Arias v. Cty. of Bergen

321 A.3d 804

479 N.J.Super. 268

Andris ARIAS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.COUNTY OF BERGEN, Defendant-Respondent.

DOCKET NO. A-2574-22

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued on April 30, 2024

Decided June 14, 2024

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-6633-22.

Alex S. Capozzi, Roseland, argued the cause for appellant (Brach Eichler, LLC, attorneys; Alex S. Capozzi, on the briefs).

David Mateen, Assistant County Counsel, argued the cause for respondent (Thomas J. Duch, Bergen County Counsel, attorney; David Mateen, on the brief).

Tyrone Frederick Sergio argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (Britcher, Leone & Sergio, LLC, attorneys; E. Drew Britcher, on the brief).

Before Judges Mayer, Paganelli and Augostini.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

MAYER, P.J.A.D.

₂₇₂Plaintiff Andris Arias appeals from a March 20, 2023 order dismissing her complaint against defendant County of Bergen (Bergen) without prejudice. We affirm.

[1] We recite the facts from the motion record. On April 24, 2021, plaintiff fell in a hole while rollerblading on a paved pedestrian pathway in Van Saun County Park (Park). The Park, established in 1960,¹ consists of 130 acres of land in Paramus. It provides recreational amenities free of charge to the public, including athletic fields, catch-and-release fishing, bicycling and walking paths, and picnic facilities.

On December 13, 2022, plaintiff filed a complaint against the County, alleging negligence and seeking damages for injuries she ₂₇₃suffered from her fall.² About a month later, in lieu of filing an answer, the County filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 4:6-2(e). The County asserted immunity under the Landowners Liability Act (LLA), N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-2 to -10. The County argued the LLA "bar[red] plain- tiff’s claim for negligence" because: (1) the County was presumptively entitled to immunity; and (2) "there [were] no facts alleged in [plaintiff’s] complaint that [her] injury was caused by [the County’s] willful or malicious conduct."

In opposing the County’s motion, plaintiff argued the LLA was intended "to apply to rural and semi-rural tracts of land" and "was never intended to apply to residential and suburban neighborhoods." Because the Park contained "buildings, structures, [and] amenities" within a "densely populated suburban neighborhood … surrounded by residential housing," plaintiff asserted the County was not entitled to immunity under the LLA.

The judge entered a March 20, 2023 order granting the County’s motion and dismissing plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim. In his decision, placed on the record on that same date, the judge explained:

Plaintiff’s contention that the [LLA] does not apply because Paramus is densely populated and because the [P]ark is surrounded by residential areas … is not persuasive. Plaintiff was … not injured in a residential area. She was injured in a … large 130-acre County park. There’s no reason why the [LLA] would not apply to this County park.

Plaintiff’s contention that the [LLA] does not apply because there are buildings in the [P]ark is inconsistent with the statute. The [LLA] expressly provides that it applies even if the premises [are] improved.

The judge concluded, "[t]o the extent courts have read into [the LLA] certain limitations relating to urban or residential areas, those limitations have no application here."

The judge further found plaintiff’s complaint "d[id] not allege that the County may be held liable for willful or malicious failure ₂₇₄to guard or warn against the dangerous condition and certainly d[id] not allege any facts that could support such a [conclusion]." The judge observed the photograph annexed to plaintiff’s amended complaint "appear[ed] to [depict] an area where the asphalt was worn away over time … and, arguably, in need of repair." However, the judge found "no basis to conclude that the County created [that] condition."

Regarding dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice, the judge stated:

Based on the allegations of [her] complaint, [ ] plaintiff has no basis to allege willful or malicious conduct that would create an exception to immunity under the [LLA].

….

[ ][P]laintiff may seek leave to file an amended complaint within [forty-five] days if there’s a good faith basis to do so. But under the circumstances and based on what I’ve seen so far, I’m not giving [ ] plaintiff leave to—to file an amended complaint. [ ] [P]laintiff … can move for leave to file an amended complaint. I want the County to be able to take a look at that and potentially oppose the motion if … appropriate.

On appeal, plaintiff contends the judge erred in finding the County entitled to immunity under the LLA. She asserts the Park is located in a densely populated residential area and therefore ineligible for immunity under Harrison v. Middlesex Water Co., 80 N.J. 391, 403 A.2d 910 (1979).³ Further, plaintiff contends the judge erred in dismissing her complaint because discovery was incomplete. Plaintiff argues the judge considered evidence beyond the pleadings and converted the County’s motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. We reject these arguments.

[2–4] We recite the well-settled case law governing our review of motions to dismiss. "Rule 4:6-2(e) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted are reviewed de novo." Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, 246 N.J. 157, 171, 249 ₂₇₅A3d 461 (2021) (citing Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 108, 203 A.3d 133 (2019)). In considering a motion under Rule 4:6-2(e), "[a] reviewing court must examine ‘the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint,’ giving the plaintiff the benefit of ‘every reasonable inference of fact.’ " Id. at 171, 249 A3d 461 (quoting Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 107, 203 A.3d 133). The test for determining the adequacy of a pleading is "whether a cause of action is ‘suggested’ by the facts." Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746, 563 A.2d 31 (1989) (quoting Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192, 536 A.2d 237 (1988)). However, if a trial court "considers evidence beyond the pleadings in a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion, that motion becomes a motion for summary judgment, and the court applies the standard of Rule 4:46." Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 107, 203 A.3d 133.

[5] We review a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo, "applying the same standard used by the trial court." Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78, 276 A.3d 108 (2022). We consider "whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540, 666 A.2d 146 (1995).

[6] Additionally, we apply de novo review of a trial court’s interpretation of a statute or court rule. Kocanowski v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 237 N.J. 3, 9, 203 A.3d 95 (2019); State v. Dickerson, 232 N.J. 2, 17, 177 A.3d 788 (2018).

We first address plaintiff’s claim that the judge erred in determining the County was entitled to immunity under the LLA

The LLA provides certain owners, lessees, and occupants of property owe no duty to persons injured while using such property₂₇₆ for recreational activities and are immune from suit. N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-3. Specifically, the LLA states:

Except as provided in [N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-4]:

a. An owner, lessee or occupant of premises, whether or not posted as provided in section 23:7-7 of the Revised Statutes, and whether or not improved or maintained in a natural condition, or used as part of a commercial enterprise, owes no duty to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for sport and recreational activities, or to give warning of any hazardous condition of the land or in connection with the use of any structure or by reason of any activity on such premises to persons entering for such purposes[.]

[N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-3(a).]

[7] It is well established that this immunity is available to public entities. Trim- blett v. State, 156 N.J. Super. 291, 295, 383 A.2d 1146 (App. Div. 1977). However, immunity is unavailable to persons or entities under the following circumstances:

a. For willful or malicious failure to guard, or to warn against, a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity; or

b. For injury suffered in any case where permission to engage in sport or recreational activity on the premises was granted for a consideration other than the consideration, if any, paid to said landowner by the State; or

c. For injury caused, by acts of persons to whom permission to engage in sport or recreational activity was granted, to other persons as to whom the person granting permission, or the owner, lessee or occupant of the premises, owes a duty to keep the premises safe or to warn of danger.

[N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-4.]

The LLA defines "[s]port and recreational activities" to include "hunting; fishing; trapping; horseback riding; training of dogs; hiking; camping; picnicking; swimming; skating; skiing; sledding; tobogganing; operating or riding snowmobiles, all-terrain vehicles or dirt bikes; and any other outdoor sport, game and recreational activity including practice and instruction in any of these activities." N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-2. The Legislature provided the LLA "shall be liberally construed to serve as an inducement to the owners, lessees and occupants of property, that might otherwise be reluctant to do so for fear of liability, to permit persons to come onto their property for sport and recreational activities." N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-5.1. However, the LLA does not define the term "premises."

₂₇₇Plaintiff argues the County is not entitled to...