Aragon v. Che Ku

277 F.Supp.3d 1055

Martina Aguilar ARAGON, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.CHE KU, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 16–cv–3907 (WMW/KMM)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

Signed September 28, 2017

Daniel R. Olson, Laurel J. Pugh, Mark R. Bradford, Bassford Remele, Phillip F. Fishman, Phillip Fishman Law Office, Rachel Petersen, Rachel Petersen Law Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiffs.

Britton D. Weimer, Weimer & Weeding Bloomington, MN, William C. Weeding, Mpls, MN, PLLC, for Defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Wilhelmina M. Wright, United States District Judge

In this dispute arising from the conditions of Plaintiffs' employment, Defendants move to dismiss three counts of Plaintiffs' four-count amended complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Dkt. 52.) For the reasons addressed below, the Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are twelve Latino individuals who are former or current employees of Defendants. Defendants are five Minnesota corporations¹ that operate grocery stores in the Minneapolis–St. Paul metropolitan area (collectively, the "corporate defendants") and two individuals, Che Ku and Leng Ku (collectively, the "individual defendants"), who serve as the chief executive officers of the corporate defendants and are involved in their daily business operations. Most of the plaintiffs have worked for more than one corporate defendant. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants move employees between the stores that Defendants operate and also have, at times, directed some Plaintiffs to perform work at the homes of the individual defendants. Each Plaintiff's dates of employment vary. The longest period of employment extended from 1998 to 2015.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engaged in a pattern and practice of discriminatory conduct toward Plaintiffs, including but not limited to physically restraining Plaintiffs at their workplace, implicitly or explicitly threatening Plaintiffs with deportation for failure to cooperate with Defendants, and physically assaulting certain Plaintiffs. For example, eleven Plaintiffs allege that, on multiple occasions during the course of their employment, they were locked in portions of the grocery store, including the freezer. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants failed to pay overtime; denied Plaintiffs adequate breaks and medical attention; abused or harassed Plaintiffs verbally, physically, and sexually; and threatened to report Plaintiffs to immigration authorities if Plaintiffs did not follow management's instructions or reported their work conditions.

Plaintiffs' amended complaint asserts four counts. Count I alleges that Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiffs based on their Latino origin, in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991). Count II alleges that Defendants violated "customary well-established and universally recognized international law" prohibiting forced labor pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Count III alleges that Defendants engaged in forced labor, a violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. § 1589. And Count IV alleges that Defendants violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1964.

Defendants move to dismiss Counts II, III, and IV for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

ANALYSIS

A complaint must allege sufficient facts such that, when accepted as true, a facially plausible claim to relief is stated. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). If a complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, dismissal is warranted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When determining whether a complaint states a facially plausible claim, a district court accepts as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in a plaintiff's favor. Blankenship v. USA Truck, Inc. , 601 F.3d 852, 853 (8th Cir. 2010). To meet the federal pleading standard, factual allegations must be sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Mere "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" are insufficient, and legal conclusions couched as factual allegations may be disregarded. See id .

I. Blanket Pleading Against Defendants (Counts II, III, and IV)

Defendants assert that Counts II, III, and IV must be dismissed for failure to state a claim because the amended complaint "impermissibly lumps all Defendants together" and fails to provide Defendants fair notice of the grounds for Plaintiffs' claims.

In some circumstances, a complaint fails to state a claim for relief if it "lumps all defendants together and does not sufficiently allege who did what to whom ... because it does not provide fair notice of the grounds for the claims made against a particular defendant." Tatone v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc. , 857 F.Supp.2d 821, 831 (D. Minn. 2012). This District has expressly discouraged complaints that fail "to clearly state which claims are asserted against which Defendant" and thereby require the Court to "seek to divine some clarity out of the pleading." I.E.C. ex rel. J.R. v. Minneapolis Pub. Sch., SSD No. 1 , 970 F.Supp.2d 917, 928 (D. Minn. 2013) (collecting cases). But the absence of such clarity in pleading does not necessarily result in dismissal. E.g. , id. ("Despite the failure of pleading clarity here, because there are only three legal claims asserted in this present lawsuit, the Court can readily address each of them.").

For example, in Qwest Communications Co., LLC v. Free Conferencing , the district court rejected the defendants' motion to dismiss a complaint that allegedly lumped defendants together. 990 F.Supp.2d 953, 969–70 (D. Minn. 2014). The court observed that, in many cases in which claims have been dismissed on this basis, discrete acts were alleged in the complaint without the complaint identifying the actions attributable to each defendant. Id. The plaintiff in Qwest , by contrast, specifically alleged that all but one defendant had entered into a contract, alleged when the contract began, and alleged "facts related to all Defendants as the result of their respective contracts." Id. at 970. Qwest's pleading, the court concluded, put the defendants on sufficient notice as to which claims were asserted against which defendants, and the court recognized that requiring a plaintiff "to plead each claim and fact separately with respect to each Defendant would create a complaint that would be not only significantly longer, but also unwieldy." Id.

Here, the amended complaint clearly alleges that each count is directed at each Defendant. There is no need to separately identify each Defendant in each count to understand which counts are alleged against which Defendant because every count is asserted against every Defendant. Compare I.E.C. ex rel. J.R. , 970 F.Supp.2d at 928 (observing that the complaint "fails to clearly state which claims are asserted against which Defendant"), with Qwest , 990 F.Supp.2d at 969 (observing that all but one claim was asserted against all defendants).

Defendants' argument fares no better with respect to Plaintiffs' factual allegations. To be sure, the amended complaint includes some allegations that are directed at "Defendants" generally. But the vast majority of Plaintiffs' factual allegations specifically identify which corporate defendants employed a particular Plaintiff and which individual or corporate defendant allegedly participated in the conduct at issue. Moreover, the amended complaint alleges that many of the Plaintiffs worked for more than one corporate defendant. In these circumstances, some level of imprecision is to be expected, at least until the record can be further developed during discovery.²

Because Plaintiffs' amended complaint does not impermissibly lump Defendants, dismissal of Counts II, III, and IV on this basis is not warranted.

II. Plaintiffs' ATS Claim (Count II)

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs' ATS claim, Count II of the amended complaint, for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The ATS provides, in full:

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 1350. Defendants advance several alternative grounds in support of their argument for dismissal: (1) Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they are "aliens"; (2) the ATS does not permit claims against private individuals and businesses; and (3) the ATS does not permit a cause of action based on allegations of forced labor and, to the extent that it does, Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to support such a claim. Each argument is addressed in turn.

A. Plaintiffs' Alien Status

Defendants first contend that Plaintiffs fail to state an ATS claim because, although the amended complaint alleges that Plaintiffs are "Latino" and were born outside the United States, it does not expressly allege that Plaintiffs are not United States citizens and have not been naturalized.

When evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a district court accepts as true all factual allegations advanced in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor. Blankenship , 601 F.3d at 853. Plaintiffs allege that they are Latino, were born outside of the United States, and feared they would be deported if Defendants reported them to immigration authorities. Because the only reasonable inference to be drawn from these factual allegations is that Plaintiffs are aliens, Defendants' motion to...