Arkansas Parole Board v. Johnson

2022 Ark. 209

654 S.W.3d 820

ARKANSAS PAROLE BOARD; John Felts, Brett Morgan, Andy Shock, Boyce Hamlet, Wendy Ryals, Jerry Riley, and Lona McCastlain, in Their Official Capacities as Members of the Arkansas Parole Board; Arkansas Department of Corrections, Division of Correction; and Dexter Payne, in His Official Capacity as Director, Appellants

v.Willis JOHNSON, Appellee

No. CV-22-430

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered: December 1, 2022

Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Joseph Karl Luebke, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellants.

Lassiter & Cassinelli, by: Michael Kiel Kaiser, for appellee.

KAREN R. BAKER, Associate Justice

Appellants Arkansas Parole Board; John Felts, Brett Morgan, Andy Shock, Boyce Hamlet, Wendy Ryals, Jerry Riley, and Lona McCastlain, in their official capacities as members of the Arkansas Parole Board; Arkansas Department of Corrections, Division of Correction; and Dexter Payne, in his official capacity as Director of the Division of Correction (the "Board"), appeal from the Pulaski County Circuit Court's order granting appellee Willis Johnson's motion for judgment on the pleadings, entering judgment in Johnson's favor for the relief requested in his petition, and denying the Board's motion for summary judgment. The Board presents one argument on appeal: The circuit court erred by entering judgment on the pleadings in favor of Johnson and finding that he is parole eligible. We reverse and remand.

I. Facts and Procedural History

On June 25, 1997, Johnson pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and aggravated assault, crimes he committed when he was fourteen years old. Johnson was sentenced to serve forty years’ imprisonment for first-degree murder and a six-year consecutive prison term for aggravated assault—a total of forty-six years’ imprisonment.

In 2017, the General Assembly passed the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act ("FSMA"). See Fair Sentencing of Minors Act of 2017, No. 539, 2017 Ark. Acts 2615. As will be discussed below, it is undisputed that the FSMA contains parole-eligibility provisions that apply retroactively to Johnson, but the parties disagree on how the FSMA impacts the calculation of Johnson's parole eligibility.

On November 3, 2021, Johnson filed a petition for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and mandamus relief seeking to remove any remaining uncertainty regarding the FSMA as applied to him. According to his petition, the Board was incorrectly calculating his parole-eligibility date and denying him a parole hearing. Relying on the FSMA, Johnson claimed that the Board erroneously listed his parole-eligibility date as October 8, 2025, but that he was parole eligible on October 8, 2021, after serving twenty-five years. Johnson sought a declaratory judgment that the FSMA applies to his sentences; that he is entitled to parole eligibility after twenty-five years’ imprisonment; and writ of mandamus ordering the Board to modify his parole eligibility. In the alternative, Johnson sought a declaratory judgment that the FSMA applies to his first-degree-murder sentence specifically, and given that he has already served twenty-five years, he must be made instantly parole eligible.

On December 8, 2021, the Board filed an answer to Johnson's petition requesting that the circuit court deny Johnson's petition. Also, relying on the FSMA, the Board denied that Johnson became parole eligible on October 8, 2021. The Board argued that his consecutive sentence for aggravated assault does impact his parole-eligibility date and that his sentences should be "stacked"—run one after another—for parole-eligibility purposes. Stated differently, the Board argued that the FSMA requires that he serve the additional parole-eligibility period applicable to his aggravated-assault conviction consecutively to his twenty-five-year parole-eligibility period for his first-degree-murder sentence. The Board argued that because Johnson was classified as a Class IV inmate, his is ineligible for meritorious good-time credit. Accordingly, the Board asserted that, based on the applicable parole-eligibility statutes, Johnson would be parole eligible on October 8, 2023, after serving twenty-five years for first-degree murder and two years for aggravated assault.

On December 30, 2021, Johnson filed his motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that there are no contested issues of material fact and that the only contested issues are purely legal in nature. On January 11, 2022, the Board filed its response to Johnson's motion for judgment on the pleadings and a cross-motion for summary judgment.

On May 23, 2022, after a hearing on the motions, the circuit court granted judgment in favor of Johnson and denied the Board's motion for summary judgment. The circuit court found that Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-621(a)(2)(A) applied retroactively to Johnson's sentences; "[s]ubsection (a)(2)(A) notes that the 25-year parole eligibility applies regardless of ‘any applicable sentencing enhancements’ "; and that the "25-year parole eligibility applies ‘regardless of the original sentences that were imposed.’ " Specifically, the circuit court found that the FSMA's twenty-five-year parole eligibility applies to Johnson's aggregate sentence for both the first-degree-murder and the aggravated-assault convictions rather than just the murder conviction. Further, the circuit court found that Johnson pleaded guilty to both offenses on June 25, 1997, with 259 days of jail-time credit. He began serving his sentences on October 9, 1996, and has therefore served more than twenty-five years of his forty-six-year aggregate sentence. Accordingly, the circuit court found that he is entitled to immediate parole eligibility based on the retroactive application of Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-621(a)(2). The circuit court then ordered the Board to modify Johnson's parole-eligibility date to October 9, 2021, and that Johnson may immediately request a parole hearing. On June 2, 2022, the Board timely appealed.

II. Law and Analysis

On appeal, the Board argues that the circuit court erred by entering judgment on the pleadings in favor of Johnson and finding that Johnson was parole eligible after serving twenty-five years’ imprisonment.

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is appropriate if the pleadings show on their face that there is no merit to the suit. Palade v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark. Sys. , 2022 Ark. 119, 645 S.W.3d 1. When reviewing a grant of judgment on the pleadings, we view the facts alleged in the complaint as true and in the light most favorable to the party seeking relief. Id. We will affirm the circuit court's decision in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Id. However, we review issues of statutory interpretation de novo, as it is for this court to determine the meaning of a statute. Dep't of Ark. State Police v. Keech Law Firm, P.A. , 2017 Ark. 143, 516 S.W.3d 265. The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Keep Our Dollars in Independence Cty. v. Mitchell , 2017 Ark. 154, 518 S.W.3d 64. We first construe the statute just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Id. In conducting this review, we will reconcile statutory provisions to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible in an effort to give effect to every part. Id. Furthermore, we will not read into a statute language that was not included by the legislature. Id.

Here, the statute at issue, Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-621 (Supp. 2021) provides in pertinent part:

(a)(1)(A) A minor who was convicted and sentenced to the former Department of Correction or the Division of Correction for an offense committed before he or she was eighteen (18) years of age and in which the death of another person did not occur is eligible for release on parole no later than after twenty (20) years of incarceration, including any applicable sentencing enhancements , and including an instance in which multiple sentences are to be served consecutively or concurrently , unless by law the minor is eligible for earlier parole eligibility.

(B) Subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section applies retroactively to a minor whose offense was committed before he or she was eighteen (18) years of age, including a minor serving a sentence of life, regardless of the original sentences that were imposed.

(2)(A) A minor who was convicted and sentenced to the department or the division for an offense committed before he or she was eighteen (18) years of age, in which the death of another person occurred , and that was committed before, on, or after March 20, 2017, is eligible for release on parole no later than after twenty-five (25) years of incarceration if he or she was convicted of murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102, or no later than after thirty (30) years of incarceration if he or she was convicted of capital murder, § 5-10-101, including any applicable sentencing enhancements , unless by law the minor is eligible for earlier parole eligibility.

(B) Subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section applies retroactively to a minor whose offense was committed before he or she was eighteen (18) years of age, including minors serving sentences of life, regardless of the original sentences that were imposed.

(Emphasis added.)

As set forth above, the circuit court found that subdivision (a)(2)(A), which contains a twenty-five-year limitation, applied to Johnson's aggregate sentence for both first-degree murder and aggravated assault. Johnson argued and the circuit court agreed that subdivision (a)(2)(A)’s reference to "sentencing enhancements" supported his position that the twenty-five-year limitation applied to his aggravated-assault sentence. Further, the circuit court found that the reference to the term "sentences" contained in subdivision (a)(2)(B) also supported its interpretation of the statute.

On appeal, the Board argues that the circuit court erred in interpretating subdivision (a)(2)(A) to encompass both...