Archambault v. State

1

2024 ND 38

Zachary Archambault, Petitioner and Appellant v. State of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellee

No. 20230336

Supreme Court of North Dakota

March 7, 2024

Appeal from the District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, the Honorable Gary H. Lee, Judge.

Laura C. Ringsak, Bismarck, ND, for petitioner and appellant submitted on brief.

Breezy A. Schmidt, Assistant State's Attorney, Minot, ND, for respondent and appellee; submitted on brief.

Opinion of the Court by Bahr, Justice, in which Chief Justice Jensen and Justices Crothers, McEvers, and Tufte joined. Justice McEvers filed an opinion concurring specially.

Bahr Justice.

AFFIRMED.

[¶1] Zachary Archambault appeals from a district court order denying his application for postconviction relief. He argues the court erred by denying his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

I

[¶2] In 2021, a jury found Archambault guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a minor child, a class AA felony. We affirmed his conviction on appeal. State v. Archambault, 2022 ND 198, 982 N.W.2d 8.

[¶3] In 2023, Archambault filed an application and an amended application for postconviction relief, alleging his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. In August 2023, the district court held an evidentiary hearing. Both Archambault and his trial counsel testified at the hearing. In September 2023, the court denied Archambault's application.

II

[¶4] "Postconviction relief proceedings are civil in nature and governed by the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure." Koon v. State, 2023 ND 247, ¶ 20, 1 N.W.3d 593 (quoting Bridges v. State, 2022 ND 147, ¶ 5, 977 N.W.2d 718). In postconviction proceedings, the applicant bears the burden to establish the grounds for relief. Vogt v. State, 2022 ND 163 ¶ 5, 978 N.W.2d 727. This Court has explained its standard of review after an evidentiary hearing in postconviction proceedings:

When we review a district court's decision in a post-conviction proceeding, questions of law are fully reviewable. The district court's findings of fact in a post-conviction proceeding will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if it is not supported by any evidence, or if, although there is some evidence to support the finding, a reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.

Koon, at ¶ 20 (quoting Morris v. State, 2019 ND 166, ¶ 6, 930 N.W.2d 195 (citations omitted)).

III

[¶5] Archambault argues his trial counsel's conduct fell below the standard of reasonableness that is expected and constitutionally ensured. This Court's review of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is well established:

To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, the applicant must show: (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The question of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact and is fully reviewable on appeal.

Koon, 2023 ND 247, ¶ 21 (quoting Kratz v. State, 2022 ND 188, ¶ 12, 981 N.W.2d 891 (explaining the Strickland test)).

[¶6] To prove the first prong, "the defendant must overcome the 'strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" Stoppleworth v. State, 501 N.W.2d 325, 327 (N.D. 1993) (quoting State v. Skaro, 474 N.W.2d 711, 715 (N.D. 1991)). "To establish the second prong, the defendant must specify how and where trial counsel was incompetent and the probable different result. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Koon, 2023 ND 247, ¶ 22 (citation omitted).

[¶7] "Courts need not address both prongs of the Strickland test, and if a court can resolve the case by addressing only one prong it is encouraged to do so." Booth v. State, 2017 ND 97, ¶ 8, 893 N.W.2d 186 (quoting Osier v. State, 2014 ND 41, ¶ 11, 843 N.W.2d 277). "If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed." Id. (quoting Garcia v. State, 2004 ND 81, ¶ 5, 678 N.W.2d 568).

IV

[¶8] Archambault alleged his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in six ways. In its order, the district court addressed each of Archambault's alleged grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and made detailed findings and conclusions regarding each ground.

A

[¶9] Archambault argued his trial counsel should have filed a motion to suppress his three-hour video confession because he was suffering from drug and alcohol effects and wanted to self-harm. The district court noted Archambault does not allege law enforcement officers did not give all requisite Miranda warnings or that they coerced his repeated confessions. The court found:

In this case, the confession given by Zachary Archambault lasted [approximately] three hours. He answered all questions and freely confessed to numerous instances of sexual contact with the minor child victim. There was nothing in the confession to suggest that Zachary Archambault was suffering from any mental or emotional maladies which interfered with his decision-making.

[¶10] The district court further found Archambault never told his trial counsel about his alcohol and drug use or his self-destructive frame of mind, and never asked his trial counsel about a mental evaluation for purposes of a suppression motion. The court found trial counsel could not know Archambault "was suffering from some malignant self-loathing that pushed him toward self-harm," and that trial counsel could not possibly see this for himself without Archambault informing him. Rather, the court continued, trial counsel saw a three-hour taped confession in which Archambault "seemingly knowingly and voluntarily confessed repeatedly to sexual acts with the minor child." Because the three-hour taped confession seemed "knowingly and voluntarily" given without more, the court held trial counsel's failure to file a pretrial motion to suppress did not fall below a reasonable standard of care.

[¶11] The district court's findings were not induced by an erroneous view of the law and are supported by evidence. The court did not clearly err in finding Archambault did not show his trial counsel's representation was below the standard of reasonableness.

B

[¶12] Archambault argued his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel because he did not interview the minor victim before trial. The district court concluded trial counsel's failure to interview the child fell below a reasonable standard of care. However, the court concluded Archambault did not show a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's failure to interview the victim, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The court found trial counsel's failure to interview the minor victim did not undermine the confidence of the result of the trial due to Archambault's video confession, which the court referred to as the "centerpiece" of the State's case. As explained by the court, after being properly Mirandized, "Archambault confessed repeatedly to the investigating officer of his many sexual acts with the minor child. These included confessions of intercourse, anal sex, and oral sex. The sexual acts occurred over a series of many months."

[¶13] We need not address whether the district court erred in finding trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by not interviewing the minor victim before trial. We resolve this allegation on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice. The court found Archambault failed to establish there was a reasonable probability the result of a trial would have been different. The court's findings were not induced by an erroneous view of the law and are supported by evidence. The court did not clearly err in finding Archambault failed to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for trial counsel's alleged error.

C

[¶14] Archambault asserted his trial counsel should have requested a mental evaluation to determine Archambault's fitness or competence. Addressing this argument, the district court found Archambault testified he never told his trial counsel about his now claimed frame of mind. He also never asked his trial counsel "to request for any evaluation, except as a part of a presentence investigation." Rejecting Archambault's argument that trial counsel should have asked for the evaluation anyway, the court explained "[a] motion for an evaluation as to competency or fitness to proceed is not automatically and routinely done," and an attorney must have a good faith basis for making a motion for a competency evaluation. Because Archambault did not tell his trial counsel about his "mental distress," the court found there was "no way [his trial counsel] could make a good faith motion for an evaluation." Based on these and other findings, the court found Archambault did not demonstrate his trial counsel's conduct fell below the standard of reasonableness. The court further noted:

[I]t was also Zachary Archambault's burden to bring forward evidence that he does indeed suffer from some form of mental defect due to his internal self-loathing. And, that this internal self-loathing compelled him to make a false confession. Other than his own say-so, he has presented nothing. He has offered no opinion from any psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker, or any other mental

...