claims were dismissed. The net effect of Defendants' summary judgment victory is that there is no federal lawsuit remaining. The Court concludes that this constitutes success as to a substantial part of the litigation before this Court, and Plaintiff does not seriously argue to the contrary. See Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Touche, Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 219, 220 (7th Cir. 1988) ("no question" party obtaining summary judgment on federal law claim and dismissal of pendent state law claims was prevailing party).

Because Defendants qualify as the prevailing party in this matter, this Court presumes that they are entitled to properly taxable costs. The costs a district court may tax are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Subsection (2) of § 1920 permits this Court to tax "[f]ees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case." Defendants' request for costs representing their payments for deposition transcripts are taxable, and the Court must start from a presumption that they are entitled to those costs.

Plaintiff attempts to overcome this presumption not by arguing one of the exceptions identified in Bonds, supra, but instead by arguing that his state law claims continue in state court. According to Plaintiff, "[i]t could be...