Nearly 15 years ago, the Connecticut Supreme Court came out with a pair of decisions that seemed to put to rest the question of whether the CHRO was authorized to award emotional distress damages to employees who filed suit and prevailed in state law employment discrimination cases.
But, as discussed below, the CHRO has lately been suggesting otherwise. This has important implications to employers in defending against such claims. In order to understand where we are, we need to look back at some of the key cases and issues related to them, so bear with me for a bit.
The Background Cases
- The first case, Bridgeport Hospital v. CHRO, 232 Conn. 91 (1995), held that the CHRO had no authority to award emotional distress damages in state law emplo
yment discrimination claims involving race, gender, physical disability, age and the like. It’s holding was unequivocal: “The issue before the court is whether General Statutes § 46a-86 authorizes the award of damages for emotional distress and attorney’s fees for a violation of General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(1). We conclude that it does not.” (Open disclosure: My current firm successfully represented the hospital in that matter.) - In the companion case, Fenn Mfg. Co. v. CHRO, 232 Conn. 117 (1995), the Court held that no emotional distress damages were available to claims of pregnancy discrimination in the employment context. It’s holding was also unequivocal: “The issue before the court is whether…[the CHRO], is authorized pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-86(a) to award damages for emotional distress based upon a violation of General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(7). We hold that CHRO is not so authorized.”
- In a followup case the next year, the CHRO argued that another statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. §46a-58 authorized the CHRO to award emotional distress damages in employment discrimination cases. The Connecticut Supreme Court, in CHRO v. Truelove & MacLean, Inc. 238 Conn. 337 rejected that claim as well: “The commission’s argument is that § 46a-58 (a) encompasses claims of discriminatory employment practices and that violations of § 46a-58 (a) entitle a claimant to damages for emotional distress pursuant to § 46a-86 (c). We disagree.”
The Supreme Court Reintroduces Such Claims, At Least According to the CHRO
Case closed right? Not according to the CHRO, which has started using another case as the basis for re-introducing emotional distress awards BACK into employment discrimination claims. Specifically, in arguments to CHRO...
