Apuzza v. NYU Langone Long Island

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Adrienne Apuzza, Plaintiff, v. NYU Langone Long Island, Defendant.

No. 2:22-cv-7519 (NJC) (JMW)

United States District Court, E.D. New York

July 23, 2024

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY, DISTRICT JUDGE:

On December 29, 2023, I granted Defendant NYU Langone Long Island's (“NYU Langone”) motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint in this action with prejudice. (Dismissal Order, ECF No. 53; Am. Compl., ECF No. 25-1.) I now consider a Motion to Vacate the Dismissal Order and Judgment (“Motion to Vacate”) filed by pro se Plaintiff Adrienne Apuzza (“Apuzza”), pursuant to Rules 60(b)(1), (4) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”). (Mot., ECF No 55.) For the following reasons, I deny the Motion to Vacate.

BACKGROUND

The Dismissal Order is incorporated by reference, and familiarity with it is presumed. See e.g. Williams v. Nat'l R.R Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), No. 18-cv-7070 (DLC), 2019 WL 3423267, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2019) (incorporating by reference prior recitations of procedural history and facts). Consequently, I recite only those facts necessary to resolve the Motion to Vacate.

The Amended Complaint alleges that NYU Langone, Apuzza's former employer of thirty-five years, discriminated and retaliated against her on the basis of an alleged disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. when it terminated Apuzza's employment after she refused to get vaccinated against COVID-19. (Dismissal Order at 1-2.) On October 16, 2023, NYU Langone moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 52.) I dismissed the Amended Complaint with prejudice on December 29, 2023, and the Clerk entered judgment on February 9, 2024. (Dismissal Order; ECF No. 54, as amended on February 21 2024, ECF No. 56.)

Also on February 9, 2024, Apuzza filed the Motion to Vacate. (Mot.) On February 23, 2023, NYU Langone opposed the Motion, and Apuzza filed a notice of appeal of the Court's Dismissal Order.^[1](Def.'s Br. ISO Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. (“Opp'n Br.”), ECF No. 57; Not. of Appeal, ECF No. 58.)

In the Dismissal Order, I found that the Amended Complaint failed to state a claim for relief for Apuzza's discrimination, retaliation, and other claims under the ADA. (See generally Dismissal Order.) Regarding the discrimination claim, I found that the Amended Complaint failed to plausibly allege a qualifying disability under the “record of” and “regarded as” prongs of the ADA. (Id. at 5-6.) I also found that the Amended Complaint did not plausibly allege that Apuzza was “regarded as” having a disability by NYU Langone because “[w]hether Apuzza's alleged impairment is the (1) present ‘on-going condition of contagiousness,' or the (2) future risk of developing COVID-19, Apuzza's argument that NYU Langone ‘regarded her' as disabled fails because she admits that her argument is premised on the notion that NYU Langone regarded all of its employees as having that condition.” (Id. at 8.) I further found that the Amended Complaint could not allege that NYU Langone regarded Apuzza as at risk of developing COVID-19 in the future because “the ADA does not cover future impairments.” (Id. at 9-10.) I also found that the Amended Complaint failed to plausibly allege a qualifying disability under the “record of” prong because “making a record that a person was unvaccinated does not qualify as recording them ‘as having an “impairment” that limited one of their major life activities.'” (Id. at 10.) Additionally, I found that the Amended Complaint failed to allege “specific facts making it plausible that [Apuzza's] impairment substantially limited one or more major life activities as required by the [ADA,]” and therefore failed to plausibly allege that she was “disabled under the ‘record of' prong of the ADA.” (Id. at 11.)

I also dismissed the retaliation claim for the Amended Complaint's failure to allege causation because NYU Langone's vaccine mandate requiring termination of noncompliant employees was already in place prior to Apuzza's opposition to the policy. (Id. at 12-13.)

Finally, I dismissed the additional ADA claims in the Amended Complaint. First, I found that the direct threat and accommodations claims failed because Apuzza did not plausibly allege a qualifying disability. (Id. at 14-15.) Second, I found that the improper medical inquiries and medical privacy claims failed because the ADA does not prohibit inquiries about vaccine status and, again, because the Amended Complaint did not plausibly allege a qualifying disability that would trigger the ADA's non-disclosure duty. (Id. at 15-17.) The remaining claims that the vaccine mandate violates public health laws and that “the policy attempts to overcome established rights that form the bedrock of modern society” were irrelevant to the discrimination and retaliation claims in the Amended Complaint and failed for lack of plausible factual and legal support. (Id. at 17-18 (quotation marks omitted).)

After dismissing the claims in the Amended Complaint, I denied leave to amend as futile. (Id. at 18.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 60(b) permits a party to seek relief from a district court's order or judgment because “(1) [of] mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . (4) the judgment is void; . . . or (6) any other reason that justifies relief” among other reasons. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Rule 60(b) is “a mechanism for extraordinary judicial relief invoked only if the moving party demonstrates exceptional circumstances.” Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). The decision to grant “a party's Rule 60(b) motion is committed to the sound discretion of the district court....” Stevens v. Miller, 676 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). “A Rule 60 motion may not be used ‘simply to relitigate matters settled by the original judgment.'” MAVL Capitial, Inc. v. Marine Transp. Logistics, Inc., 771 Fed.Appx. 56, 57 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Donovan v. Sovereign Sec., Ltd., 726 F.2d 55, 60 (2d Cir. 1984)). “Although a pro se motion is read liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments suggested, a pro se litigant is not excused from the requirement of producing highly convincing evidence to support a Rule 60(b) motion.” Rowe v. Cenlar FSB, No. 19CV07278JMAAYS, 2022 WL 3682302, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2022), aff'd, No. 22-1870, 2023 WL 6873092 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2023) (quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

Apuzza argues that she is entitled to vacatur of the Dismissal Order under Rules 60(b)(1), (4), and (6). Because the Motion to Vacate fails to make the required showings under all three subsections, the Motion is denied.

I. Apuzza Is Not Entitled to Relief Under Rule 60(b)(1)

Apuzza is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1) because she has not demonstrated that I overlooked any legal or factual issue that would have altered my decision. Apuzza argues that I “made a factual mistake and . . . failed to apply the relevant legal pleading standard” for her “regarded as” claim by not considering the Amended Complaint's allegations of adverse actions taken against her. (Mot. at 1.) She claims that because she “refused the treatments imposed by the COVID policy,” NYU Langone “regarded” her as “a health and safety threat,” and “that adverse actions were taken against her once she refused treatment for an undiagnosed condition (the perceived disability).” (Id. at 2.) Apuzza also contends that I ignored her claim that NYU Langone demanded she undergo various medical treatments for an undiagnosed condition as a new condition of employment in violation of the ADA, and that improper medical inquiries were a new “discriminatory qualification standard.” (Id. at 5, 7.)

Rule 60(b) permits a party to seek relief from a district court's order or judgment because of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1). “Under this provision, a district court may correct its own mistakes that are of a substantive legal nature and its own mistake[s] of fact.” Castro v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon as Trus. for Certificate Holders of CWalt Inc. et al., 852 Fed.Appx. 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Int'l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 670 (2d Cir. 1977) and Gey Assocs. Gen. P'ship v. 310 Assocs. (In re 310 Assocs.), 346 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2003)) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “Dissatisfaction with a judgment does not sufficiently justify an allegation of mistake under Rule 60(b)(1).” Hamilton v. Lee, 188 F.Supp.3d 221, 238 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). Additionally, Rule 60(b)(1) “will not provide a movant an additional opportunity to make arguments or attempt to win a point already carefully analyzed and justifiably disposed.” Id. (quoting In re Bulk Oil (USA) Inc., Nos. 93-CV-4492, 4494, 2007 WL 1121739, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2007)) (quotation marks omitted).

Contrary to Apuzza's assertions, I applied the correct legal standard to Apuzza's Amended Complaint. As I addressed in the Dismissal Order, a plaintiff must plead facts that plausibly show all of the following elements in order to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA:

(1) the employer is subject to the ADA; (2) the plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA or perceived to be so by [the plaintiff's] employer; (3) [the plaintiff] was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation; (4) [the plaintiff] suffered an adverse employment action; and (5) the adverse action was imposed because of [the plaintiff's] disability.

(Dismissal Order at 5 (quoting Davis v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 804 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2015).) The ADA defines a “disabil...