Archambault v. United States

641 F.Supp.3d 636

Charlee ARCHAMBAULT,Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jacob Archambault, Plaintiff, v. The UNITED STATES of America, Joshua Antman;Jay Romero, Individually and in Their Official Capacityas Police Officers for the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Law Enforcement Services;and Unknown Supervisory Personnel of the United States, Individually, Defendants.¹

3:22-CV-03002-RAL

United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Central Division

Signed November 18, 2022

Jeffrey R. Beck, Beck Law, Prof. LLC, Sioux Falls, SD, John R. Hinrichs, Heidepriem, Purtell, Siegel & Hinrichs LLP, Sioux Falls, SD, for Plaintiff.

Terry L. Pechota, Pechota Law Office, Rapid City, SD, for Defendant Joshua Antman.

Justin L. Bell, May, Adam, Gerdes & Thompson LLP, Pierre, SD, for Defendant Jay Romero.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS EXCEPT AS TO BIVENS CLAIM AGAINST INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS AND STAYING CLAIM PENDING TRIBAL COURT EXHAUSTION

ROBERTO A. LANGE, CHIEF JUDGE

In January of 2019, on the Rosebud Indian Reservation, Jacob Archambault Spotted Tail was shot and killed during an encounter with two Rosebud Sioux Tribe police officers. Jacob's mother, Charlee Archambault, alleges that the officers violated her son's constitutional rights, and that she and Jacob's estate are entitled to damages. All Defendants named in this case have moved to dismiss the lawsuit on various grounds. Doc. 20; Doc. 22; Doc. 25. For the reasons set forth below, this Court grants the motions to dismiss all § 1983 claims as well as any claims against the United States and "Unknown Supervisory Personnel" of the United States. This Court stays the remaining Bivens-based claim against the named tribal police officers pending exhaustion of any available tribal court remedy.

I. Standard on Motion to Dismiss

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Courts must accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and make all inferences in the plaintiff's favor, but need not accept the plaintiff's legal conclusions. Retro Television Network, Inc. v. Luken Commc'ns, LLC, 696 F.3d 766, 768-69 (8th Cir. 2012). Although detailed factual allegations are unnecessary, the plaintiff must plead enough facts to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[,]" meaning "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Therefore, the "factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Cook v. George's. Inc., 952 F.3d 935, 938 (8th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up and citation omitted).

On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), however, the standard depends on whether the defendant is making a facial attack or factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction. Stalley v. Cam. Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 520-21 (8th Cir. 2007). When a defendant makes a facial attack to challenge whether the facts alleged in the complaint establish subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff is afforded similar safeguards as in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990). Namely, the Court must "accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint, giving no effect to conclusory allegations of law," and determine whether the plaintiff's alleged facts "affirmatively and plausibly suggest" that jurisdiction exists. Stalley, 509 F.3d at 521. A court's review then is limited to the face of the pleadings. Branson Label, Inc. v. City of Branson, 793 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir. 2015).

Conversely, when a defendant attacks the factual basis for subject matter jurisdiction, a court can consider matters outside the pleadings, "and the non-moving party does not have the benefit of 12(b)(6) safeguards." Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729 n.6. "A factual attack occurs when the defendant challenges the veracity of the facts underpinning subject matter jurisdiction." Davis v. Anthony, Inc., 886 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up and citation omitted). In that case, "no presumptive truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff's allegations," and a "court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case." Osborn, 918 F.2d at 730 (citation omitted). Here, all Defendants appear to raise facial attacks, so this Court takes the well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint as true in ruling on the motions to dismiss.

II. Background

A. Facts alleged in Complaint

The Rosebud Sioux Tribe, a federally recognized Indian tribe, runs the Rosebud Sioux Tribe Law Enforcement Services ("RSTLES") to provide policing on the Rosebud Indian Reservation in Todd County, South Dakota. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 4-6. The United States, through the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, has contracted with the Tribe under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 ("ISDEAA") to provide law enforcement services on the Reservation.²

At around 5:00 p.m. on January 27, 2019, Defendant Officer Joshua Antman, an employee of RSTLES, was dispatched to a disturbance where Jacob Archambault Spotted Tail was identified as a person of interest and driving a gold SUV. Doc. 1 at ¶ 10. Although not expressly stated in the Complaint, the briefing makes clear and the parties at the motion hearing agreed to judicial notice that Archambault is a tribal member and the events in question occurred within the exterior boundaries of the Rosebud Indian Reservation. Doc 21 at ¶ 2; Doc. 26 at 1, 7, 10, 12; Doc. 37 at 3, 6. Sometime shortly thereafter, Officer Antman observed a gold Chevrolet Tahoe parked near the intersection of Hospital Road and Tiny Road. Doc. 1 at ¶ 11. Officer Antman pulled his patrol car behind the Tahoe and saw a female passenger exit the rear driver's side of the vehicle. Id. at ¶ 13. Officer Antman did not try to speak to her. Id. at ¶ 14.

Officer Antman activated his emergency lights to execute a traffic stop as the Tahoe pulled away. Id. at ¶ 14. The Tahoe did not stop for the emergency lights, but instead crossed Hospital Road and traveled down Tiny Road toward BIA Highway 1. Id. at ¶ 16; Doc. 21 at ¶ 6. At some point, the Tahoe turned around and traveled the other direction up Tiny Road, and Officer Antman saw that Archambault was the driver. Doc. 1 at ¶ 17.

Archambault drove the Tahoe up Tiny Road for a short distance, before merging with Low Rent Housing Road and immediately turning onto North Spotted Tail Lane. Id. at ¶ 18. North Spotted Tail Lane leads to a dead end, but there is an off-road trail near the end of the road that connects to Spotted Tail Lane. Doc. 32 at 3. The trail runs roughly parallel to the two roads until it makes a sharp turn for a steep climb onto Spotted Tail Lane. Id. Archambault turned onto this trail, but the Tahoe lost traction due to an accumulation of snow on the ground. Doc 1 at ¶¶ 19, 21.

Officer Antman parked his patrol car behind the Tahoe to block access to North Spotted Tail Lane as Archambault struggled to maneuver the vehicle up the trail. Id. at ¶ 22. At this point, Defendant Officer Jay A. Romero, also with RSTLES, arrived on the scene and parked next to Officer Antman's patrol car, further blocking access to North Spotted Tail Lane. Id. at ¶ 23. Officer Antman and Officer Romero positioned their patrol cars perpendicular to the Tahoe. Id. at ¶ 25. The two officers exited their vehicles and stood to the side of their patrol cars while Archambault tried to crest the snowy incline in the Tahoe. Id. at ¶ 26. Unable to climb the trail, Archambault reversed the Tahoe past Officer Antman, stopped next to Officer Romero's patrol car, and drove forward in another attempt to crest the final portion of the trail. Id. at ¶¶ 27-28. The Tahoe spun out yet again. Id. at ¶ 29.

Archambault reversed the Tahoe to make a third run at the incline. Id. at ¶ 30. This time, as he passed the patrol cars, the Tahoe hit the bumper of Officer Romero's car. Id. at ¶ 31. Officer Antman and then Officer Romero began firing their duty weapons. Id. at ¶¶ 32-33. They fired a combined fifteen rounds at Archambault and the Tahoe—some through the passenger door of the Tahoe and some through the windshield. Id. ¶¶ 34-36. Archambault was struck and suffered multiple gunshot wounds, including one in the left side of his chest, after which he drove down a steep embankment and crashed into a ravine. Id. at ¶¶ 37-39. Archambault was partially ejected from the Tahoe. Id. at 40. Plaintiff alleges that even though Archambault was alive when the Officers went to check on him, neither officer rendered any medical aid. Id. at ¶¶ 40-41. Archambault died at the scene. Id. at ¶ 41. An autopsy later concluded that Archambault's death was a homicide, caused primarily by the gunshot to the left side of his chest, which pierced his left lung. Id. at ¶¶ 43-44.

B. Procedural History

On January 24, 2022, Plaintiff Charlee Archambault, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Jacob Archambault, filed a four-count complaint against Defendants. Doc. 1. Plaintiff named four separate defendants: the United States of America; Joshua Antman and Jay A. Romero,³ individually and in their official capacities as police officers for RSTLES; and Unknown Supervisory Personnel of the United States, individually. Id.

Plaintiff's Complaint and briefing are not entirely clear or consistent about what claims are alleged against which Defendants. For example, Count One of the Complaint, Doc. 1 at 6, is titled "Violation of Constitutionally Protected Rights - 42...