Archer v. Gipson, Case No. 1:12-CV-00261-LJO-JLT

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES.

(Docs. 127 & 128)

Before the Court in the above-styled and numbered cause of action is Plaintiffs Darrell Archer and Keitha Darquea's Motions for Attorneys' Fees, filed September 8, 2015. (Docs. 127 & 128). The matter is appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See E.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 230(g). Having considered the record and relevant law, the Court will grant Plaintiffs' motions.

Plaintiffs Darrell Archer and Keitha Darquea (together, "Plaintiffs"), proceeding pro se, initiated this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants on February 23, 2012. (Doc. 1). Subsequent to Defendants' motion to dismiss, this Court dismissed certain claims and multiple defendants. (Doc. 12). Defendant moved for summary judgment and of the three

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remaining causes of action, this Court granted the motion as to Plaintiffs' first cause of action under § 1983 related to Defendant Gipson's warrantless yet reasonable search at the subject property, but in all other ways denied the motion as to the second and third causes of action. (Doc. 81).

A jury trial was held in this case from August 4-6, 2015. The jury found in favor of Plaintiffs on their claims that Defendant Jill Gipson ("Gipson") and J.E. Burke Construction, Inc. (together, "Defendants") violated their Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully seizing their personal property without a warrant, and that these Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their due process rights by failing to provide adequate notice and opportunity to be heard prior to seizing their personal property.

The jury awarded compensatory damages to Plaintiffs of $937.36 "plus interest due as of [August 6, 2015]" against Defendant Gipson and $1.00 against Joseph Burke and/or J.E. Burke Construction, Inc. (Doc. 121). The jury also found that Defendant Gipson and J.E. Burke Construction, Inc.'s conduct was malicious, oppressive, or in reckless disregard of the Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. See id. In a bifurcated damages phase, the jury awarded punitive damages of $800.00 against Defendant Gipson and $200.00 against J.E. Burke Construction, Inc. (Doc. 122). The Court entered final judgment on August 10, 2015 (Doc. 125).

After prevailing at trial, Plaintiffs filed the instant motions for attorneys' fees (Docs. 127 & 128). Defendants filed their Opposition on September 23, 2015 (Doc. 129), to which Plaintiffs filed their Reply on September 30, 2015 (Doc. 130). The matter is now ripe for review.

A district court has discretion to award a civil rights litigant their reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses where they are the prevailing party in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (providing in pertinent part that, "[i]In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[] . . . 1983 . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs . . . ."); see also Bauer v. Sampson, 261 F.3d 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2001) (prevailing "plaintiffs in § 1983 actions 'should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances could render such an award unjust'") (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).

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Plaintiffs move for attorneys' fees and expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Although Defendants present arguments for reducing or denying Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees, they do not challenge the reasonableness of Plaintiffs' lodestar calculation, billing records or hourly rates.

The Court proceeds in two steps when evaluating a request for attorneys' fees under § 1988. "First, courts generally apply . . . the lodestar method to determine what constitutes a reasonable attorney's fee." Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Costa v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012)). Once the prevailing party has carried its burden of showing the reasonableness of the rate and the hours expended, "the resulting product is presumed to be the reasonable fee contemplated by § 1988." Jordan v. Multnomah Cty., 815 F.2d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984)). Second, "[t]he district court may then adjust [the lodestar] upward or downward," based on the following factors:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the "undesirability" of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases.

Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1202 (alteration in original) (quoting Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008), and id. at 1209, n. 11 (quoting Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1996)). One "important factor" is "the results obtained." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Where a party is only partially successful, and the successful and unsuccessful claims are "distinctly different claims for relief that are based on different facts and legal theories," the hours spent on unsuccessful claims should be excluded from the reasonable hours calculation. Schwarz v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 73 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 1995). However, if the successful and unsuccessful claims are related, the court may at its discretion adjust the total fee award either by specifying particular hours to be eliminated, or by reducing the award to account for the limited success. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436.

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I. PREVAILING PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorneys' fees because they proceeded pro se. Defendants next argue that the Court should exercise its discretion and not award any attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs because, based on their limited success at trial where they sought an award in excess of $400,000.00 but the jury awarded a mere fraction of that, they should not be considered a prevailing party. Defendants also argue that the jury awarded mere nominal damages, thus, proportionately, the Court should not award any attorneys' fees, citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) (holding that "when a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.").

Plaintiffs aver that they prevailed at trial and thus are entitled to a fees award totaling $111,595.00. Plaintiffs posit that the fee award should not be proportionally tied to the damages award because the award was not nominal. Plaintiffs aver that by awarding punitive damages and a specific amount tied to the lien on the property, the jury awarded more than a nominal damages award. Plaintiffs further argue that the Court should not decline to award attorneys' fees because it is well established that "fail[ure] to recover on all theories of liability is not a bar to recovery of attorney's fees." Thomas v. City of Tacoma, 410 F.3d 644, 649 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436).

A. Prevailing Party

To be entitled to fees, a civil rights litigant must be the prevailing party and the relief must "materially alter[ ] the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff." Fisher v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000). A "prevailing party" is one who "succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.

In support of their argument that Plaintiffs did not prevail on all of their claims, Defendants emphasize that the Court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' first cause of action, finding Defendant Gipson's initial search constitutional. Even so, Plaintiffs were successful in opposing Defendants' motion for summary judgment on every other cause of action

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and were also successful at trial, obtaining a Judgment in their favor. A plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney's fees even for claims on which she did not prevail, if they "involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories." McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435). Here, all of Plaintiffs' claims arise from Defendants' seizure of their personal property and the abatement process, a shared common core of facts. See Doc. 1. Therefore, "the district court should not attempt to divide the request for attorney's fees on a claim-by-claim basis." Ambat v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 757 F.3d 1017, 1032 (9th Cir. 2014).

For these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are the prevailing party. See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 11 l("To qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim. The plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom fees are sought.").

B. Civil Rights Litigants Proceeding Pro Se Are Not Entitled to Attorneys' Fees

Defendants assert that pro se civil rights litigants are not entitled to attorneys' fees under § 1988. Plaintiffs emphasize that Defendants do not cite to authority...