Arias v. East Hartford

ARIAS et al, Plaintiffs, v. EAST HARTFORD et al, Defendants.

CIVIL No. 3:20-CV-00895 (JCH)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

July 30, 2021

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO 23)

Janet C. Hall United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Gandhy Arias (“Gandhy”) and Dillinger Arias (“Dillinger”) brought this action on June 29 2020, alleging six federal and state law claims stemming from an incident involving defendant police officers that occurred on or about November 6, 2017. See Compl. and Jury Demand (“Compl.”) (Doc. No. 1). The Defendants, Sergeant O. Caruso, Officer J. Kaplan, Officer T. Castagna, Officer Meucci, the Town of East Hartford, and Chief of Police Scott M. Sansom moved to dismiss all claims. See Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. No. 23); Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.' Mem.”) (Doc. No. 23-1); Defs.' Reply Br. to Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.' Reply”) (Doc. No. 38). Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. See Pls.' Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (“Pls.' Mem.”) (Doc. No. 25).

For the reasons discussed below, the Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.

II. BACKGROUND

On or about November 6, 2017, at approximately 1:45 AM, plaintiffs were leaving a nightclub in East Hartford when they noticed a physical altercation in progress between defendant police officers and a group of individuals. Compl. ¶ 6. Plaintiffs allege that they noticed “several of the police officers . . . being overly aggressive and abusive, and using excessive force in handling the situation.” Id. at ¶ 7. Because of this, Dillinger began recording the incident with his phone from approximately 20 to 25 feet away. Id.

Plaintiffs allege that, when one of the defendant officers noticed that Dillinger was recording the incident, the officer approached them and ordered them to move even further back. Id. at ¶ 10. Even though plaintiffs obeyed the order, the officer still pushed them with his hands. Id. Another defendant officer allegedly began pushing Dillinger as well. Id. at 11. Shortly thereafter, a third defendant officer approached plaintiffs and “violently slapped” the phone out of Dillinger's hand before throwing him “to the ground violently.” Id. at ¶ 12. The fourth defendant officer then grabbed Gandhy “and threw him violently to the ground” as well, putting his knee and body weight on his back before tightly handcuffing him and throwing him into a police cruiser. Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiffs do not specify which defendant officer did what, and at all points in the Complaint they make allegations against “one of the Defendant police officers, ” “another one of the Defendant police officers, ” or the “fourth Defendant police officer” rather than mentioning them by name. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 8, 11, 13.

Gandhy was then taken to the police station. Id. at ¶ 15. He alleges that, during the ride in the cruiser, he repeatedly asked the officer to loosen the handcuffs, as his wrists were in pain. Id. at ¶ 14. The officer allegedly “ignored his requests” and “told him to shut up” and, when the handcuffs were finally released inside the police station, they left “several marks and pain on his wrists for months.” Id. at ¶¶ 14-15. Both Gandhy and Dillinger, who was arrested as well, allege that they were then put into cold prison cells for over eight hours. Id. at ¶¶ 16, 18. Gandhy was also denied his right to make a phone call to an attorney. Id. at ¶ 16. In the morning, plaintiffs were informed that they were arrested for “interfering with police in violation of [Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-167a] and breach of peace in the second degree in violation of [Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-181].” Id. at ¶ 20. Both Gandhy and Dillinger say that at no point did they “obstruct, resist, hinder, endanger[ ] or prevent the Defendant officers from performing their duties, ” as they were simply filming the altercation. Id. at ¶ 21. As a result of this incident, plaintiffs say they “look at police officers differently; almost to the point that they are afraid of them because of their abuse of their power and authority.” Id. at ¶ 19.

Gandhy and Dillinger allege six federal and state law claims in their Complaint. They bring the First Count under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code, raising claims for violations of their Fourth and Sixth Amendment rights due to an unreasonable seizure and denial of the right to legal counsel. Id. at ¶ 23. The Second Count is also brought pursuant to section 1983, alleging a Monell claim for a “pattern and practice of failing to train and/or discipline [East Hartford Police Department] officers.” Id. at ¶ 29. The Third Count alleges a violation of the Equal Protection clause due to plaintiffs being “treated in a discriminatory and unconstitutional manner . . . based on race.” Id. at ¶ 31.

The final three claims are brought under state law. Count Four alleges discrimination based upon race in violation of Article First, Section 1 and Article First, Section 20 of the Connecticut Constitution. Id. at 33. Count Five alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress, and Count Six negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. at ¶¶ 35, 39.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court liberally construes the claims, accepts the factual allegations in a Complaint as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. See La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2020). However, the court does not credit legal conclusions or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.^[1]

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants have moved to dismiss all claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). As an initial matter, they argue that the two section 1983 claims in Count One against the four defendant police officers in their individual capacities should be dismissed because, by “fail[ing] to specify [the] unconstitutional act[s] each [individual] defendant is alleged to have committed, ” and instead only referring broadly to acts committed by “‘the defendant officers', ” plaintiffs have “not sufficiently allege[d] personal involvement of any of the defendant officers in any alleged Constitutional violation.”^[2] Defs.' Mem. at 23. They also argue that, with the exception of the Fourth Amendment claim, plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible claim for relief against any of the defendants. Id. at 7-21. Finally, the individual defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity as to each claim set forth in the first three counts. Id. at 23-25. The court addresses each of these arguments in the order presented here.

A. Sufficient Personal Involvement

“A plaintiff seeking relief under § 1983 must allege facts showing the defendants' personal involvement.” Gonzalez v. Yepes, No. 19-CV-267, 2019 WL 2603533, at *7 (D. Conn. June 25, 2019) (citing Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013)). Pleadings that (1) “fail[ ] to differentiate among the defendants, alleging instead violations by ‘the defendants';” (2) “fail[ ] to identify which defendants were alleged to be responsible for which alleged violations, ” or; (3) “provide no factual basis to distinguish [the defendants'] conduct” may not meet this standard and are subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 Fed.Appx. 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Gonzalez, 2019 WL 2603533, at *7 (“[a]s a corollary of the personal involvement requirement, complaints that . . . fail to differentiate as to which defendant was involved in the alleged unlawful conduct are insufficient to state a claim.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Such pleadings are dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because they fail to meet the requirement in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 that “a complaint give each defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the ground upon which it rests.” Atuahene, 10 Fed.Appx. at 34 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

When a Complaint fails to differentiate between defendants' conduct, courts generally apply the “group pleading” doctrine to determine if dismissal is warranted.^[3] In Atuahene, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of a pro se prisoner Complaint because the plaintiff “fail[ed] to identify which defendants were alleged to be responsible for which alleged violations.” Atuahene, 10 Fed.Appx. at 34. That complaint initially made allegations against “the defendants, ” and the plaintiff was given two opportunities to amend his Complaint. Id. After he merely replaced the references to “‘the defendants' with the names of all of the defendants, ” the District Court properly dismissed the Complaint. Id.

Similarly the Tenth Circuit has cited Atuahene to hold that, generally, a “Complaint's use of either the collective term ‘Defendants' or a list of the defendants named individually but with no distinction as to what acts are attributable to whom” warrants dismissal because “it is impossible for any of these individuals to ascertain what particular unconstitutional acts they are alleged to have committed.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008). The Robbins court ...