Aranda v. Davis

ARTURO DANIEL ARANDA, Petitioner, v. LORIE DAVIS, Respondent.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:89-CV-13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS VICTORIA DIVISION

May 4, 2020

ORDER

In 1979, Arturo Daniel Aranda was sentenced to death for his role in killing a Laredo police officer. Aranda submitted a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 1989. (Docket Entry No. 2). After Aranda's petition was denied in 1991, (Docket Entry Nos. 26, 27), he filed a Motion under Rule 59(e) to Alter and Amend Judgment. (Docket Entry Nos. 33, 34). Respondent filed an opposition, (Docket Entry No. 38), and Aranda filed a reply (Docket Entry No. 39). Aranda's Rule 59(e) motion has been pending since that time.

On September 25, 2018, this case was reassigned to the undersigned judge. After receiving briefing from the parties, the Court will deny Aranda's Rule 59(e) motion. The Court will not certify any issue for appellate review.

I. Background

On direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminals Appeals succinctly described the crime for which Aranda received a capital conviction and death sentence:

The indictment jointly charged [Aranda] and his brother, Juan J. Aranda, with knowingly and intentionally causing the death of Pablo E. Albidrez, a peace officer by shooting him with a gun knowing that Albidrez was a police officer for the city of Laredo acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty. . . . [T]he evidence shows that [Aranda] and his brother drove to Laredo from San Antonio. The purpose was to pick up a load of marihuana and take it to San Antonio. After the station wagon was loaded and the two men were leaving Laredo they were confronted by police officers who stopped them. In the ensuing gun battle the deceased police officer, who was in uniform and who was in a marked police vehicle with its lights flashing, was killed by [Aranda] who was shooting with a pistol.

Aranda v. State, 736 S.W.2d 702, 703-04 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).

On September 23, 1987, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Aranda's conviction and sentence on automatic direct appeal. The State of Texas then set an execution date for February 25, 1988. Both the Court of Criminal Appeals and the United States Supreme Court stayed Aranda's execution while he filed a writ of certiorari. When the Supreme Court denied certiorari review on June 30, 1988, the trial court set another execution date for November 9, 1988. Through pro bono counsel, Aranda then sought state habeas review. One week before his scheduled execution date, the Court of Criminal Appeals denied state habeas relief.

Aranda then proceeded to federal court. The court stayed Aranda's execution date. On April 20, 1989, Aranda filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus raising twenty-nine grounds for relief. (Docket Entry No. 2). On October 15, 1991, the Honorable Ricardo H. Hinojosa denied federal habeas relief without holding an evidentiary hearing or allowing additional factual development. (Docket Entry No. 26). An amended memorandum and order was issued on December 31, 1991. (Docket Entry No. 27). A final judgment was issued that same date. (Docket Entry No. 30).

On January 15, 1992, Aranda filed a timely motion to alter or amend judgment. Respondent opposed the motion (Docket Entry No. 38), and Aranda filed a reply (Docket Entry No. 39). Since Aranda filed his reply, the parties have not submitted any substantive motions or filings.¹

On September 25, 2018, this case was reassigned to the undersigned judge. This Court ordered the parties to confer and provide a joint update discussing "the status of this litigation, any relevant changes in the law since the denial of relief, and what proper steps should be taken to renew federal habeas review." (Docket Entry No. 47). The parties provided an update and explained that the issues remaining in this case required adversarial briefing. (Docket Entry No. 59). The parties have provided significant briefing that discusses the merits of Aranda's Rule 59 motion. In particular, the parties have addressed changes that have occurred in the law over the last few decades.

II. Rule 59 Standard

This matter comes before the Court on the limited question of whether Aranda has shown that this Court should alter or amend the judgment in this case. Federal procedure limits post-judgment review. "Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly." Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004). A district court reviewing a Rule 59(e) motion must balance "two important judicial imperatives relating to such a motion: 1) the need to bring litigation to an end; and 2) the need to render justdecisions on the basis of all the facts." Templet, 367 F.3d at 479. "Rule 59 gives the trial judge ample power to prevent what he considers to be a miscarriage of justice. It is the judge's right, and indeed his [or her] duty, to order a new trial if he [or she] deems it in the interest of justice to do so." 11 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure Civil, § 2803 (2d ed. 1995) (citing Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wis. Nat. Bank, 624 F.2d 798, 807 (7th Cir. 1980)). However, due to the extraordinary nature of this remedy the Fifth Circuit has found that the Rule 59(e) standard "favors denial of motions to alter or amend a judgment." Southern Constructors Group, Inc. v. Dynalectric Co., 2 F.3d 606, 611 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 174 (5th Cir. 1990).

A district court has considerable discretion to grant or deny a motion under Rule 59(e); however, "such discretion is not limitless." Templet, 367 F.3d at 479. Rule 59 only allows a court "to alter or amend a judgment to (1) accommodate an intervening change in controlling law, (2) account for newly discovered evidence, or (3) correct a manifest error of law or fact." Trevino v. City of Fort Worth, 944 F.3d 567, 570 (5th Cir. 2019).

III. Analysis

Aranda's Rule 59 motion raised several arguments which fell into two categories: (1) intervening changes in the law relating to his claim under Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) prove that his jury could not fully consider his mitigating evidence and (2) the amended memorandum and order applied the wrong legal standard, reached an incorrect result, and was factually incomplete absent an evidentiary hearing. Aranda's recent briefing has refined his arguments to challenge the adjudication of three claims based on new legal developments regarding: (1) his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim; (2) his Penry claim; and (3) his claim challenging his confession.

The Court has reviewed the claims raised in Aranda's initial Rule 59 pleadings and summarily finds that the earlier filings did not show any error requiring the alteration or amendment of judgment. This Court's discussion, therefore, will focus on the arguments raised in the recent briefing. The Court's analysis will center on whether Aranda has shown intervening law or manifest error that calls into question the judgment in this case.

Much has changed since the denial of Aranda's federal petition. Still, post-judgment review of Aranda's arguments is limited. Legal developments will only require altering or amending the judgment if they would have changed the result that should have been reached. Also, "[t]he manifest injustice standard presents . . . a high hurdle" for the movant. Westerfield v. United States, 366 F. App'x 614, 619 (6th Cir. 2010). The Fifth Circuit has explained that a "manifest error" as one that is "plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law." Guy v. Crown Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2004). With that understanding, the Court will consider Aranda's post-judgment arguments.

A. Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Standard

Aranda argues that this Court should reconsider the judgment regarding his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim "because it did not correctly apply the standards for deficiency and prejudice established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), as clarified by subsequent decisional law." (Docket Entry No 63 at 3). Relying on more-recent Supreme Court precedent, Aranda argues that the amended memorandum and order applied an incomplete legal standard to his ineffective-assistance claim and thus reached the wrong result. Aranda, however, has not shown a basis for Rule 59 relief on his ineffective-assistance claim.

In 1984, the Supreme Court established the constitutional baseline for effective legal representation and delineated the parameters for assessing resultant prejudice. The past twodecades have seen deeper exposition by the Supreme Court on the Strickland standard. In 2000, the Supreme Court first overturned a death sentence using the Strickland analysis in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). In subsequent years, the Supreme Court has emphasized the constitutional obligations of defense counsel in capital cases. See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U. S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). However, "none of these cases established retroactive constitutional rules." Ayestas v. Davis, 933 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir. 2019).

The amended memorandum and order unquestionably applied the correct legal standard to Aranda's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. The decision relied on Strickland and repeatedly quoted from that decision and related precedent. While Aranda may quibble about the specific wording used in the decision, it applied the correct legal principles to his ineffective-assistance claim. Aranda's complaints amount to little more than disagreement with the result and are more properly raised on appeal. The Court finds that Aranda has not shown any new law or manifest error requiring altering or amending the final judgment.

B. A Texas Jury's Consideration of Mitigating Evidence

Aranda's federal petition...